

Rural
Development
in
PAKISTAN

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To
MUSARRAT

who stood by me throughout my trials and tribulations

FOREWORD

I met Shoaib Sultan Khan, the author of this book, in one of the conferences organized by the United Nations Centre for Regional Development, Nagoya, Japan, in 1978. The conference was convened to discuss rural regional planning methodology with accent on the basic needs of the poorest among the poor. The experience of Pakistan in rural development since 1948 was narrated by Shoaib with such sense of involvement that I could not help asking him to tell the whole story in much greater details. We were on the same wave length.

After talking with Shoaib, I felt that what had happened in Pakistan has also been the story of rural development in India and other parts of the Indian subcontinent. There is something which binds the countries of the subcontinent together, the different political processes operating notwithstanding. There is a common history from which spring many values, behavioural patterns, class structures of the society, and planning perspectives. There are many differences indeed emerging largely from fresh interpretations of the roles each should play in international affairs. But then there are limits to these interpretations. The basic unity transcends the superficial differences. I could easily see these limits as I discussed with Shoaib the emerging development policy trends in the subcontinent in general and Pakistan in particular.

Gandhi left a deep imprint on the minds of the peoples of the subcontinent. Akhtar Hameed Khan with whom Shoaib worked and whom he refers so often in this book is one of the few sincere workers of Gandhian tradition in Pakistan. The story of Shoaib's association with Akhtar Hameed Khan made me realize that there is a need for a far closer relation between the countries of the subcontinent—India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, etc. A closer link will help us to understand each other better.

This book is written lucidly and candidly. It traces the history of rural development in Pakistan from the early 1920s when F.L.

Brayne, ICS, did pioneering work of village reconstruction in Gurgaon district of the then Punjab to the present day. Mahatma Gandhi commenting on Brayne's work in 1929 said:

After Mr. Brayne's back was turned upon Gurgaon, the people who were working under his inspiration or pressure seem to have gone to sleep . . . the manure pits lying neglected, the new ploughs rusting and co-education dissolving. . . .

The reason for the failure is not far to seek. The reform came not from within but was super-imposed from without. Mr. Brayne made use of his official position to put as much pressure as he could upon his subordinates and upon the people themselves, but he could not carry conviction by force, and conviction so essential to success was lacking. Mr. Brayne thought that the results would convince the people. But that is not how reform works. The reformers path is strewn not with roses but with thorns, and he has to walk warily. He can but limp.

Since Brayne's work many rural development projects have been launched in Pakistan as well as in other countries of the subcontinent. The net contribution of each of these projects as apparent from various evolution reports and also from Shoaib's book is the same as Gandhi's evaluation of Brayne's work.

Shoaib's book gives the story of the success and failure of rural development processes and institutions in Pakistan. I have no intention to review this excellently written book. But a few significant observations made by Shoaib require restatement. It has been clearly brought out that unless Pakistan is in a position to develop its own model of development free from the influence of foreign agencies, it will not be able to make much headway on the rural front. It is also clear that unless the bureaucratic structure of the administration changes and people's organizations are given the responsibility of generating and implementing plans, there is no possibility of sustained growth and improvement. The third thing that becomes clear from the book is that there is a great need for a programme of socio-economic-structural reform which would shift the balance of power from the rural rich to the rural poor.

The above conclusions have emerged from a penetrating analysis of rural development in Pakistan by a man who has been deeply

involved in rural planning for over a decade. I am sure the message of this book would reach all those who are engaged in rural development efforts in both developed and developing countries and would generate a fresh approach to rural development planning—an approach which would be participatory rather than bureaucratic, which would rely more on people's institutions rather than on government machinery and which would be based more on the local experience rather than on the experience of the developed world.

I am indeed happy to be associated with the publication of this book.

Institute of Development Studies
Mysore

R.P. MISRA

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CHAPTER ONE

HISTORICAL DESCRIPTION

As a child I was always intrigued by a mysterious looking building called "The Labyrinths" in the city of Lucknow in northern India. The building was a source of amusement to the tourists because no one could dare enter it or come out of it without the help of professional guides. There was no explanation as to why this apparently useless structure was built. However, the guides who claimed to be the descendents of the original custodians of the building used to explain that the building was constructed during the great famine in the times of the Nawabs of Avodh in the eighteenth century and took many years to complete for the simple reason that construction was only carried out during the night and it used to be demolished at sun-rise. This strange practice was adopted to provide wages to well-to-do members of the society, who had their self-respect against acceptance of doles and prestige and status against doing of manual work, to save them from starvation. The rulers of the day devised this simple methodology and the result was the labyrinths which in the twentieth century appeared a meaningless structure and at best the result of the whims of a ruler of the bygone days. The sub-continent is full of such buildings and towers, all of which have a story to tell. I had not read Keynes at that time or heard about the New Deal. Apparently works like "Labyrinths" were the results of the earliest Public Works Programmes initiated in the sub-continent.

Whereas in countries such as the United States, Keynes and development-minded administrators were fighting the depression by introducing a new theory for reversal of recession; in India the British were content by following the theory of the Victorian era of depending on philanthropy and self-help. Whereas in the States efforts were afoot to provide easy credit to boost investment and big programmes were being launched to generate employment such as Tenesse Valley Authority (TVA), because unemployment was the core of economic depression in the sub-continent immediately

after the First World War when low production, low prices, low incomes, low wages, little savings and much unemployment plunged deeper into depth and destitution the rural populace the administrators had nothing more to offer than preach the gospel of progress through self-help. It took the shape of what came to be commonly known as the philosophy of Rural Reconstruction.

Rural Reconstruction

Like the Victorian philanthropists, F.L. Brayne popularized Rural Reconstruction under the guidance of the District Officer. The basis of this movement was to galvanize the rural population seemingly sitting idle to help themselves because the protagonists of this philosophy believed that the insolvency and backwardness of rural India was due to cussedness of the rural population. They traced it to the rural societies' ignorance, superstition and factionalism. Brayne and his followers moved from village to village exhorting people to help themselves. People were suffering from indebtedness, from lack of employment, from lack of basic amenities of life and whom the fall in agricultural prices after the rise during the First World War had pushed into a slump worse than anywhere else in the world. Money incomes had declined and debts had doubled in value and their paying capacity had decreased. The farmers were tottering on the verge of bankruptcy and destitution and unemployment prevailed. Like loyal and subservient subjects, people listened with rapt attention to the exhortations of Brayne and his band of dedicated missionaries. Once in a while someone did dare crack a joke like the story of an incident at the time of introduction of a new type of persian wheel. When the bull could not manage to keep itself straight and every time that it tried to pull the wheel it fell down, a wise man of the village came up and suggested that it might be worthwhile to recruit graduate bulls before introducing a sophisticated equipment like the one in question. Rural reconstruction failed to achieve lasting results; indeed it only generated hectic activities in a few places, in a few villages and that was the end of it. Akhter Hameed Khan succinctly sums up the programme, "it cost government next to nothing and it achieved little more than nothing."¹

However, the British administrators had to tackle the problem of famine time and again in the sub-continent and they did succeed in developing a famine code to get over from one crisis to

the other. The basic features of the famine code were: (1) loans for the land-owners; (2) "test work" for the labourers; and (3) doles for the disabled.

I had never heard of the word "test relief" till I was assigned a Sub-Division in one of the Districts of East Bengal. For over two years I administered the programme without fully realizing the objectives of the scheme; most of the funds were used for the purposes of buildings or for earth work which was washed away with the first monsoon rains. By historical accident test relief was only in vogue in the famine prone areas, for example, it was never heard of in Punjab or the areas which now comprise Pakistan.

There were attempts by private sector agencies also to undertake rural uplift but their attempts were confined to very limited areas and failed to make any impact on rural poverty.

Post-Independence Period

Although not much was achieved through Rural Reconstruction but the legacy of these theories dominated subsequent planning even after Independence. The concept of guide, philosopher and friend either in the shape of the Deputy Commissioner or the Village-Aid worker, etc., continues to haunt the planning scene. Self-sacrifice and missionary zeal on the part of government functionaries as well as the people continues to be an important pillar of the Rural Development Programmes. The miracles from self-help are still eulogized and the concept of model villages is still very much the "in" thing. Whereas planning in other spheres has comparatively been dispassionate and down to earth but not so in the field of rural sphere. The planners and administrators alike seem to turn their backs on economics and related disciplines and adopt a "philanthropic and ethical posture."²

Under the circumstances, well after neighbouring India had started Community Development Programme and introduced the concept of compact blocks for administrative viability and integrated activities of the development departments with local councils, although the dependence on "Sarm Dan" and self-help continued to be pre-dominant, Pakistan thought of introducing Village Aid (Agricultural and Industrial Development) around 1953. It is interesting to note that governments of the day till the seventies were cajoled into launching a rural development programme only at the behest of foreign-aid giving agencies otherwise governments

were quite content with their activities in the field of industrialization or urban development side by side paying lip service to the development of rural areas.

The Village Aid

The Village Aid was the brainchild of the Americans and it was much better than the old Rural Reconstruction. Its administrative scheme was sound because it took the Thana as the Village Aid area of operation. It envisaged posting of a multi-purpose Village Aid worker who was supposed to act as a guide, philosopher and friend to the villagers and his functions included education, organization, motivation, formation of all purpose village councils, modernization of agriculture, improvement in health facilities, building of roads, giving of credit, arranging marketing and generating self-help. As a young field officer 20 years ago I found the Village-Aid programme introduced in my Sub-Division in two of the Thanas out of six, without any orientation and training towards the programme having been given to the representatives of the other nation building departments whom the Village Aid workers were supposed to represent at the village level. To make matters worse the technical experts of the departments questioned the bonafides and the expertise of the Village Aid worker and his capability to represent them. They were further chagrined to find that the Village Aid Development Officer was given a jeep and also a money-bag, to show himself off. The result was rivalry and generation of an inter-departmental jealousy, the extent of which was realized only when instead of working with the programme the departments started working against the programme. The development officer, a newly recruited person unaware of the prejudices of the departmental representatives, in his ignorance further aggravated the situation by trying to be smart and patronizing. In the village itself the councils never got off the ground. In East Bengal where there were elected local councils, the Development Officers of the Village Aid were won over by mostly the defeated candidates in the local elections and whereas elected members were left high and dry the village council comprising the defeated candidates started doling out patronage and extending their influence in readiness for the next elections.

Being the chief executive of the Sub-Division my relationship with the Development Officer depended not on any authority that

I wielded over him, although technically the SDO was the Chairman of the Sub-Divisional Development Committee, but on the basis of personal help which I rendered to the Development Officer in getting his little daughter admitted and looked after in a Dacca Hospital after a road accident. I wonder how many SDOs or Development Officers were in such an enviable position.

Village Aid was abolished after seven years without even a formal evaluation. The programme had defects and limitations. No one could have denied that but these could have been removed and the programme could have been improved.

The rural works component in the Village Aid programme was dependent on self-help. All projects had to show a 50 per cent contribution from the local community. In majority of the cases this was achieved through manipulation of accounts. Voluntary labour was haphazard and because of the class conflict in villages such projects became an indirect source of help to large land-owners. If a road was to be constructed and voluntary labour required it were the poor of the village who were rounded up for the free labour or *Begar* as it was locally known. Because of free labour gainful employment was minimum through these projects, hence despite Keynes and the New Deal and the Chinese example public works for the sake of rural employment was not thought of in Pakistan till 1960.

CHAPTER TWO

DAUDZAI PROJECT—A CASE STUDY³

Pakistan is predominantly a rural country with nearly three-fourths of its population (approximately 75 million) living in about 45,000 villages. The realization that the earlier development programmes had not benefited the most needy in the rural areas made the Government of Pakistan adopt the integrated rural development approach, as a result of the recommendation of a Federal Committee set up to look into the problems of rural areas and suggest a strategy to assault rural poverty. The Committee which formulated the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) in February 1972 made an urgent recommendation: "It is of utmost importance to test the programme through pilot projects before replication." The Pakistan Academy for Rural Development at Peshawar, a national research and training institute, was also charged with this pioneering research. The Academy tackled the issue from two angles, one of developing a viable model suitable for replication in the whole country, with necessary modifications keeping difference in regional conditions, and the other of documenting, evaluating and revamping the strategy as a guide to research scholars and planners alike.

Search for a Viable Unit of Development Administration

Having embarked on developing a pilot project for Integrated Rural Development, the Academy researchers set out to determine the physical boundaries of the project area. In this connection they kept in view the following principles of development administration:

- (a) Provision of services both in the public and the private sector, fully coordinated and supported with adequate supplies.
- (b) Upgrading the skills (human skills) of the rural population to enable it to make the best use of the services being provided.
- (c) Integration of the public agencies such as development

departments with elected local councils.

Existing Pattern of Administration

When the Academy researchers looked at the existing pattern of administration, which was a legacy from the British days and had emerged in its present shape over a period of about a hundred years, they found that it was a law-and-order oriented administration with emphasis on revenue collection. It was certainly not development-oriented. It was also not fair to blame the colonials for having devised an administrative set-up which suited their needs very well and which was an efficient administration from the law-and-order and revenue collection points of view. However, after independence, the same administrative pattern was geared to development needs. No wonder it did not produce the desired results. Another phenomenon which came to the notice of the Academy researchers was the fact that since independence there has been tremendous expansion at the higher levels of administration such as those of the Central and Provincial Governments. Over the years a highly sophisticated planning apparatus has been developed in the country but this expansion has hardly affected the administration at district level and almost nothing has been done below district level. The British wanted to establish the imperial peace (Pax Britannica) and they did so by taking the law-and-order administration right down to grass-roots, i.e. the police station level. The British wanted to collect revenue and they expanded the revenue department right down to the village level. They were not interested in local development or were only marginally so; therefore, none of the development departments were expanded in the same way as the police and revenue departments were organized.

The first concern of the Academy researchers was to determine a viable unit for the purposes of provision of services. In the existing pattern of administration the services did not filter down below subdivision (Tehsil) level, and the subdivision was an unmanageable unit for either provision of services or for integration of development departments with local councils (as was apparent in Basic Democracies days) and, of course, it was hopelessly unwieldy for upgrading of skills. Peshawar subdivision is nearly 500 square miles in area and has a population of about 500,000. The other subdivisions of the country will be the same in area and

population, a little more in area and less in population or vice versa. The fact is that subdivision cannot be a viable unit of development administration and this is the reason why many plans failed, not because they were not good plans (in fact they were very good plans) but because there was no organization at grass-roots to carry them out.

Having concluded that administration has to be brought down and sub-division was too remote a level for meaningful Integrated Rural Development, the Academy researchers discovered that existing jurisdiction of the police station could very well be converted into a viable unit for development administration. Herein they found an area which was not only compact and manageable but, over the years, 99 cases out of 100 would have infrastructure facilities, if any existed in the rural areas, centred at the police station headquarters. If there was a school or a health dispensary or a veterinary dispensary or if there were any roads these were usually at the police station (Thana). When the Academy researchers collected data relating to Daudzai police station they found that they got an area of 79.5 square miles with 89 villages having a population of 96,196 (1972 census). There are six police stations in the Peshawar subdivision. In the North-West Frontier Province there are approximately 105 police stations which give an average of about 140 square miles in area and a population of 50,000 for the six settled districts. Except in the case of Baluchistan where the area might be too large and the population too small, the conclusion that a police station jurisdiction is a viable unit of development administration would be applicable to all the Provinces in the country. Thus the jurisdiction of a police station, which again had the advantage of being an old established unit of administration (though being used purely for the purpose of law-and-order) proved very viable for the provision of services and even more viable for the upgrading of the skills of the rural population because no village would be more than a day's return journey from the headquarters of this unit. Another advantage in selecting an already existing unit of administration was to lessen the chances of political bickerings and bureaucratic highhandedness. The task which the Academy had undertaken was to convert the police station which, over a hundred years, had stood as a symbol of law-and-order, into a symbol of development. This symbol of development, which we

called the Markaz, was to be the base of operation for the Integrated Rural Development. (A Markaz is the administrative centre of an IRD project area.)

Markaz—A Symbol of Development

In late April 1972 when the Academy selected the jurisdiction of Daudzai police station for its Integrated Rural Development Programme project area (Markaz) it found that, except for the Agriculture department and the Police and Revenue, no other department had expanded to the grassroots since independence. In the case of the Agriculture department the way in which it was organized made its impact minimal. The agriculture assistant, posted at police station headquarters in the case of Daudzai, had more than 34,000 acres of cropped area and nearly 19,000 landowners to deal with. In the first place, therefore, the Academy set out to persuade the departments to expand to the Markaz level. The departments of Health, Education, Animal Husbandry, Co-operatives, Forestry and Irrigation agreed to do so. The Revenue department was persuaded to decentralize its records and to establish a revenue record room at the Markaz level under a Naib-Tehsildar. This meant dispersal of the Naib-Tehsildars who previously used to be located at tehsil (sub-division) headquarters. In the case of the Agriculture department, on the insistence of the department itself, the number of assistants was increased eight-fold. Instead of one, eight agricultural assistants were inducted in Daudzai police station.

A project manager was appointed to integrate and co-ordinate the activities of the development departments which had expanded to the Markaz level. Again, the project manager belonged to the Local Government department and this was done intentionally to avoid establishing a new department of Integrated Rural Development as such, because Integrated Rural Development, in the eyes of the Academy researchers, meant expansion of the existing departments to the Markaz level; organizing the rural people for the purposes of upgrading their skills to enable them to make the best use of the services provided at the Markaz, and not the creation of a "super department."

Inadequacy of the Departments

After nearly 8-10 months of survey research by the Daudzai func-

tionaries a considerable number of problems came to the surface. The rural population was in need of a hundred and one things and the Markaz functionaries could do nothing. Their lands were deteriorating, becoming waterlogged and affected by salinity; the irrigation system was falling apart; villages were threatened by river action; lands were being eroded. There was lack of communications affecting marketing as well as causing indescribable hardships in getting consumer goods, medical attendance and education. With the best of intentions and despite the goodwill from the departments, the Markaz functionaries were getting nowhere. Farmers were in need of fertilizers. They were in need of pesticides. They were in need of extension education. However, even eight agricultural assistants were incapable of doing much in this regard. The absence of skills in the rural population made the inadequacy of the department even more pronounced. The departments were so organized that they could not do much for the rural population. In this situation the Markaz functionaries were be-

TABLE 1. POPULATION AND LAND

1. Area of Daudzai Thana	79.5 Sq. miles	
2. Hadbast Villages	89	
3. Population (1972 Census)	96,196	
4. Households	15,042	
5. Total acreage	51,690	
6. Uncultivable land	11,295	
7. Cultivated area	34,408	
8. Banjar Qadeem and Jadeed (waste land)	5,973	
9. Total cultivable land	39,417*	
10. Irrigated land	28,985	
11. Unirrigated	5,423	
12. Per capita land	0.35 acres	
13. Per household cultivated land	2.3 "	
14. Per owner cultivated land	1.81	
15. Per owner cultivated and waste land	2.07	***

*NOTE: Land of two villages not included on account of its being under consolidation.

**See Table 2.

coming more and more frustrated every day and the Academy researchers had to take a deep look at the situation obtaining in the Markaz and come up with proposals to rectify it. They found

that while the conventional methods were followed there was no visible economic impact. There were good reasons for this as can be seen from the Table 1 and Table 2:⁴

TABLE 2. LAND OWNERSHIP IN DAUDZAI THANA

Size of holdings	Owners		Area		Average holding (Acres)
	No	%	Acres	%	
Up to 5 acres	17,553	92.38	18,916	47.99	1.08
From 5 to 10 acres	891	4.69	6,480	16.44	7.27
From 10 to 20 acres	327	1.72	4,502	11.42	13.77
From 20 to 30 acres	90	0.47	2,309	5.86	25.66
From 30 to 40 acres	58	0.31	2,013	5.11	34.71
From 40 to 50 acres	37	0.19	1,646	4.17	44.49
Above 50 acres	44	0.23	3,551	9.01	80.70
Total	19,000	99.99	39,417	100.00	2.07

Establishment of Development Units

On the basis of the survey research carried out by the Markaz functionaries, it was discovered that priority number one in the Daudzai area, according to the rural people, seemed to be land development, water management and communications. The reliance of the Markaz on the provincial Public Works Department (Irrigation Branch) did not produce the desired results, not because the department was not willing to help, but for the simple reason that it was not so organized as to be able to help the Markaz in preparing the blueprints for development of the Daudzai area. In a little less than a year, the department produced only two blueprints for the Markaz, whereas the Markaz functionaries and the rural people wanted many more and thought that many more were needed.

After the frustrations of the first year it was evident that the problems of the Daudzai villages could not be solved by wishful ad-hoc measures. In their contact with the villagers the agricultural assistants came across problems which were not of provision of inputs but mostly of land development and of flood protection works. It was also obvious that without organizing people it would not be possible to identify their problems. Two work units were

therefore inducted at the Centre: one to organize the villages and the other to provide technical support in translating people's demands into blueprints. We learnt two very important lessons from this exercise. First, that the rural people are in the best position to identify their needs because they have been living in the villages for generations and no one else is more sensitive or alive to their needs, not only that, it was also found that they were capable of suggesting solutions to their problems which at best needed to be given a technical shape after it had been looked into and examined by a technician such as the engineer. I was horrified to discover that the development plan prepared, without consulting the people, by the Markaz functionaries under my guidance and duly approved by the Secretaries Council in the initial stages of the project, had nothing in common with the development plan which emerged through the efforts of the development units in consultation with the people.

Another lesson learnt was that at micro-level the needs of one village very often differ from that of the other and unless and until an intensive diagnostic survey by development units is undertaken, a meaningful development plan of an area could not be prepared. The preparation of the development plan for Daudzai area also reflected the intensity of development required for the rural areas.

After the engineers completed their survey the following picture emerged:⁵

LAND DAMAGE IN DAUDZAI THANA DUE TO
INADEQUATE INFRASTRUCTURE

<i>Cause of damage</i>	<i>Land damaged acres</i>	<i>Percentage of cultivated waste land</i>
1. Flood, Scouring and Erosion	7,382	18.73*
2. Water-logging and Salinity	5,046	12.80
3. Drought	5,423	13.76
4. Inadequate Irrigation	11,518	29.22**
Total	29,369	74.51

*NOTE: Already washed away land is 3,292 acres viz 8.53 per cent.

**NOTE: It is 39.54 per cent of the total irrigated area i.e. 11,462/28,985.

It was found that nearly 75 per cent or three-fourths of the land area required protective or development investment before the farmers could really increase their inputs and their productivity—18.72 per cent of the land was threatened by flood and erosion and 12.8 per cent by waterlogging and salinity. Although the revenue records showed a total 28,985 irrigated acres but the village to village survey showed that many irrigation channels were silted up and many a drainage work were needed and too often the supply of water failed at a crucial time. For more than 11,000 acres of nearly 29,000 acres of the recorded irrigated area new works or repair of old works was urgently needed.

The following table⁶ indicates the poor utilization of land:

LAND UTILIZATION IN DAUDZAI THANA

- Total Cultivated land—34,408 acres
- Total Irrigated land - 28,985 acres
- Land Utilization during Rabi 1971-72 (October 71 to April 72)

<i>Crop</i>	<i>Acreage</i>	<i>% of Total Cultivated Land (1)</i>
Wheat	11,590	33.71
Fodder	2,630	7.64
Vegetables (2)	1,050	3.05
Barley	444	1.29
Beet	318	.92
Tobacco	41	.12
Total	16,082	46.74

- Land Utilization during Kharif (April 1972 to October 1972)

<i>Crop</i>	<i>Acreage</i>	<i>% of Total Cultivated Land (1)</i>
Sugar-cane	14,515	42.18
Maize	8,441	24.53
Fodder (2)	1,056	3.07
Vegetable	1,004	2.92
Rice	393	1.14
Cotton	30	.09
Others	67	.19
Total	25,506	74.13

(1) The figures for 2/3 villages are not available.

(2) Vegetable acreage includes melons and water-melons.

- Orchards — 1,164.5 areas 3.38 per cent
- Cropping intensity (3+4) 120.87 per cent

Thus only 46.74 per cent of the land was cultivated for the Rabi (winter) crop while 74.13 per cent was utilized for the Kharif (summer) crop; although the Daudzai area had abundant water resources yet cropping intensity was no more than 120 per cent where the potential was easily over 200 per cent.

The blueprints prepared by engineers are summarized in the table on the facing page.⁷

There were 115 schemes of flood control, irrigation and drainage costing approximately 2.7 million rupees developing 16,675 acres at an approximate cost of Rs 162 per acre. With some multiple accounting these works were to benefit 105 villages (including hamlets) and 91,369 persons. The local roads, culverts and ferry boats costing an approximately 3 million rupees were to benefit 97 villages for transporting whatever they sell or buy. Without these works it was idle to hope for increased production. Thus the works programme was the very foundation of economic development in Daudzai.

For years we have talked and thought of rural development by self-help. In Daudzai it was apparent that to leave the development to the rural population on the basis of self-help would be no more than a pious hope and in fact it would add to the frustration and disappointment already nourished by the rural people towards the government.

Methodology of Development Units

It is interesting to note that in many cases the development units at Daudzai were confronted with villagers' problems, the solutions to which were given the highest priority. Without first getting their particular problems solved, the villagers were not prepared to accept or even to listen to any other type of assistance or extension advice. In one case, for instance, when the Markaz functionaries offered inputs for better agricultural production such as fertilizers, seeds, etc., the people demanded that land development works and land protection works be undertaken before they would be willing to accept the inputs. In another village, the seemingly ignorant rural people demanded that first the sand-dunes, which had blocked their irrigation channel for many years, should be dealt with, before they could be motivated for any other projects. The Daudzai Development Units had many such encounters; they learnt the hard way what people demanded and that what they

FLOOD CONTROL, IRRIGATION, DRAINAGE AND
LINK ROADS REQUIREMENT IN DAUDZAI THANA

No. Category	No. of Schemes	Estimated Cost (Rs)	Acres Benefited (Rs)	Peracre Cost	Villages Benefited	Population Benefited
1. Erosion and Flood Control (165 spurs)	30	1,592,780	4,090	389	30	23,352
2. Irrigation	62	803,471	11,518	70	52	41,054
3. Drainage for Water-logging	23	302,974	1,067	284	23	26,963
Total	115	2,699,225	16,675	162	105	91,369
4. Link Roads	55	2,837,400	—	—	97	—
5. Ferry Boats	8	46,000	—	—	—	—
6. Culverts	26	170,120	—	—	—	—
Total	89	3,053,520	—	—	97	—

demand was the right thing. For months, the engineers and the co-operative organizers had to lead the lives of gypsies, moving from one village to another.

Organizing People

It was obvious that the type of development plan thrown up by the people could not be implemented unless each village was thoroughly organized to do it. The development units found that it was possible to organize people around solution of problems which the people thought to be their priority number one. Thus problem-centred organizations were the first ones to emerge in Daudzai area. The development units persuaded the villagers to form disciplined groups to protect and improve their lands. The small farmers of every village were asked to group themselves, to hold regular weekly meetings, to select a manager and to learn to work cooperatively. Moreover, they were asked to make weekly deposits in order to prove their bonafides and to show that they were capable of raising funds to defray maintenance costs of the project to be completed. They were persuaded to appoint project committees for enrolling and supervising the labourers as no contractors were to be engaged. The technical unit undertook to train and oversee the execution of the project. It was clearly understood that there was to be a partnership between the government and the villagers and only the first investment in the shape of PWP funds was to be expected from the government. The villagers did respond to the call for discipline and thrift. This is demonstrated from the following figures as of December 1976:⁸

Number of villages organized	80
Total membership	2,715
Savings	Rs 150,426/46

These organizations were initially used for the execution of the land development work and subsequently for extension education and for maintenance of work carried out in the villages. They will ultimately be useful for developing representative leadership. Right from the beginning, taking Raiffesen's principles of co-operation, the Markaz insisted on these organizations meeting weekly and depositing savings regularly. Each organization met as a general body every week and thus the defect from which the traditional

co-operatives in the country suffered, i.e. the dominance of the executive committee, was done away with. These organizations varied in membership from as few as 20 members to as many as 150. They, however, represented interest groups in the villages, and primarily comprised the 'small' men. Although there was no bar against the "bigger" man becoming a member of the organization, he found the rigours of the organization, i.e. weekly meetings and weekly deposits, a little too much and apparently of no use to him. Once people were organized, the Daudzai Markaz functionaries became more effective.

Working of the Village Organizations

(a) Works Programme

The People's Works Programme was very useful for carrying out land development works through the project committees nominated by all the concerned village organizations. The technical supervision was provided by the Markaz engineer and his staff, but the paymastership was left to the village organization itself through the project committee. The elimination of the contractor from the scene not only resulted in upgrading the skills of the local rural labour, because the project committees engaged local labour, but also resulted in quality work at much less cost because the village organizations, through their weekly meetings, proved effective watchdogs on the project committees. The village organization thus had a sense of involvement in the completion of the work, which, on completion, came to be looked upon as the property and asset of the whole village organization. The villagers, in this process, learned how to maintain muster-rolls, how to keep accounts and how to maintain the works when they were completed.

Invariably, the works were completed at less than the cost estimated by the engineer. In the beginning the organization used to demand that the money thus saved should only be spent within their village. However, very soon they learned the philosophy of the programme and were convinced that there were many other benefits which were accruing to them because of their having organized themselves. They also learned the hard way that the organizations which did not fulfil the role of being partners in development failed to move forward.

Development—A Partnership

Through village organizations, it was put forward to the villagers that development is a partnership between government and the people. Government would only help the villagers if they were prepared to fulfil certain obligations, i.e. to organize themselves, to hold weekly meetings of their organizations, to save regularly to create equity capital and to undertake maintenance of works completed through their project committees. In some cases, when the Markaz engineering staff detected corrupt practices being resorted to by the project committee or one of its members, the matter was referred to the general weekly meeting of the organization. This had a salutary effect on the recalcitrant committee member. The organizations were also asked to send their managers and model farmers regularly (fortnightly) to the Markaz headquarters for upgrading their skills through exposure to the technicians located at the Markaz headquarters.

(c) Equity Capital

Immediately after the establishment of the Daudzai Markaz a number of banks opened their branches at Nahaqi (headquarters of the Daudzai Markaz), including the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan. The Markaz functionaries did their best to help the Agricultural Development Bank in reaching the small farmers. Their Spot-Loaning Programme, in particular, was given a boost. The commercial banks were afforded all facilities. However, very soon it was obvious that, like the government departments, the banks were also so organized that they could do little for the small farmer. Having been thwarted in their efforts to get credit from the banks, including the Agricultural Development Bank and the Co-operative Bank, the Markaz functionaries advanced a loan of over Rs 88,000 in November 1973 to village organizations from the circulating fund. The credit was given not to individuals but to organizations on the basis of credit needs worked out by the respective organizations for their members. These were to help people where the banks had shown their inability to advance anything. These loans were advanced in the shape of fertilizers and seeds.

Meanwhile, the equity capital of the organizations through weekly savings kept on steadily increasing. Since the village organizations, when registered, would be federated at the Markaz into a

Federation, the latter would be the central bank for the purposes of credit needs of the primary organizations. With the completion of land development works, the people's demand for inputs also increased day by day. In fact, they reached a stage where village organizations could be federated at the Markaz level. As the Indian experience shows, concentration on only one of these aspects (in the case of India, on the Panchayati Raj System) does not help in improving the quality of life of the rural areas.

(d) Agriculture Extension

Once village organizations come into existence and people become organized, agriculture extension gets going. In Daudzai, the village organizations were asked to select their model farmers for training and upgrading of skills at the Markaz headquarters. A model farmer from each organization comes to the Markaz headquarters once a fortnight and is taught and demonstrated improved methods of cultivation, etc., by the agricultural experts of the department. In this manner, the agricultural assistant who previously felt completely at bay has now focused on those model farmers who are cultivators themselves and are permanent residents of the villages. Whatever they learn at the Markaz from the agricultural experts they not only apply in their fields but report to the weekly meetings of their organizations. Thus, in course of time, they will be the extension agents who would then teach improved methods of cultivation to other members of their village organizations.

(e) Health Programme

At the time of the inauguration of Daudzai Markaz it was found that there was only one health dispensary with two visiting dispensaries under a compounder (para-pharmacist) for the Daudzai area, which has a population of over 96,000. With the organization of people, the medical technician at the Markaz prepared first-aid boxes, each containing medicines worth Rs 250 and suitable for treatment of 15 to 20 simple diseases. The village organizations were requested to nominate village Pesh-Imam (local priests) for first-aid training by the medical technician. After some training, which is to continue regularly on a fortnightly basis, the medical technician handed over the box to the Imams, with a price-list as to how much they were to charge for each medicine so that their stocks could be replenished at suitable intervals with this money.

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The experiment is in a way, an adoption of the Chinese "Bare-Foot Doctors" programme. The Imam was chosen because the villagers also have faith in his healing power through prayers. With sufficient training and experience, the Imam will steadily be able to treat more diseases and also provide the referral service for patients suffering from serious diseases.

(f) Other Programmes

Programmes for women, youth and in the field of education would be organized as soon as people get organized and village organizations come into existence, a forum for technicians and experts becomes available.

(g) Creation of Rural Cadres

The Markaz was fully geared to upgrading the skills of the rural population, as it was steadily creating rural cadres of co-operative managers, of model farmers, of Imam compounders, etc. The cadre of co-operative managers had persons among its ranks acting as co-operative organizers themselves. We enlisted the services of managers to make their village organizations act as a nucleus of unorganized villages. The experiment proved very successful in selected villages within a distance of one to one and a half miles from their home village. The number of manager-organizers is likely to increase and it is expected that this proliferation will also take place in other rural cadres.

Role of Departments

The history of rural development administration in Pakistan is replete with instances where many a good programme was sacrificed at the altar of departmental jealousies. In Daudzai when the departments expanded to the Markaz it was decided by the Secretaries' Committee of the Provincial Government of the Frontier that the project manager, who would be an employee of the local government department, should be the co-ordinator of all the departments at the Markaz level. The Committee, on the recommendations of the Academy, had decided that:

(i) the jurisdiction of the line departments would cease at Markaz level and departments would deal with their functionaries only through the project manager;

(ii) the project manager would be drawing and disbursing finance officer for all the Markaz functionaries;

(iii) the project manager would initiate the annual confidential reports on all the Markaz functionaries; and

(iv) the project manager would be the leave sanctioning authority for casual leave and the recommending authority for the earned leave for all Markaz functionaries, etc.

To our great discomfiture, we found that the powers meant nothing to the departments and the decision of the Secretaries' Committee was no more than a piece of paper. The departments, who have been well entrenched for the last 100 years or so, felt their position threatened. Therefore, they were out to destroy this monster of Intergrated Rural Development which they felt would otherwise destroy them. We learned the hard way that we wanted only two things from the departments: (i) to expand to the Markaz level; and (ii) to upgrade the skills of rural population and help in creating rural cadres.

For these two things the Academy researchers decided that no powers were required for the project manager. The departments (and we discussed with them individually) were very happy, in fact very keen, to expand to the Markaz level. For their role as teacher in creating-rural cadres they were not very clear but they had no serious objection to performing this role. It was therefore decided that each department will expand to the Markaz level on the pattern of the Daudzai project and the departmental representatives would be directly under the control of their respective departments from where they would continue to receive salary, etc. However, the departments agreed to make the contingent expenditure such as travelling allowance, etc., available to their Markaz functionaries, either by placing the funds at their disposal or earmaking the funds separately for their use. Co-ordination, if any, will be carried out by the project manager, not in his capacity of project manager but ultimately in his capacity as secretary of the Markaz council, as and when it is inducted.

To ensure that the departmental experts are available to the project manager for carrying out the training programme of the rural cadres, a training allowance has been fixed for each class taken by departmental experts. The training funds are controlled by the project manager. Through this simple device the co-opera-

tion of the departmental functionaries has been obtained by the project manager.

Short-Term Changes

When first approached the villagers in North-West Frontier Province had exhibited pessimism and despondency towards the idea of getting organized; they had countered that the people of the area were individualistic and the village so faction-ridden and unwilling to cooperate with each other. These statements were borne out by the fact of little cohesiveness in the villages specially amongst the majority of the poorer people. However, within a year they exhibited a great potential for organization. The danger that the organization would be dominated by the influential and bigger landlords in the village did not prove true for the simple reason that although there was no bar against the bigger man becoming a member of the organization, he found the rigours of the organization i.e. weekly meetings and weekly deposits, a little too much and apparently without use to him. Some of these gentlemen offered to pay in lump sum instead of paying a small amount every week. However, it was insisted that the idea was to inculcate discipline and not only to get savings. In one case the bigger man of the village was able to dominate the organization and hoodwink the project staff. He held regular weekly meetings and got regular savings deposited by members of his pocket organization with a view to getting a works project sanctioned and executed. Immediately after completion of the project the organization became dormant and it transpired that the members of the organization were all paid employees and tenants of the bigger man and that the project benefited only the lands of the bigger man. In fact, almost 10 per cent of the organizations turned out to be inactive, i.e. they stopped holding weekly meetings or making deposits or attending training classes for several months. However, none of the groups wanted to withdraw completely. They allowed their savings and shares to remain with the project. It is obvious that they wanted to retain a relationship however tenuous with the centre. At any time one or more of these groups may again become active as it did happen in several cases.

The Markaz or Centre was innovative in the administrative field because for the first time since independence the existing pattern of administration, which was a legacy from the British days

and geared to maintenance of law and order and collection of revenue, was being given a developmental orientation. A viable unit of development administration at the lowest level was set up in the shape of the Markaz. Whereas the physical jurisdiction of the unit was the same as that of the law and order unit its functions and objectives were totally transformed. The Markaz complex was being developed as the symbol of development to take over the place of the police station building which for 100 years had been the symbol of law and order.

Once organizations emerged in the villages it became possible to experiment with projects of intermediate technology such as hydro-electric generators, "gober" gas plant, etc. Incentives were also provided for development of village handicrafts.

The biggest change was discerned in the attitude of the people. The same people who were conditioned to the paternalistic attitude of the government now started looking up to it as partners. The tendency to make "Matalboona" (demands) gave way to an understanding that obligations existed on both sides and development was only possible as a joint effort.

Conclusions

The lessons learnt from the Daudzai experiment in Pakistan can be summarized as below:

(i) One has to be wary of the old theory of developing rural areas through a paternal government and its officers. The dedicated guides and philosophers seldom succeeded in raising even a ripple in the ocean of rural poverty.

(ii) The concept of self-help has been totally misconstrued and used to the great disadvantage of the rural population. Self-help does not mean provision of free labour, free land and donations; what it does mean is acceptance by the people of the idea of self-discipline, of forging partnership with the government and of taking up responsibility for maintenance of projects completed. The programmes which insist on free local labour or payment of labour in dubious terms such as kind, tend to discriminate against the poor and have little chance of success.

(iii) The economic orientation of the works programmes produces maximum benefits. The social and welfare provision must therefore be left to the line departments.

(iv) The planning of local level projects can only be done in con-

sultation with the local people. Plans prepared without consulting the people are likely to be unrealistic and unhelpful in alleviating rural poverty. Micro variations of local demands are such that any attempt at formulation of a local plan without a diagnostic survey is likely to prove futile. The pay-off of small scale local projects identified and executed by village organizations is much higher than large-scale projects, centrally planned and executed through contractors.

(v) So far as the small farmers are concerned, while many factors are involved, there are three fundamentals for development:

(a) It is not possible to improve land or to undertake other local development works projects except through the joint action of disciplined groups;

(b) It is not possible to develop an effective extension system for small farmers except through the same disciplined group; and

(c) It is not possible to develop an effective credit system for small farmers unless they are organized in disciplined groups.

(vi) Whereas the role of traditional local councils is acknowledged in the field of inter-village planning, raising of taxation and coordination with development departments, economic development of each village can only be achieved through formation of disciplined groups in the villages with linkage at the Markaz with their federation as well as with the council. Indeed Daudzai experience shows that absence of local councils not only did not hamper implementation of the works programme but was an unequivocal success because of the presence of disciplined groups in the villages.

(vii) Development of rural areas through an army of government functionaries and a totally unified control was bound to produce little results. Instead utilization of government experts to upgrade the skills of the rural population through continuous training of authentic representatives chosen by their groups was a surer way to success.

CHAPTER THREE

RURAL WORKS PROGRAMMES

Despite the fact that the need for essential infrastructure and gainful employment was glaring in the rural areas, the impetus to launch rural works programme came accidentally. President Kennedy's "food for peace programme" launched due to large food surpluses envisaged that local funds generated through the programme should be used for development of rural areas. The law under which the programme was launched came to be commonly known as PL 480 (Public Law No. 480). This law was used to supply commodities to developing countries. In August 1961, an agreement was signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan for provision of \$621 million worth of US food surplus to be paid in Pakistani rupees. The planners for two years could not decide what to do with the funds. There was of course the engineers' approach which envisaged expending of large sums of money on big projects through contractors. There were those who thought of popularizing handicrafts in the villages. The Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, Comilla, under the dynamic leadership of Akhter Hameed Khan, started experimenting and documenting pilot projects wherein capital works to ensure agricultural growth and intensive employment was undertaken through building up of infrastructure of link roads and subsidiary irrigation channels. A Five-Year Thana Plan and 15 years Perspective Plan was prepared with maintenance as the responsibility of the local councils, subsequently an irrigation programme was added along with a rural electrification programme. The school works programme was also thought of. The Comilla Experiment became the basis for launching of the rural works programme first in East Pakistan and by 1963 in West Pakistan.

Current Planning of Rural Works Programmes, 1963-1969

In 1963 as Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet of the Province of

West Pakistan Government I first heard of the Rural Works Programme being given a formal shape. The Planning and Development Department of the Province had come up with a proposal before the Cabinet whereby funds earmarked for RWP were to be allocated to the Districts on the basis of area and population. Whereas in East Pakistan the programme was firmly based on the directions formulated on the basis of the Comilla Academy's Pilot Projects, in West Pakistan it was more of an ad-hoc arrangement for utilization of funds than achieving of given objectives. The Comilla Pilot Public Works Programme served as a model for the whole Province. The principles evolved were: (a) planning by Union and Thana Councils; (b) training of Union Councils and Local Project Committee; (c) execution of works by Project Committees; and (d) mobilization of villagers on a massive scale by village leaders.

The funding of the programme in East Pakistan from 1962-63 with an initial outlay of 100 million rupees was doubled to Rs 200 million in the years 1963-64 and 1964-65. In 1965-66 the amount was reduced to Rs 120 million due to Indo-Pakistan war.

In West Pakistan the injection of surplus commodities under PL 480 was done with a view to mop up purchasing power generated by Indus Basin replacement works, according to an expert. In East Pakistan, Rehman Sobhan maintains,⁹ the RWP allocation outside the Plan was merely a sop to counter-balance the iniquitous distribution of resources. The objective of the programme in West Pakistan was generally described to provide a mixture of social and welfare provision as well as infrastructure works with an accent on bigger allocations in favour of less developed areas. The sectoral allocations within the programme showed government's concern not so much to relieve rural unemployment or under-employment but to increase productivity and social amenities. In the initial stages 50 per cent funds were required to be spent on rural roads and 25 per cent on drinking water. In fact, income generation schemes were conspicuous by being given no importance.

The planning for Rural Works Programme was initiated at the Union level where after the fixation of priorities a Union Plan was formulated. The second stage started at the Tehsil (Sub-Division) level where planning was assessed with a wider point of view in conformity with the funds limitations and other aspects. Thus a

Tehsil plan was finally prepared and sent to the District Council for incorporation in the Annual District Plan of the District. In the beginning 75 per cent of the entire allocation of Rural Works Programme went to Union Councils and the sanctioning power up to Rs 5,000 or less rested with the Tehsil Councils. Schemes up to Rs 50,000 fell within the sanctioning jurisdiction of the District Council and the schemes up to half a million rupees were sanctioned by the Divisional Councils. After the schemes were approved by the competent authority, implementation was left to the Local Councils for which Project Committees were formed comprising leading members of the local public and headed by a member or chairman of the Union Council. The functions of the Project Committees extended from engaging labourers and supervising the work to submitting accounts to the Local Council and executing the project properly. The Chairman of upper tiers were supposed to exercise general supervision over the implementation of the projects.

For once the injustice or the reality of asking for people's contribution towards rural works was realized and after an initial insistence that 50 per cent of the cost of the project should be forthcoming in shape of labour or donation of land or in cash the position was reversed and it remained no more a condition precedent for undertaking a project under RWP. As Project Director, RWP in one of the Districts in the North-West Frontier of Pakistan, my main problem was not so much the formulation of the plans because that had already been done by my predecessor but its execution. The plan was at best a collection of projects thrown up from below but mostly dependent on needs of few individuals than of the community. The bigger or costlier projects were mostly included on the insistence of local members of the Provincial Assemblies or the more influential people of the area. Since the objectives of the Programme had not been clearly articulated each Project Director was left free to determine within the overall sectoral allocations the type of projects he wanted to undertake. There was a tendency to spend more money on buildings because it was something visible and one could also get a plaque with suitable inscriptions affixed to the building for the satisfaction of one's ego. No consideration was given while developing these plans as to how much employment these were going to generate or how much incomes these would increase if this did happen it

was incidental and not specifically so intended. There was indeed a feeling that perhaps funds were being allocated at this scale—which was not really much because it worked out to only about Rs 3 per head of population—for one year only and hence the full amount should be utilized irrespective of the utility or otherwise of the projects. Subsequently these fears proved unfounded because the programme continued and funds were made non-lapseable which meant that even if funds allocated had not been fully utilized by the end of the financial year these were carried over to the next year unlike other budgetary grants which used to lapse if not fully spent by the end of the financial year.

Thus on the planning side the weaknesses were obvious but on the implementation side things were even worse. There was hardly any technical staff at the disposal of the Project Director to either get the plans and blue prints prepared or to have the execution adequately supervised. The result was completion and execution of projects in many cases much below standard. This side of the programme was not at all taken care of. The Project Directors were left to themselves to use their own initiative and good offices to rectify the situation. Attempts by some Project Directors to involve the staff of nation building departments in execution of the rural works did not prove very effective because most of the Departments looked on the programme with suspicion and some, such as PWD (Public Works Department), with open hostility. Technical hands were in short supply in the market in early sixties and it was with considerable effort and difficulty that Project Directors were able to recruit technical hands, such as engineers, etc., for execution and supervision of the projects.

In West Pakistan unlike East Pakistan there was no tradition of elected local councils. The system of Basic Democracies which was introduced in West Pakistan in 1959 was still in its infancy, when the rural works programme was launched. The system of Basic Democracy itself was nothing original or innovative, it was simply a wider extension of Local Government Institutions prevailing in the past or at its time of conception in some parts of the country. It was in fact a revival and an expansion whereas it was worthy of commendation for the extension it envisaged, it was certainly liable to condemnation as a retrograde step which put the clock back at least by 30 years in context of the Local Government Institutions as it prevailed in what was East Pakistan at that time. In

West Pakistan the dependence on one person, i.e. Chairman of the Union Council, to look after the welfare of 10,000 persons was fraught with an inherent defect. This in fact denied the normal villager or his leader an access to the making of decisions affecting his well-being. The diluted participation of the people through their Chairman of the Union Council at the Tehsil level was further diluted and made ineffective at the District Council where only a few of the Chairmen of the Union Councils were represented. The use of the works programme funds for political purposes during the Presidential Elections of 1965 made a mockery of the objective of peoples participation in the programme. The large doses of funds given to the different tiers of Basic Democracy had inherent in them the temptation for the elected representatives as well as others to misuse public funds for private ends. However, so long as it remained confined to individuals it did not do much damage but once the government of the day started encouraging misuse of funds under the works programme for political ends to the neglect of social and economic development, the beginning of the demise of Basic Democracy was spelled out. Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan's decision to convert members of the Union Councils/Committees into an electoral college for electing the President and the members of the National and Provincial Assemblies proved a bane for these institutions.

The period 1963 to 1969 may be called the period of the rise and fall of the original Rural Works Programme in West Pakistan. Some experts have credited the programme as "by and large a remarkably successful innovation in rural development." Its achievements are listed as completion of 60,000 projects. It claims to have been a cheaper programme costing Rs 10 to 11 per sq. ft. construction cost compared to Rs 16 to 18 per sq. ft. of the PWD. It claims to have given weightage in allocation of funds to less developed areas. It also claims to have mobilized local contribution to the extent of 25 per cent of the cost of the projects; it created awareness in people about development needs; it encouraged decentralization and administrative flexibility; and it gave a fillip to cooperative activity. The critics credited the programme only with partial success in developing, planning, technical and administrative capability in rural Local Councils; it was beset with major problems in the sector of communications; it failed to generate local taxation; and it paid only lip service to Union Councils

autonomy. Because of lack of technical support to Union Councils, there was a tendency to concentrate on bigger projects rather than smaller projects. The tendency to involve contractors and to get work done departmentally specially in case of water supply schemes gained strength from year to year and the employment content of the programme remained very weak.

A close scrutiny of one of the sectors such as communications shows that during 1963-69, 37.8 per cent of the total allocation of 334 million rupees was spent on rural roads of the following description.¹⁹ 700 miles of metalled roads; 2,000 miles of treated roads; 6,000 miles of katcha roads; 2,000 miles of repairs; 250 bridges; and 10,000 culverts.

It is an impressive data, however, seen in the background of the factual position that there was no provision for maintenance of projects under the Rural Works Programme till 1966 and thereafter too only 4 per cent on previous year's expenditure was allowed as maintenance cost the picture becomes not too encouraging. There was no provision for continuing maintenance when RWP grants ceased. This was a major weakness of the Programme during 1963 to 1969 and if one carries out a survey now there would be very few of these projects still on the ground. Although the Basic Democracy Order, 1959 (repealed in 1971) included as many as 29 taxes under Schedule V but for political or administrative reasons the imposition of taxes was always postponed.

The release of funds also remained highly erratic during the period after initial adherence to proper release of funds the quarterly releases became irregular and often delayed well past the working season. The political agitation against Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan's regime threw everything in disarray. It culminated in the imposition of Martial Law in 1969. The programme continued as a lame-duck programme and with the abolition of Basic Democracy system in 1971 it almost came to standstill.

Integrated Rural Development Programme

The traumatic experience of late 1971 resulted in the break up of the country in two independent parts namely: Pakistan and Bangladesh. It also brought the military rule to an end since 1958 and ushered in a popularly elected leader at the helm of affairs. The new political government had won the mandate of the people

on the promise of providing "*Roti, Kapra Aur Makan*" (Bread, Cloth and Housing). Immediately after the take-over it therefore set about to fulfil its promise to the nation and for the first time in the history of the country the government of the day took steps on its own, without being cajoled by aid-giving agencies, to do something for the rural areas. As a first step the new political government appointed a committee to recommend an Integrated Rural Development Programme for the country. Within three months of its taking over power the new government approved the launching of Integrated Rural Programme on the basis of the recommendations of the Committee. The Committee described the objectives of the programme "to improve the quality of life for rural masses" which it recommended can be done mainly through increasing productivity and improving employment opportunities. It further recommended that development had to come through participation of the people and the methodology commended to achieve this objective was formation of farmers organizations/cooperatives. The Committee hoped that the people and their organization, government departments, local government institutions, business and professional classes, at present acting independently, would be made to converge and make a conscious plan to improve the quality of rural life, through IRDP.

Administrative Organization

The Committee envisaged the village as the primary unit for the purposes of preparation of production plans and development schemes. It was proposed that day-to-day work of the primary unit should be looked after by a body representing various interests in the village which should be given a legal status and should generate its own funds and will be responsible for arranging: (i) preparation of production plans; (ii) operational supervision; (iii) farm management; (iv) procurement of inputs; (v) marketing of agricultural produce; (vi) supervised credit; (vii) extension of activities; (viii) provision of irrigation facilities; (ix) provision of civic amenities and social welfare activities like education, health, sanitation etc; and (x) provision of facilities of non-agricultural sector.

The real hub of integration was to be a rural centre to be called a "Markaz" covering an area of about 50 to 70 sq. miles with 25 to 30 villages. This centre was to be located at a place which had

facilities like marketing, banking and electricity. This focal point in course of time was to be developed into an "agrovillage." Being centres for agricultural supplies and marketing of produce these centres were supposed to automatically provide employment to some of the people intending to move to the bigger cities. The agrovillages were to provide job opportunities and stall the pressure on big cities. The Markaz functions were to be looked after by a Markaz Integrated Committee consisting of representatives—one from each primary unit. The chief executive of the Committee was to be a government servant. This arrangement was tentative till the establishment of Local Councils system. The functions of the Markaz Committee were spelled out as follows:¹¹

- (i) Technical guidance.
- (ii) Supervized credit.
- (iii) Production inputs, such as fertilizers, seeds, pesticides, plant protection material and equipment, farm machinery and workshop facilities.
- (iv) Proper water management.
- (v) Marketing and processing of agricultural produce.
- (vi) Transportation and storage.
- (vii) Provision of facilities to the non-agricultural sector.
- (viii) Arrange adequate banking facilities to cater to the credit requirements of the area.
- (ix) Encourage saving and raising funds.
- (x) Arrange training of farmers and farm leaders by using existing school/institution facilities through technical staff.
- (xi) Assess the credit requirements on the basis of production plans and arrange for the same.
- (xii) Arrange to set up agro-industries based on local raw materials.
- (xiii) Planning and execution of the rural works programme.
- (xiv) Integrate the functions of the Development Departments like Agriculture, Cooperatives, Animal Husbandry, Fisheries, Forestry, Social Welfare and Community Development, Health, Education, Electricity, Drainage, Reclamation, Small Industries, etc.
- (xv) Seed multiplication programmes.
- (xvi) Prepare and execute low-cost housing schemes where necessary.

At the Provincial level a Rural Development Board presided over by the Chief Minister was envisaged consisting of public representatives, secretaries of the nation building departments and technical advisors. The Board was to be responsible for policy-making, budgeting, approval of plans, coordination and evaluation of projects, amongst other functions. At the national level it was recommended that an autonomous fund called the Central Rural Development Fund should be created by the Central Government to be used for research, surveys and grants to the Provincial Rural Development Boards. The Central Board was to be presided over by the Federal Minister of Agriculture.

The funding of the programme was left vague and the Committee recommended that the existing staff and facilities should be readjusted to suit the project requirements. It did concede that it might be necessary to inject some capital initially but the Committee wanted to make it clear that gradually the project and its organization will have to be self-financing.

Under the phasing of the programme the Committee recommended a pilot project approach. The suggested priorities were: (i) farmers organizations and institutions; (ii) essential physical infrastructure such as road, drainage, electricity, etc; (iii) credit; (iv) supplies of inputs; and (v) storage and marketing.

As a result of these recommendations Integrated Rural Development Programme was formally launched by the then President of the country on 1 July 1972. However, quite oblivious to what was being done under IRDP the Planning and Development Ministry came up with a document in May 1973 explaining the philosophy and concept of People's Works Programme—the word "Rural" had been transformed into "People's" because the party in power bore the nomenclature Pakistan People's Party.

People's Works Programme

Its specific objectives were described as follows:¹²

- (i) To combat unemployment and under-employment by significantly enlarging opportunities for gainful work.
- (ii) To undertake within the framework of the country's overall development plan such productive projects as will satisfy the felt needs of the people and build up the economy through the production of basic capacities and amenities.
- (iii) To mobilize local resources and to motivate the people

for a massive productive effort with a view to institutionalizing development and associating a large segment of the population.

(iv) To develop and encourage constructive leadership and local initiative.

(v) To inculcate skill formation and proper training.

The basic purpose to organize people for implementation of PWP works and to establish joint enterprise between the government and the people was the corner-stone of the scheme. Government was to provide administrative, technical, legislative and financial support and was to protect the programme from attacks of vested interest; whereas the people on their part were supposed to identify projects, execute and evaluate them through tapping the organizational and management capabilities of the rural masses.

For the first time the PWP was to take care of urban areas also, although no separate administrative set-up was provided at the Provincial and District level for rural and urban areas.

Administrative Set-Up

For administering PWP a People's Halqa Committee (population 10 to 12 thousand) and a People's District Works Council and a People's Provincial Council at different tiers were envisaged. The adult population of a village was to act as an assembly and for discharging day-to-day work was to elect a chairman and an executive committee. The village assembly was to take basic decisions, frame initial proposals and entrust them to the executive committee for detailed investigation, planning and execution. The executive committee was to consist of five or more members and was to be responsible for execution of projects through mobilization of local resources and with the technical assistance of government departments. Above the village, the Halqa Committee was to scrutinize the projects received from the Village Committees and supervise implementation of the decisions of People's District Works Council. The People's District Works Council was given the authority to approve the projects received from the Village Committees through the Halqa Committees. The People's Works Council at the Provincial level under the Chief Minister was to coordinate and oversee the programmes. The government departments were supposed to function at all levels to provide technical, administrative and financial assistance to these institutions.

There was to be a department of Local Government and People's Works Programme with a Director General for PWP in each Province. Similarly, Directors, Deputy Directors and People's Works Officers were to be appointed at Division, District and Halqa level to act as a liaison between the different tiers.

At the Federal level a Cell in the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Development was to be established to undertake studies in problem areas and to suggest solution, receive and analyze progress report on PWP projects and assist the Provincial Governments for devising ways and means to improve the system and procedures.

Description of Projects

Along with the document on concept and philosophy of PWP the Planning Commission also issued description of projects to be undertaken under the PWP. These projects were intended to provide facilities for¹³: reorganization of cottage industries on scientific basis; introduction of two-pronged programmes for development of poultry; development of fish culture; encouragement of sunburnt and stabilized bricks; production of cloth, small industries for women; establishment of community workshops for construction of buildings and sheds; community buildings; road construction—improving existing rural roads and establishment of new links and 42,000 miles of new roads were targeted; irrigation and drainage channels; housing community shops; water courses; small dams; afforestation and tree planting; mass literacy—60,000 students receiving higher education were to put in 6 months of national service to teach adult literacy classes in villages, these core of teachers were to be supplemented by 13,000 students studying in general Universities, 22,500 students pursuing professional courses and 1,41,000 teachers in primary schools; PWP to help education drive through construction of buildings at Rs 7 per sq. ft; cultural activities such as out-door sports, in-door sports, performing arts, fine arts, audio-visual arts, Radio/TV newspapers—half of the cost of the Radio and TV and 3 months subscription was to be paid out of PWP funds; playgrounds and games; mass surveys distribution of essential commodities; building of small projects; provision of drinking water supply—out of 64,000 rural communities only 0.63 per cent were said to have community water supply—PWP aimed at providing piped water supply to every village with population of around 5,000 persons; plant protection works; and

encouragement of sheep breeding and orchard growing.

In most of the projects only 60 per cent of the wages were supposed to be paid in cash and 40 per cent in kind. For volunteers having partial engagement in work payment was to be paid at 20 per cent in cash and 80 per cent in kind.

The North-West Frontier Province Experience

The IRDP Committee had recommended "it is considered of utmost importance to test the programme through pilot projects before replication. These projects should preferably be located close to the institutions engaged in rural [development, agricultural or social sciences." One of the institutions suggested by the Committee for taking up a pilot project was the Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, Peshawar. I happened to take over the Directorship of the Academy simultaneously with the acceptance of the recommendations of the IRDP Committee. As directed by the Federal Government, the Provincial Governments set about to implement the directives of the Federal Government in regard to IRDP. The North-West Frontier is one of the Provinces of Pakistan having an area of about 30,000 sq. miles with about 9 million people. The government of NWFP decided to adopt a pilot project approach and five IRDP pilot projects were initiated under the project directorship of different agencies such as Agriculture, Cooperatives, Irrigation and General Administration Departments. The Pakistan Academy for Rural Development which is located at Peshawar and caters for all the four Provinces has besides training the officers of the nation building departments of the 4 Provinces, experimentation and research as one of its the main functions. In the field of research the Academy endeavours to develop viable models which could be replicated all over the country. Thus when the Government of the Frontier Province asked the Academy to take up one of the IRDP pilot projects it accepted the offer with the objective to develop a model for Integrated Rural Development which could be worthy of replication not only in the Frontier Province but all over the country. In course of time the Frontier Government accepted the Daudzai model as potentially the most successful and decided to expand it in the whole Province.

The Pakistan Academy for Rural Development formulated plans for developing a pilot project of Integrated Rural Development in April 1972. The Director of the Academy was designated as the

Project Director and the Chief Secretary of the Province, who was also Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Academy, agreed to provide his backing and support to the programme. To begin with:

(i) A Centre (Markaz) of development administration was set up at a level below the District and Tehsil for a conveniently small area, generally equal to the boundaries of a Thana. Although basically it was a law and order unit of administration but from the point of view of accessibility within the area and concentration of infrastructure facilities the Thana Headquarters over the last 100 years had grown into a growth centre. It was, therefore, considered desirable to adopt an already existing unit of administration for the purposes of rural development rather than carve out a new unit of administration which could have generated difficulties such as accommodating political requests and bureaucratic whims.

(ii) Representatives of basic need departments such as Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, Health, Education, Cooperatives, Revenue Administration and Forestry were posted at the Centre and their activities were coordinated by a Project Manager belonging to the Local Government Department.

(iii) The Departments were expected to make concerted efforts for servicing the villagers and improving their economic and welfare conditions.

(iv) Comparatively a large number of agricultural assistants, almost eight times more than the previous development, were posted to bring about a big increase in production by urging the farmers to use modern methods and bigger inputs.

(v) In the absence of the Local Councils attempts were made to set up village committees and revive old cooperatives and a Markaz cooperative was also registered.

(vi) The financing of the project was done on an ad-hoc basis and a grant was given for contingent expenditure pending submission of detailed development plan of the Markaz.

Having set up a Centre and having got the functionaries of the Government Departments posted, as a Project Director I felt that everything would now fall in line and development of the area would come about. A development plan for the area was hurriedly

prepared sitting in the make-shift offices of the Centre in consultation with the departmental functionaries. The works plan amounting to over 6 million rupees was submitted to the Provincial Secretaries Committee and duly approved. However, funds for execution of the plan were not made available and it was left to the initiative of the Project Director to arrange funds from different sources. As a former Deputy Commissioner of the District and Secretary in the Provincial Government I was able to get some funds from the Local District PWP funds, at personal level. These funds were only sufficient to undertake construction of two schools and a couple of flood protection spurs. Much energy was spent by me as Project Director on urging the departmental representatives to make plans and implement them. However, the departments were so organized that with the best of intentions they could not do much in this direction. The Irrigation Department could only produce a couple of blueprints for small village works. The PWD could never spare even their sub engineers to survey the communications problems.

The Academy researchers on the basis of the basic data collected by them concluded that the villages of Daudzai were in a very poor shape and with the establishment of the Centre their problems began to receive an attention which they had never received before. However, soon it was obvious that the resources available at the disposal of the Centre were grossly inadequate to meet the demands of the villages and whatever little was available failed to have any impact because of lack of skills in the rural population to make use of these facilities. There was no organization specially of the poor and the number of individuals in any case was too large to be serviced by a handful of officers. Thus in the first year while the conventional methods were followed there was no visible economic impact.

Although there was no empirical data but keeping in view the scarcity of land and the small holdings, it was not difficult to conclude that there was serious problem of employment and unemployment in the Daudzai during the slack agricultural season. Works on flood control, irrigation drainage and link roads were expected to provide a substantial and very productive employment. In the development of land was inherent a permanent increase in the scope of future employment.

Thus the entire project staff was involved for one year in pre-

paring surveys and blueprints. The final surveys and blueprints revealed that there existed significant difference between whatever limited data were available (mostly from revenue records) and what was finally surveyed. Also the blueprints made after consulting the local population were found to be more realistic and beneficial than those planned independently by the project staff. The Revenue Department records clearly pointed out as to who were the real clients of the programme—92.4 per cent of the land owners had less than 5 acres. This important information shaped the Daudzai rural development strategy. This information also focused on the likely difficulties which were to be encountered in that the number of such small farmers was 17,553. If the programme was to primarily focus on large farmers (with 10 acres or more) it would have been much easier to deal with only 550 such farmers. Therefore, the previous (intentional or unintentional) rural development strategies that focused on large farmers were rejected in favour of the strategy stressing on small farmers.

The benefits of preparing surveys and blueprints for each Markaz (Centre) were evident in that the rural development strategy for each Centre will be unique depending upon local problems and priorities, planning for such problems without people's participation and without the area blueprints and surveys would be impossible. Thus diagnostic surveys and preparation of blueprints prior to launching of a Rural Works Programme was considered of utmost importance.

Execution of Works

Once people had been organized and their bonafides and trust in the programme reflected through the performance of their organization in weekly meetings and savings, project committees were asked to be appointed for execution of the works project. The Centre helped in providing the blueprints, the technical supervision in executing the project, in training local leaders and in preparation of muster-rolls, etc. It was found that the organization was the best watch-dog for the project committees. In one case when the engineer complained against dishonest practices of the Chairman of a project committee, the matter was raised in the weekly meeting of the village organization. To the engineers' great discomfiture and to my surprise the organization refused to censure the recalcitrant chairman of the project committee. Indeed, it fully

backed the chairman and vouched about his honesty. I appreciated the attitude of the organization only in the context of future conduct of the chairman of the project committee. There never ever was any complaint about this project committee indulging in dishonest practices. Another important function performed by the organization was that the payment of wages to the labourers on the project used to be made in front of every one during the weekly meeting of the organization.

The project committee was entrusted with the following major assignments: (i) on the spot supervision; (ii) procurement of material and equipment; (iii) fixation of rates and wages; (iv) hiring and payment to labourers; (v) handling finances—muster rolls, etc.; and (vi) measurement of works completed.

With the completion of the survey and blueprints and a definite indication about availability of funds for undertaking the projects a system of quarterly plan was introduced and the project committees of all the village organizations whose works were included in the plan for ensuing quarter used to be invited to the Centre for one day. The nature and importance of works and their role and responsibility used to be explained. The undertaking of integrity and honesty in the larger interest of the project population also used to be taken. The meetings also served the objective of explaining the rationale of allocation of funds for each project. There was no bickering after these meetings as to why one village received more funds than the other. The basis of allocation of funds was clearly understood to be the intensity of development required and not ad-hoc distribution of funds.

The project committee members were given a brief orientation to carry out the duties effectively. The instructions imparted by the engineers included the following aspects: (i) preparation of muster roll; (ii) maintenance of accounts; (iii) reading of blueprints and following the specifications; (iv) procurement of material; (v) hiring of labour and fixing of wages rates; and (vi) supervision of work.

For the purposes of keeping of accounts one of the members used to be appointed as an accountant for assisting the project committee in properly maintaining daily accounts. In one situation it was found that the scheme accountant preferred to work as a labourer than to keep the accounts. It was not difficult to identify the reason because the remuneration as scheme accountant was less than half than as a labourer. This was based on the fallacy of

self-help and of the expectation that people would be willing to give their time and energy for nothing. This may be true once in a while but to expect this for continuous activity or for continuous period is indeed not facing the realities of life.

Payment of Labourers

Local labourers were employed on the prevalent wage rate. Payment used to be made in the weekly meetings of the village organization in the presence of all the members. In the beginning the organizations professed self sacrifice and fixed wages at half the prevailing market rate. However, the mistake was soon realized because this tended to discriminate against those who offered to work on the project.

The contractors were totally eliminated; local labour and material were used. With brief orientation and instructions and supervision by the technical unit most of the works programmes were executed satisfactorily. In fact, in most cases the works were completed in less than the estimated cost as is indicated by the following table:¹⁴

<i>Works (May 73 to June 75)</i>	<i>Estimated cost (Rs)</i>	<i>Actual cost (Rs)</i>
Flood protection	9,29,530	8,38,492/21
Irrigation	4,04,259	3,13,145/78
Drainage	87,600	61,608/70
Communications	2,05,700	1,77,919/00
	16,27,089	13,93,166/63

It required some explanation in the initial stages that if the work was completed in less than the estimated cost the balance amount was not the property of the organization but had to be refunded to the Markaz administration. By and by the project committees of the organizations understood the relationship between cost estimates and actual expenditure and it goes to their credit that in no case was any complaint received that the actual costs were intentionally inflated to reach up to the estimated cost.

Supervision

This was achieved through the project committees and the Markaz engineering unit. The engineer and the sub-engineer paid frequent visits to the sites. Their efforts were supported by inspection visits and observation tours by the Project Manager and the Project Director.

Maintenance

This was one of the weakest links in earlier Rural Works Programmes and great emphasis was paid in making the village organization to understand the responsibility of maintenance in case a project was sanctioned for the village. The engineer calculated maintenance cost at the standard rate of 4 per cent of the project cost per annum. Initially the weekly savings were insisted upon specially in villages where projects were under execution with the objective of collecting maintenance costs. However, it was explained that the repairs and maintenance costs would be much higher than the rate at which savings were being collected. The organizations, not in one single case, showed any reluctance to shoulder the responsibilities of maintenance and although there was no regular contribution towards a maintenance fund, ad-hoc contributions were made in villages where maintenance of a completed project became necessary.

Planning

After the initial preparation of the development plan on the basis of the diagnostic survey carried out by the development units in the absence of local council structure the problem of solving the vexed question of assigning priorities to the projects in the development plan devolved on the Project Director. The simple yardstick applied for this purpose was the viability of the village organization to undertake execution and maintenance of the project. In the beginning this was not believed because people had got used to getting projects sanctioned on the basis of their influence and approach to the authorities concerned. However, as time went by and since no exceptions were made people came to accept the yardstick. In one case I was literally hounded by a retired Brigadier, an old friend of mine to sanction a project for his village. It took me some effort to ward off his approaches for nearly a year and a half till a village organization was formed

<i>Works plan</i>	<i>Cost estimates</i>	<i>No. of Schemes</i>						<i>Total</i>
		<i>Flood protection</i>	<i>Irrigation</i>	<i>Drainage</i>	<i>Road</i>	<i>Ferry Culverts Bridges etc</i>		
Feb. 73 to June 74	2,75,984	4	2	—	—	4	12	
Jul.-Oct. 74	7,05,480	6	1	1	2	2	12	
Oct.-Dec. 74	3,98,754	1	5	1	2	—	9	
Jan.-Mar. 75	3,84,400	4	1	2	1	1	9	
Apr.-June 75	91,900	—	2	1	—	—	3	
Jul.-Sept. 75	4,48,300	3	2	2	1	—	8	
Oct.-Dec. 75	4,60,750	2	3	3	2	1	11	
	27,65,568	19	17	10	10	8	64	

which qualified for sanction of a project. It must be said to the credit of the Brigadier that ultimately he came and admitted the soundness of the procedure followed by Markaz for sanctioning works projects.

In the beginning from April 1973 to March 1974 projects used to be approved in monthly meetings of the project officers at the Academy. However, from July 1974 the quarterly works plans were introduced based on the exhibition of group order and discipline by the village organizations. The number of schemes in each plan varied because of the cost variation of works. Bigger works used to be carried over to the subsequent quarters. The table¹⁵ on p. 43 gives the details of works plans from June 1973 to December 1975.

The details of financial allocations to Daudzai project were as follows:¹⁶

<i>Financial year (July to June)</i>	<i>Receipts (Rs)</i>	<i>Expenditure (Rs)</i>
1971-72	1,00,000/00	47,950/50
1972-73	6,53,503/00	2,17,257/15
1973-74	9,28,183/72	10,48,381/58
1974-75	17,53,221/79	21,86,783/57

The release of development funds as grant-in-aid afforded the project administration a certain amount of autonomy in utilizing the funds on works projects. Funds were advanced easily to the village organizations for execution of works. This attracted the people and facilitated their association and participation in the programme, helped in gaining people's confidence which in turn ensured their responsibility to shoulder maintenance and repair of works in the future. Subsequently the release of funds through pre-audited procedures adversely affected the pace of works execution and the momentum of active participation generated among the people.

Employment

The project adopted in Daudzai was aimed at to achieving an increase in productivity through a massive land development programme. The other positive results of this activity were the increase in income and employment generation. In the short run, the works

	<i>No. of schemes</i>	<i>Skilled Lab. No. Days</i>	<i>Unskilled Lab. No. Days</i>	<i>Other Lab. No. Days</i>	<i>Total wages</i>
Flood protection	10	769½	410	1	34,725.00
Irrigation	6	497½	234	27	37,273.00
Drainage	5	72	355	5	36,107.00
Link Roads	6	212	295	42	28,944.00
Boats	2	50	—	—	1,450.00
Culverts	2	54½	64	—	2,516.50
	31	1655½	1358	75	1,41,015.50

programme was the catalyst in organizing people and providing employment. The development works made use of skilled and unskilled labourers and some of the skilled persons had to be imported from outside. Similarly, material such as cement and G.I. wire had to be purchased from markets from beyond the project area. Bricks mostly sunburnt were locally manufactured and thus generated local employment. Information about labour employment and wages in respect of 26 works projects is tabulated on previous page.¹⁷

Besides, employment was also provided to works on contract for weaving of wire mesh or collection of boulders for spurs. Animal labour including donkey, buffalo and bullock were used. An attempt to show the wage component under the different categories of works produced the following figures:¹⁸

Works	No. of work	Total wages (Rs)	Total actual cost	Wages as % of cost
Flood protection	10	34,725.00	5,61,783.09	6.18
Irrigation	6	37,273.00	1,40,491.52	26.53
Drainage	5	36,107.00	60,385.85	59.69
Roads	6	28,944.00	1,41,988.96	20.38
Ferry Boats	2	1,450.00	9,100.00	15.93
Culverts	2	2,516.50	12,938.50	19.44
	31	1,41,015.50	9,26,688.22	15.21

Other indirect benefits which accrued through the works programme include appreciation in land value due to improved irrigation system and flood protection works.

The benefits to individual farmers were dramatically demonstrated in village visits. In village Geedar one farmer with a wife and eight children reported that he was cultivating eight acres before the execution of works project but owned 19 acres of waste land that was used only for pasture. With the completion of the project now he was cultivating all his lands and claimed that his income had gone up manifold. This project completed at a cost of Rs 1,25,000 brought under irrigation over 500 acres of waste land. Without the intensive diagnostic survey this project could never have been identified. The project was identified by the village organization. Projects like these have provided considerable stimu-

lus to government departments to consider small-scale but high pay off projects.

Evaluation of Current Experience

In the preceding pages I have discussed two different types of programmes which were implemented since 1972 in places other than NWFP and in the NWFP of Pakistan. Although there has not been an evaluation of the Integrated Rural Development Programme but a non-official group was commissioned to evaluate the People's Works Programme. The group in its report¹⁹ submitted in late 1975 pointed to the conceptual confusion of two seemingly conflicting goals of PWP namely self-help and generating remunerative employment opportunities. The group also criticized the unrealistic dimensions of the programme. It also criticized the domination of the programme by National and Provincial leaders which resulted in total negation of local autonomy in identification, execution or evaluation of PWP projects. In some cases the group was of the view that the PWP instead of generating people's participation produced just the opposite results and tended to undermine people's capacity towards self-reliance and made them prone to dependence on government. The decision to cover urban areas under PWP was also rated as not a good innovation by the group. Failure on the part of the government to establish Local Councils system was pointed out as a major reason for the failure of the PWP.

The Federal Cell in the Ministry of Planning and Development failed to coordinate the programme either with the Provincial Governments or with the IRDP. The group adversely commented on the performance of the Provincial Rural Development Boards which in the case of two Provinces were never established and the provinces where it was established its activities were sporadic and ineffective. The District Committees in course of time usurped all the powers of the Project Committees and according to the group, in reality the PWP in Punjab was executed on the orders and directions of members of the National and Provincial Assemblies and in the case of Sind on the orders of the Chief Minister and in the case of Baluchistan on the orders of bureaucrats and politicians. In the case of Baluchistan 40 per cent of the PWP funds were placed at the disposal of the Chief Minister of the Province for sanctioning projects.

Although funds were allocated on the formula of 55 per cent for underdeveloped districts and 45 per cent for developed districts, but of the funds allocated to districts the requirement that 50 per cent of these funds should be spent on village level projects was not strictly adhered to. In most cases preference was given to bigger projects and their execution through contractors. The sectoral allocations such as 80 per cent for communications and education and 20 per cent for health and social welfare projects was in fact utilized on the basis of 70 per cent for these sectors and 30 per cent for miscellaneous and other projects which in actual terms meant Rs 117 million out of a total Rs 331 million. Although the group found the utilization of funds ranged between 70 per cent to 83 per cent but the percentage of utilization according to the group was not necessarily indicative of the degree of effectiveness of the programme. The group quotes the example of the Province of Sind where utilization of funds was nearly 83 per cent but the utilized funds failed to deliver planned benefits because most of the funds were expended on the construction of model villages and IRDP Markaz Complex.

Income Employment Generation

The group found it hard to get relevant data on the actual employment of the PWP but on the assumption that 300 man days constituted a year round employment, the impact of PWP on employment generation hardly exceeded 24,000 persons in one year. In relation to the total cost of the PWP over the three years period the group came to the conclusion that the capital cost for employing a unit of labour for 300 days exceeded Rs 13,000 which in its opinion was a very high figure for generating employment in the rural environment. If one accepts this figure then PWP negates the very objective of generating employment at comparatively lower cost.

People's Participation

The biggest falacy of the PWP concept and philosophy was that the rural people were organized and village organizations were in existence. The whole programme was based on this wrong assumption. Since there was no community to work with the PWP, the involvement of the community remained only an unattainable objective. Funds were utilized mostly by political leaders for perso-

nal gains and the aftermath of March Elections was a direct result of the corrupt practices institutionalized through programmes such as PWP by the PPP government. The local contribution in PWP projects was often covered through knowingly accepted inflated estimates and thereafter refunding the cash contribution by completing the project within the limits of the PWP funds available. According to the group, nearly 90 per cent of the projects had no local contribution. People also objected to executing PWP projects through self-help specially in areas where next door they found big and expensive projects being undertaken by government totally financed out of public funds. In fact, the condition of local contribution had to be waived to meet the situation.

The NWFP Experience

Much of what has been said by the non-official experts group about the PWP would be true about areas in NWFP where Daudzai strategy was not extended. The NWFP rural development plan was accepted in early 1975 and extended to about one-third of the Province. However, since most of the projects were in their first year, i.e. at the diagnostic survey, there was little PWP activity in those areas. In fact, PWP as a separate programme ceased to exist in areas where Daudzai strategy was implemented. It became a part of the overall plan and was one of the four important activities namely: (i) organizing people to form disciplined groups; (ii) developing an extension education system for small farmers through the organized groups; (iii) developing and improving land to extend irrigation or control erosion or water-logging through the joint action of disciplined groups; and (iv) developing an effective credit system for small farmers through their organized disciplined groups.

Planning on the Administrative Aspects

NWFP was the only province in Pakistan which till todate has a five-year rural development plan including PWP as an important component. The status of the plan is that it has received the stamp of approval of the highest planning body in the country namely ECNEC (Executive Committee of the National Economic Council) but in fact since late 1975 the project is dormant and of late efforts seem to be afoot to pick up the threads and rejuvenate the programme. The administrative scheme is basically sound and

takes care of the limitation and drawbacks of the previous programmes. The planning process at micro level is not only recognized but is consciously encouraged through making available technical knowhow and funds at the local level. Full autonomy is conceded in respect of formulation and execution of local projects but funds are only made available once a meaningful local plan is prepared and vetted by technicians and incorporated in the overall Provincial local programme. Social and welfare schemes are purposely left out and emphasis is laid on income and employment generation schemes. The assumption being that departments such as health and education are already there to take care of social and welfare provision.

The local council structure adopted by the Province envisages establishment of a local council at the Markaz level. The linkage between the council at the Markaz and the district is also provided through elected councils. In Provinces other than NWFP the question of selecting the physical limits of the project area kept hanging for over last five years. In Punjab they tried to cut-across the boundaries of established administrative units and carved out projects on the basis of potential growth centres; after much trial and error they finally accepted the principle that the existing unit of administration known as Thana is best suited for IRDP and PWP activities. In the Province of Sind the Provincial Government is thinking of keeping these centres at Taluka level—a unit of administration in Sind Province although bigger in size than Thana but much smaller than a Tehsil or Sub-Division. The problems of Baluchistan are of a special nature, i.e. vast area with sparse population. However, the principle has been accepted that for the purpose of a project area it is the accessibility within the centre to the remotest corner of paramount importance and hence the area of the project and not the population is the determining factor.

Administrative Control

In a country which inherited a tradition in which law and order and revenue collection took precedence over developmental activities the administrative machinery tends to favour centralization be it in planning or financing. The relationship of the project area with the district, and of the project administration with the district administration has not yet been formalized. The plan aimed at

eliminating or at least for purposes of development shifting the emphasis from the Sub-Division to the Thana level. The linkage between Thana administration and the district administration was forged through two councils at the two levels. However, in the absence of such councils it was planned to have a District Coordination Committee to perform the functions of the District Council once the plan was extended to the whole Province. The Punjab experience had clearly shown that autonomy in matters of local Government was very important if the functions of the local councils were entrusted to people's representatives elected for National and Provincial Assemblies the results were likely to be disappointing. In fact, in the Frontier where such nominated councils were not inducted the utilization of PWP funds was comparatively better.

Staffing

It was imperative that proper staff should be recruited and properly trained. This was frequently borne out by comparison between the project staff of Frontier Province and of the other Provinces. Training proved to be a very positive investment and for implementation of a programme like the NWFP rural development plan continuous exposure and orientation of field staff to training and evaluation sessions is considered of paramount importance.

The availability of staff was expected to cause some problems. A rough estimate indicated the following manpower requirements in implementation of the programme: 5,170, i.e., 3,730 skilled workers and 1,440 others. The only real difficulty was expected in recruitment of qualified engineers. However, as a result of the first public advertisement for recruitment of 30 projects I was surprised to find no dearth of engineers. In fact, there were almost 2.5 engineers applying for each job but later on I experienced difficulty in retaining them in the projects. The engineers tended to use the project job only as a breather or a stepping stone. However, there were a number of engineers who stayed on and another solution to the problem was examined whereby sub-engineers at project level with a team of engineers at district level were expected to satisfy the needs of the plan. In case of other personnel there was no dearth of applicants.

The monthly meetings at the Provincial Directorate with the

Project Managers were found to be a very good investment. For an initial period of six months the project staff were left in the project areas after getting the training at the Academy which turned out to be a mistake. It was found to be very important in the initial stages to have these meetings for the reasons described earlier.

Socio-economic Problems

The land development programme in Daudzai was not particularly important as an employment programme because unemployment runs at only about 7 per cent in that area. The labour force is increased in the winter by Powinda tribes who migrate down from Afghanistan in the winter months and are available for unskilled labour. The Powindas both men and women were employed on projects during the winter. The projects were geared to local employment seasons and suspended during the planting and harvesting seasons. However, one village interview taken at random in a village organization illustrated the employment situation of a farmer with 6 acres and a family of five. When asked if he ever worked on the project the answer was affirmative. Although a small farmer but fairly well to do it was therefore surprising as to why he accepted unskilled work for which wages were only Rs 5 per day, at that time. When asked the reason he replied that it was not for the wages but the anxiety to get the project completed which was to irrigate an additional 4 acres belonging to him. When asked if he would be willing to work on the project in the village near-by his laughing reply was "no not if they paid Rs 100 per day."

The use of animal labour was also rampant and fully exploited. Indeed donkey labour was found to be very efficient and expeditious in completion of projects. Each organization was left to determine itself through its project the pattern of working management. Active support was provided by the Markaz technical and organizational staff in helping the local project committees and organizations. The identification and planning of projects in consultation with the people proved a sound strategy. However, it took some effort to convince bonafides of the project staff in case of insistence on income generation projects as against the traditional symbols of development, i.e. social and welfare projects. In one village when I insisted on their identifying a project execution of which

would increase their incomes an old man of the village questioned the logic of not giving preference to construction of a school. He accused me of pursuing a policy whereby the children of the village would be left uneducated. It took sometime to explain the difference between the activities of rural development and the education department. Once convinced that the objective of the works programme was indeed to increase their incomes the villagers came out with precise problems and projects in the field.

Financial Problems

The flow of funds till the approval of the Rural Development Plan in NWFP was on an ad-hoc basis. However, once funding and phasing had been approved the availability of funds did not pose a problem. The Provincial budget is in two parts: (a) Revenue and (b) Developmental. Funds were provided for the Plan in the Developmental budget with the provision to shift the liability of recurring expenditure on the Revenue budget after completion of the Plan. This indeed meant mobilization of more resources through taxation because whereas developmental funds are sanctioned as a grant by the Federal Government the revenue expenditure is met by the Provinces by raising their own resources through taxation. While approving the Plan, the ECNEC decided to transfer the recurring liability of pay and salaries of the staff to the Revenue budget of the Province. The matter remained disputed and the Provincial Government still insists on keeping this expenditure on the developmental side for at least five years from the day of commencement of each project.

The financial administration envisaged a total decentralization of financial powers within the limits of overall sanctioned budget. The Project Manager was vested with powers of drawal and disbursement of funds subject to subsequent audit. There was lot of reluctance on the part of the Provincial Directorate to decentralizing financial powers and the Academy had to intervene time and again on behalf of the Project Managers. The subjection of the budget to pre-audit procedures caused a real bottleneck in execution of the works programme and the Governing Body, of which Finance Secretary was also a member, had to give a ruling to facilitate matters.

The audit of the project accounts was carried out by the local Accountant General and his staff. However, for auditing the

accounts of the village organizations the services of a professional firm of accountants were enlisted. The Cooperative Department was also associated with audit and inspection of the accounts of those organizations which had been formalized and registered under the Cooperative Act. The role of the Cooperative Department was clearly delineated as that of audit and inspection instead of developing cooperatives. The flow of funds has not been according to the sanctioned scale since 1975-76 and hence the projects have been unable to go beyond the first year according to the programme phasing over time provided in the Plan.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE DYNAMICS OF A RURAL
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

The first time I heard of him was from the younger brother of a Bengali colleague of mine, while working as an Assistant Magistrate and Collector (under training). The boy, very proudly, was announcing that the principal of his college at Comilla was a person who had resigned from the prestigious I.C.S. and that he was a man of very simple habits and was always dressed in homespun cloth. I dismissed the whole thing as the babblings of a teenager. Three years later in 1959, however, I came face to face with Akhter Hameed Khan. He had chosen my sub-division for the field orientation training of the faculty members of the Comilla Academy. I knew that whatever the Academy's instructional staff had seen at Brahman Baria came under close microscopic inspection. I had read their reports of the faculty meetings. I was, therefore, pleased when Akhter Hameed Khan, on getting introduced to me, remarked, "you were put under close scrutiny and came out with flying colours." At the Brahman Baria station he disappeared as brusquely as it could be. He did not allow me to offer him a lift in my borrowed jeep. However, this chance meeting was followed by many visits to the Academy and more than a year later, on the request of Akhter Hameed Khan, Chief Secretary, East Pakistan lent my services to the Academy, to help organize a course for additional Deputy Commissioners (Development). I was overwhelmed and somewhat embarrassed when Akhter Hameed Khan came to the railway station to receive me and personally escorted me to Abhoy Ashram, the abode of the Comilla Academy at that time. I was shown into the guest-house cottage and told that the last occupant of the cottage died of T.B. after 15 years of protracted illness. I almost shuddered that after a week's stay in the infected cottage, I may not contract the disease. Perhaps Akhter Hameed Khan read my thoughts and assured me that the event took place many years ago and the cottage had since been fully disinfected. Although

I did help in organizing and drawing up the course outline, I was unfortunately unable to join the course. Thereafter I did run into Akhter Hameed Khan at Lahore a couple of times and was always accused by him of "having run away."

In 1971 I visited Comilla after more than a decade as a member of a group to study Comilla Project, with a view to undertaking a similar project in West Pakistan, preferably in Peshawar District under the aegis of Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, Peshawar. The Director and I, as Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar and another member of the PARD faculty made the group. We met Akhter Hameed Khan who was busy in writing a monograph on the tour of 20 Thanas. I was keen to visit my own subdivision and Akhter Hameed Khan encouraged me in doing this and I revisited, after ten years, Sarial Brahman Baria and Guasba Thanas. I found it a different world altogether. The whole countryside had been transformed in ten years. There was an excellent network of roads and thriving markets all along the way. The produce was in abundance and the Thana centres were live and pulsating with energy and activity. Even Brahman Baria Thana (which had Tehsil Offices also) and development centre was so crowded with people trying to learn new techniques or obtain services that one could only marvel at the effectiveness and utility of the Thana centres. At Comilla when I asked Akhter Hameed Khan's advice, he was very candid and suggested that I take a Thana in Peshawar District and develop it as a model for replication in the rest of the country. Our return to West Pakistan, in the wake of March 1971 events and my subsequent posting from Peshawar, brought the whole plan to a naught.

In early 1972, when Hayat Mohammad Khan Sherpao was the Governor of the North-West Frontier Province and the post of Commissioner, Karachi was abolished, Sherpao desired that I should come back to the Frontier Province from where I had gone to Karachi. He was not too enthusiastic when I requested him to accommodate me as Director, Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, but a good and sincere friend as he was, he ultimately succumbed to my request and I got posted as Director, Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, a few days before he relinquished charge of the Governorship of the Frontier. A mere four days after my assuming the new responsibilities, a secretaries committee meeting of the N.W.F.P. was convened on 8 April 1972

under the Chairmanship of Ejaz Ahmad Naik, Chief Secretary of the Province, to discuss the Prime Minister's (then President) directive to the Provinces to start an Integrated Rural Development Programme. In the meeting the Chief Secretary raised issues relating to: (i) aims and objectives of Integrated Rural Development Programme; (ii) IRDP and the Local Councils; (iii) IRDP and coordination with Nation Building Departments; and (iv) desirability of a PC-I for IRDP.

The committee decided to have nine Pilot Projects, one in each district and to open five project areas in financial year 1972-73. Of these five, one was to be entrusted to the PARD under the personal direction of the Chief Secretary and was to serve as an action research project and a "Mother Project" for other pilot project areas. The Director, Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, was named as the project director, just as the other pilot projects were assigned to Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Director Agriculture, Superintending Engineer, Irrigation Bannu and Deputy Commissioner, Hazara. On Chief Secretary's query as to when the Academy would be able to start work on this project, I offered to do so as soon as it was convenient for the Chief Secretary to inaugurate the project. The Chief Secretary fixed 23 April for inauguration and desired to know if it would give me enough time to set up the project. I had no hesitation in accepting the date because having served in the Province off and on since 1963 I was notorious in the area and I was quite confident of assembling the team of departmental officers by the appointed day and to make the inauguration meaningful. The Chief Secretary had to rush to Islamabad on the 23rd morning and I had to inaugurate the project. But during the two weeks that we got we not only were able to get a building (with a 20 x 40 feet chopal newly constructed) which used to be tehsil headquarters building in 1895, renovated, but we were also able to assemble representatives from eight basic-need departments, namely, revenue, education, health, animal husbandry, cooperative, irrigation, besides agriculture and police which were already working at the thana level. The whole team was put under a specially selected project manager. The Chief Secretary paid a visit to the Daudzai Markaz (with headquarters an Nahaqi) a few days later and was very pleased with the progress.

On 6 July we brought before the Secretaries Committee our proposed development plan for Dandzai Markaz. The decisions

arrived at in this meeting served as the charter for Daudzai Markaz till these were replaced by the revised PC-I. The Chief Secretary took two very important decisions in this meeting, namely: (i) that rural development is a provincial field and the Province should develop its own model and be not completely fettered to a model else where in the country, and (ii) that the jurisdiction of the Markaz would be co-extensive with the jurisdiction of the existing police station.

These momentous decisions gave the Academy great freedom in developing its model. Chief Secretary's frequent visits to the Markaz tremendously boosted up the morale of the Markaz functionaries in the initial stages. At times they used to become so zealous and adopted such a superior attitude viz-a-viz their own district superiors (who could never imagine to come in such close and informal contact with the Chief Secretary) that I had to bring them down to earth and at times to remind them that immediate superiors were their superiors and should not be ignored under any situation. Ejaz Naik was a great source of strength in the initial stages and greatly helped in establishing a "base of operation" for the Markaz. Because of his interest and through the good offices of the Finance Secretary, Fazlur Rehman the project got its first grant of 100 thousand rupees even before the beginning of financial year 1972-73. There were others also who provided the necessary succour and encouragement. Commissioner Peshawar, Ijlal Haider Zaidi being the foremost amongst them. On his first visit to the Markaz, he agreed to make a grant of a million rupees to the project from the Works Programme, to provide us the initial financial support. Before his transfer and through the courtesy of the acting Deputy Commissioner, Mohib Kiani, we were able to get about 3.40 lacs out of the promised amount. Without this grant the progress of the project would have been greatly retarded and hampered.

In October 1972 I learnt from my friend Tariq, at Lahore, that AHK was visiting Punjab on the invitation of the then Chief Minister of Punjab. I suggested that AHK might also pay us a visit. A few days later he arrived at Peshawar. He was very discouraged by his experience in Punjab. In fact, he exhibited a clear mood of pessimism. I showed him around the Daudzai Markaz. He felt happy with what he saw but still he was doubtful whether the policy-makers in the Province wanted or would allow this

type of work to continue. I tried to assure him in every possible way that this was the position in this Province and my reasons for stating so were because I was convinced that both in the bureaucratic and the political circles there was support for this project. The bureaucratic support was manifest in Chief Secretary's interest in the project and in the Academy as ex-officio Chairman of Academy Board of Governors. In the political circles I personally knew Aslam Khan Khattak and Arbab Sikandar Khan Khalil for nearly two decades through my father-in-law Dr Abdur Rahim. Hayat Khan Sherpao had become very well known to me during my days as Deputy Commissioner Peshawar and was extremely kind, friendly and indulgent towards me. I had come to know many other politicians from all walks of life during my DC days, that being the election year. I knew these three top politicians of the Province intimately and I also knew that none of them had ever tried to impose their political views on me. In fact, they had never even given the slightest hint that I was as well known to their political opponents as to them. Young Hayat often used to tease me about my uncle-nephew relationship with Mr Aslam Khattak but never did he express any resentment to me on this relationship. I was, therefore, confident of the political support for the programme when I spoke to AHK. I arranged his meeting with the Chief Secretary and with the Governor. It happened when he called on the Governor there was a cabinet meeting in session and so AHK had an opportunity to meet the Chief Minister and some Provincial Ministers also. After the meeting AHK was still not so sure and his response was definitely not positive.

He was of the view that the policy-makers did not understand the programme. On my rejoinder that we should not worry about their understanding so long as we continue getting their support. Akhter Hameed Khan was left unconvinced. I could see the wisdom of his remark when a few days later, at a function of the Academy, the Governor publically had a dig at me and said that a few years ago a project was started at Sardar Garhi and every body was taken there and now one found nothing there. Similarly Shoab Sultan Khan has set up a Daudzai and every body is being taken there. However, I had my satisfaction when a few months later, the Governor visited Daudzai to inaugurate the tree plantation week, at the behest of Ghaus Khattak, Vice-Chancellor, Peshawar (then Chief Conservator of Forest) University, and after seeing

Daudzai Markaz, asked me as to why we cannot have similar set up at all police stations of the Province. I replied, "Sir, this is for you to decide."

Aslam Khattak during his Governorship gave us all support. He even gave a banquet to the delegates to the International Seminar held at the Academy but he did not visit Daudzai Markaz, although he made programmes many a time. I often used to say to him that Daudzai is more internationally known than locally known, and Akhter Hameed Khan's observation that the policy makers do not understand the programme was proved with such callousness at the time when the Prime Minister asked the Governor about the progress of Integrated Rural Development Programme in his Province and the Governor innocently replied that there was no IRDP in his Province. However the situation was saved by some people present who re-assured the Governor that probably his Province was far ahead in developing a meaningful programme.

The greatest support and the strongest umbrella was that provided to us by late Hayat Mohammad Khan Sherpao. He literally gave us blind support. As Minister for Planning and Development and as Senior Minister in the Government, we were never in need of any other support for the programme. He interceded on our behalf in the most spirited fashion, when the German grant for expansion of Daudzai approach to adjoining five Thanas was in jeopardy, Hayat Mohammad Khan Sherpao made me sit in his office for five hours and finally got the grant approved by the Federal Minister concerned. Akhter Hameed Khan's regret was that even he did not understand the programme and gave the support because he thought we were good people and must be doing good work.

Akhter Hameed Khan left with a half-hearted promise to come back and finally I did persuade him to visit us before taking up his assignment abroad. By March 1973 the Markaz had been well established but we were almost in a blind alley. The mere appointment and physical location of Markaz functionaries at Daudzai was not showing any tangible results and nor was it creating any impact on the public. In fact, every time I went to the Markaz my heart sank, seeing it a deserted place, although visitors praised us, encouraged us but I knew in my heart that we were literally doing nothing to solve the people's problems. Akhter Hameed Khan came and he looked at the situation and drew up a blue-print of

work for us for the next one year. He not only did this but also encouraged us very much and assured us that we were on the right lines and the difficulties we were encountering were a sure indication of our making a headway. Within three or four months of the implementation of Akhter Hameed Khan's advice results started showing up and the project staff as well as Academy faculty found the work very satisfying. The monthly meetings of the faculty with the Markaz project staff did a great deal in forging a meaningful relationship between the Academy and the project. Akhter Hameed Khan's advice and comments on the proceedings of the faculty-cum-project staff meetings, in the shape of monthly letters, provided us the necessary guidance and sense of direction so very essential at that stage. Akhter Hameed Khan performed his role as an "absentee landlord" in a most effective and dedicated fashion. For me personally it always came as the beacon when I was most on the verge of giving up; it was comforting to know that such tensions and rifts were a natural consequences of this type of work.

The Provincial Government, in the meantime, started showing anxiety about the pace of the IRD Programme in the Province. During Akhter Hameed Khan's visit in March, we had called on the Development Commissioner, and offered to formulate an expansion programme for the whole Province. However, the response at that time was not encouraging. There had been a change since then and Masoodur Rauf took over as the new Development Commissioner. Hence, when the new Chief Secretary Nasrum Minullah desired that the programme be expanded quickly, there was no difficulty in getting a PC-I (Planning Commission Proforma No. 1 for preparation of development plans) prepared. The PC-I envisaged opening of 87 Markaz in the Province in two years and only dealt with expansion of the departments to the police station level along with local government department functionaries, i.e. project managers, project engineers and cooperative officers. The PC-I did not include provision for works programme but stimulated provision of funds for works from the Peoples Works Programme. The PC-I did not stipulate grant of funds to and setting up of a Markaz federation as a central bank, although it did visualize a two tier cooperative system in the Markaz. The PC-I was in due course approved by the Provincial Development Working Party and then by the Central Development Working Party of the Planning Commission. It finally went up to the Executive Committee of the

National Economic Council and thus North-West Frontier Province became the first Province of the country to have got its IRDP PC-I approved. A Directorate General of IRDP was also set up but the Secretary, Local Government, under whom the Directorate was set up, had his own reservations about the expansion of the programme at such a fast pace. There were certain other issues also on which we did not appear to be in consonance. However, in view of Chief Secretary's anxiety for a sizable programme steps were taken to open as many Markaz as possible. Later in my absence Akhter Hameed Khan was able to fully convert the Secretary (Imtiaz Sahibzada) to his way of thinking.

Akhter Hameed Khan's return in March coincided with my departure abroad. The happenings during the period of my absence have been so described by Akhter Hameed Khan in the monograph on the training of first group of IRD Project Officers. "It was most unfortunate that just when the trainees were observing the Daudzai Project it was passing through its worst phase. Since the departure of PARD Director, who was the official project director of Daudzai, PARD's position was ambiguous. There was an unseemly tug of war. Even now the administrative tangle has not been resolved and PARD is no more than an impotent observer in the pilot project which is supposed to be guided by it. If this situation continues to prevail more harm than good will be done by using Daudzai as a training demonstration." Again in the second review of the project, Akhter Hameed Khan observes:

The report is a review of the working of Daudzai project during Financial Year 1974-75 (first July to 30th June). It was a strange year. At its beginning, after high hopes, there came several months of frustration when Project Director went away on long leave and the project smothered by administrative tangles. Of course, a sort of routine continued, but the formation of groups ended. Then in October, 1974 the Project Director rejoined and organizational activities started with fresh vigour. The third year's objectives, as indicated in the first review, for enrolment of groups and infrastructure were easily fulfilled.

Akhter Hameed Khan was very distressed and ready to leave. In his view no one seemed to be interested in the programme and when I asked him as to what actions he would like to be taken to

satisfy him, he listed these as follows: (i) active interest of the policy-makers and the reconstitution of the Daudzai Governing Body.

(ii) preparation of revised PC-I on the guidelines already approved, and (iii) release of Daudzai Markaz budget according to prototype approved for other Markaz.

To satisfy him on these issues, I arranged a meeting with the Chief Secretary (late in the evening) where Akhter Hameed Khan accused the Chief Secretary of not having given him more than 20 minutes in the seven months that he was at Peshawar. The chief Secretary not only satisfied him that the Provincial Government was very earnest about the programme but also gave a *carte blanche* to the Director, P.A.R.D., in regard to Provincial IRD. He also agreed to reconstitute the Daudzai Governing Body (in Director PARD's absence this was set up under the Chairmanship of Secretary Local Government) under the Chairmanship of Development Commissioner with Provincial Secretaries as its members. The Governing Body now became the forum for keeping the policy-makers informed about the model and also in clarifying many administrative and financial issues for the Provincial IRDP. The Academy was entrusted with the preparation of the revised PC-I on the principles already approved by the Development Commissioner and the Chief Secretary. A meeting with Hayat Mohammad Khan Sherpao finally convinced Akhter Hameed Khan about the Provincial Government's keenness and earnestness in implementing the programme. Akhter Hameed Khan again left in December to take up his teaching assignment for winter semester at Michigan but by then we had the programme firmly established and with the appointment of a new Director General (Sahibzada Younus and his aide Javed Musharraf), the Provincial programme started gaining momentum and very soon we made up for the lost time. The PC-I was got revised and approved by the Provincial Development Working Party and the monthly conference with the Provincial Markaz at the Academy was firmly established. This greatly helped in bringing back the Markaz on the rails in adhering to their first year's programme. Recruitment for new Markaz to be opened in 1975-76 were also finalized and training started from March 1975. The revised PC-I which envisaged a 700 million ruppies expansion programme was sent up to C.D.W.P. and was got approved on Akhter Hameed Khan's return,

Daudzai attained widespread acclaim specially from foreigners and foreign aid-giving agencies. Edgar Owens after his visit to Daudzai wrote to me "Thanks to you, there is at least one good rural project in Pakistan. How do we persuade Presidents and Prime Ministers to make a Daudzai the basis for nation-wide rural development? When someone can answer that question, one can begin to believe again in a better future for all of us."

Kurt Jansson, Resident Representative, UNDP, after his visit to Daudzai wrote: "I share the views of those who consider that project [Daudzai] to be the best in the IRDP."

T.K. Osgood of the World Bank wrote: "I feel there is a great deal for us to see and to learn in N.W.F.P."

Professor Guy Hunter, described Director PARD's address on Daudzai model at the Second International Seminar on Change in Agriculture at the University of Reading: "I thought your address was a model of how to present a quite difficult subject in an absolutely clear and simple way with the result that it had much more effect than the marvellous dexterity of Paul-Marc Henry, who contrived to say almost nothing with extreme brilliance."

Dr Ruttan, President, Agricultural Development Council, wrote: "I was particularly impressed by the Integrated Rural Development effort that is being made in the North-West Frontier Province."

Amongst others who came and encouraged us was Ford Foundation's, Frank J. Miller (along with aides Garland Wood and Tom Hiatt) who in the early stages of the project made a grant of 120,000 dollars to the Academy.

His successor Dr John Cool took up the thread left by his predecessor and supported the programme vigourously.

Joe Wheeler of US-AID and his aides, Waggoner, MacIntyre, Bill Thomas and Ken Lyvers, showed keen interest in the project and probably did a lot of propaganda work on our behalf.

Gilbert Brown of the World Bank always encouraged us greatly on his annual visits with the Economic Mission.

Amongst our frequent and keenly interested visitors were the Australian Ambassador and the British Embassy Economic Minister. Lately we had a visit by the Deputy Director, World Bank Economic Development Institute, Frost, and we have since received a request for holding one of the EDI courses at the Academy.

Within the country V.A. Jaffery, Secretary, Planning Division, was the first Federal Secretary to visit Daudzai, although the reason

he gave was that his visit was more in "self-defence" as most of the foreign visitors talked about Daudzai. In fact, Secretary, Planning, encouraged us right from the beginning and gave support to the programme at every step. Aftab Ahmad Khan, Secretary, Economic Affairs Division, was a frequent visitor to the Academy and a true friend. I.A. Imtiaz, formerly Chairman, Planning and Development Board, Government of Punjab, was one of our advocates. Mian Riazuddin was another. Saeed Qureshi, Chief Secretary Sind, and Additional Chief Secretary (Development), Rafiq Akhund, also evinced keen interest in the programme, so also M.I.K. Khalil, of E.A.D. and Siraj Yousuf Khan, of Ministry of Finance. Our friend Tariq at Lahore persuaded Chief Minister Punjab to pay us a visit along with the Chief Secretary Masrur Hassan Khan. Latif Mirza of Punjab was also a frequent visitor to the Academy and the Project.

In the Governor of N.W.F.P. Retired Maj. Gen. Said Ghawas and Abdur Raziq Khan, Provincial Minister for Local Government and Rural Development, we found true supporters. At a high-powered meeting in Islamabad, when there was a general condemnation of the way IRDP was progressing, Minister Raziq Khan, came out strongly in favour of Frontier IRDP and the Agricultural Enquiry Committee largely endorsed the principles applied at Daudzai. On another occasion, when the Provincial Registrar Co-operatives wanted to reopen certain fundamental issues, agreed to by his predecessor, A.S. Ahmed, Minister Raziq got a meeting convened at ministerial level and resolved the issue to our entire satisfaction. I had almost started forgetting the loss of Sherpao.*

The credit for all the work really goes to everyone associated with the project and of course most to the people of Daudzai, who responded so magnificently. The Academy faculty and the staff served as the sheet-anchor for the project. Amongst them the most pronounced was Minnajuddin's contribution, who worked with real dedication and diligence. Rizvi, the Deputy Director, in his own suave way nourished the project at every step. Naqvi did pioneering research work and Jaffar and Azim worked very hard and so did all the Research Officers. The Research Section under the untiring and zealous supervision of Tariq Durrani (Research Consultant) acquired new dimensions. The Project under Captain

*Sherpao was killed in a bomb blast in February 1975.

Israruddin found its feet and Cooperative Officers Motaher and Ghulam Habib along with Engineer Kazi made Akhter Hameed Khan's vision a reality. Feroz Shah (who replaced Israr) took the project to new heights with the help of cooperative officer Dul Ahmad and Engineer Fazali Rehman. The departmental functionaries—the two Akbers and Imran—deserve special mention.

The success and fame of Daudzai project aroused jealousy and hostility in certain quarters. The Pakistan Academy for Rural Development became the target of a whispering campaign and sometimes of open propaganda that it was becoming a provincialized Academy and was only providing services to N.W.F.P. The factual position supported by relevant data proved these allegations false and baseless and yet attempts to subvert Academy's work and Daudzai project continued. The Academy made it abundantly clear to the Rural Development Wing of Federal Government that the principles on the basis of which Daudzai Model has been developed are as relevant in Daudzai as anywhere else in the country. In fact, Professor, Guy Hunter, commenting on "Daudzai a Case Study," pointed out the "important point of principle which have been applied in Daudzai and are relevant to the Rural Development projects in almost any context." Guy Hunter circulated over 100 copies of the Case Study, later published in Journal "Agricultural Administration" from Reading, England. The Provinces specially Sind and Punjab at policy level (Chief Minister, Chief Secretary, etc.) did express interest in Daudzai and the possibilities of starting projects in those Provinces on these lines. The Academy always endeavoured to be of service to other Provinces and in fact the Director made many visits to Lahore and Karachi to canvass for the acceptance of Academy's approach on rural development. But it must be appreciated that the Academy could only canvass and it had no authority to force any Province to accept its approach. Of late, the Federal Rural Development Wing realized the need for giving encouragement to the Academy in its IRD work. But alas! too late!

On the basis of an invective submitted by a disgruntled trainee (a tehsil level officer, who was sent back by the Academy in the fifth week of the course for indifference and lack of interest in training), the Chief Secretary, N.W.F.P. and ex-officio Chairman of the Academy Board of Governors, F.K. Bandial, commented:

I am enclosing a copy of the explanation of Dr. Iftikhar Ali Khilji [Assistant District Health Officer] for your prompt consideration and comments. As you would notice he has made some telling observations and asked some leading questions as regards what the Academy is doing and what some of its staff members are saying. From the way he has questioned certain loyalties, disputed certain bonafidies, mentioned certain names and criticised certain views, one would seriously wonder whether the Academy was serving its true purpose. You are indeed the right person to tell.

I did try to convince the Chief Secretary through an explanation followed by an interview at Akhter Hameed Khan's request which again was followed by Akhter Hameed Khan's explanation in writing that the allegations were baseless. But the Chief Secretary was probably not convinced of our bonafidies or may be he was? However, on 8 August 1975 while opening the "fresh receipts," the following words started me in the face:

Notification No. 8/2/75-AI dated 7th August, 1975

Mr. SHOAIB SULTAN KHAN, Director, Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, Peshawar, in Grade 20, is appointed as Officer on Special Duty, Establishment Division, Rawalpindi, in his own grade with immediate effect and until further orders.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE STRATEGY FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT

To ensure that the principles of the pilot project conformed to Government policies and its research findings were examined by the policy-makers, a Governing Body was constituted in October 1974 with the Provincial Development Commissioner as Chairman and departmental Secretaries (and Director General, IRDP) as members and as Director of the Academy and Project Director, Daudzai I acted as Secretary. Academy Research Section began to submit a monthly progress report. Continuous review by the Governing Body reinforced the pilot project and created an understanding among the Departments about the role of IRDP. It helped in clarifying many administrative and financial issues for the Provincial programme. Thus on the one hand the Daudzai project proceeding in advance and documenting in progression served as a pioneer for other projects and on the other it provided the policy-makers with an illuminating case study.

On the basis of the experience gained at Daudzai, the objectives of rural development and the future phasing and funding of the programme can be clarified as follows:

Objectives of Integrated Rural Development

(1) To establish a Centre (Markaz) of development administration for a conveniently small area (a police station area in Pakistan with the exception of the Province of Baluchistan). To construct here an office building and a residential colony to accommodate all departmental representatives. To promote co-ordination between the departments and local institutions like co-operatives and self-government.

(2) To establish Local Government Council at, at least, the Markaz level and to locate the Markaz Council at the Centre and co-ordinate its work with the departments through a Local Government Department official (at present called Project Manager) and an elected Chairman of the Council,

(3) To plan and complete the physical infrastructure for the area; roads, drainage, irrigation, land improvement and electrification. To appoint for the purpose an engineering unit for survey and blueprints, to prepare the plans in consultation with the village people and to train and supervise local organizations (co-operatives and councils) for executing the works and maintaining them permanently.

(4) To make organization and mobilization of the village people as the chief concern of the Centre. To create for this purpose a two-tier organization—village organizations federated at the Centre.

(5) To train intensively and continuously many cadres of local leaders (organization managers, model farmers, project committees, councillors, teachers, paramedics, etc.).

(6) To promote extension education and servicing by all nation building departments through village institutions, especially by the two-tier organization. To train continuously for this purpose representatives of organized village groups as extension agents (managers, model farmers, paramedics, youth club leaders, school teachers, etc.).

(7) To create a strong and viable structure of co-operative credit for the majority of the farmers (most of them small) in the shape of two-tier organization—primary societies federated at the Markaz. To promote thrift, saving and investment along with credit, to collect equity capital and aim at self-financing and self-management. The Markaz Federation's functions will be to co-ordinate, train and supervise, along with banking. The village organization, in most cases, will be entrusted with the execution of infrastructure work.

(8) To add gradually other blocks (e.g. machine workshop and tractor station, tubewell drilling and maintenance section, co-operative processing unit, agro-industries). The emphasis will be on the growth and expansion of the co-operative sector financed and controlled by the majority of small farmers.

(9) As the villages become better organized and more productive, to expand the health, family planning and education programmes, e.g. establish a school board to organize along with the existing institutions, literacy, youth and woman's programmes.

(10) To integrate the local-level plan with regional and national plans.

Economic, Political and Social Objectives

These objectives in a specific manner include broader economic, political and social objectives which are being emphasized by the government. For instance, the economic impact of the Markaz programmes will reduce losses caused by the absence of protective infrastructure and will increase productivity by at least 30 per cent in five years. They will also provide more employment on a temporary as well as on a permanent basis for at least 20 per cent of the labour force.

They will raise agricultural skill and yields by 25 per cent in five years. They will build co-operative equity capital belonging to small farmers, teaching them fundamental habits of thrift, saving and investment. Politically local government institutions will promote the exercise of popular control and responsible management and leadership. The two-tier organization will strengthen small farmers' position and reduce the excessive privileges acquired by large owners of land and capital. Socially the work on and the development of infrastructure will improve the condition of wage workers. Thus tensions may be reduced with wider employment, increased productivity of land and the strong position of the small farmers.

It is obvious that a programme of rural development is a long-term activity. Everything cannot be achieved at once. Organization takes time, so does the construction of the physical infrastructure. If the initial work is done thoroughly, though slowly, there would soon be a gathering momentum. The capacity for more and better work will grow rapidly. This lesson was well illustrated in Daudzai Project.

Fundamentals for Development

The Academy research showed that as far as small farmers are concerned, while many factors are involved, there are three fundamentals for development:

- (1) It is not possible to improve land, to extend irrigation, or control erosion or waterlogging except through the joint action of disciplined groups.
- (2) It is not possible to develop an effective extension system for small farmers except through the same disciplined groups.
- (3) It is not possible to develop an effective credit system for small farmers unless they are organized in disciplined groups.

Accumulation and investment of capital, acquisition of higher productive skills and protection and improvement of land are the fundamental factors on which depends the economic advancement of the small farmers and by which their progress can be measured. Other factors, like the presence of experts such as government extension services, or facilities for health and education are indeed helpful but their effectiveness increases or decreases in proportion to the discipline or anarchy prevalent in the villages.

Phasing and Funding

Since Daudzai Project was developed with the sole objective of expansion and replication of the model to the rest of the Province of the Northwest frontier in particular and to the rest of the country in general, a programme based on the Daudzai experience was prepared and put into execution in early 1975. In the light of the field experience the future phasing and funding of the rural development programme in NWFP of Pakistan was planned as follows:

First Year

1. Posting of the following staff:
 - (i) Project Manager and assistants;
 - (ii) Cooperative Organizer and assistants; and
 - (iii) Engineer and assistants.
2. Completion of Markaz building and residential colony.
3. Engineering survey and preparation of plans and blue prints for infrastructure works.
4. Cooperative education and organization for works, agricultural development and cooperative credit.

Second Year

1. Posting of Departmental officers.
2. Registration of village organizations and federation.
3. Infrastructure works, 10 per cent.
4. Agriculture extension and cooperative credit for 25 per cent villages.
5. Establishment of local councils.

Third Year, Fourth Year and Fifth Year

20 to 25 per cent increase in each activity, viz., works, extension,

credit, etc., to cover the entire area in five years.

The Funding of each Markaz for five years was projected on the following scale:

1. Buildings	700 (Rs 000)
2. Equipment and transport	150
3. Markaz staff (Local Govt.)	736
4. Departmental staff	836
5. Grant to Federation	400
6. Infrastructure works	3,200
7. Cooperative credit	800
Total	6,800

This was the general level of investment prescribed for every Markaz area.

Expansion and Replication

By the end of 1975 the Daudzai approach had been extended to 34 Markaz areas (including five Markaz areas taken up under West German Government assistance) covering nearly one-third of the province. The recruitment of the core staff of these Markaz was done by an ad hoc committee headed by the chairman of the Provincial Public Service Commission, pending regular recruitment, and a four-month training course devised by PARD was given to the staff, before their posting to the Markaz areas. A monthly conference of all the Markaz areas core staff was also held at the Academy, after the initial training, to monitor their working and get the necessary feedback. A directorate of integrated rural development was set up at the provincial level to execute the provincial programme.

Diagnostic Survey

In Daudzai the entire project staff was involved in preparing surveys and blueprints—first without consulting the local population and then with their full consultations. The final surveys and blueprints revealed that there existed significant differences between whatever limited data were available (mostly from revenue records) and what was finally surveyed. Also, the blueprints made after consulting the local people were found to be more realistic and beneficial than those planned independently by the Project staff.

Accordingly while replicating the model in other Markaz areas,

the diagnostic survey began in Year One and lasted through full one year. It provided a detailed picture of villages in a Markaz area at a micro level, generally not available in government records. The survey included basic statistics of the area (area, population, crops, cropping intensities, yields, land holdings, schools, dispensaries, etc.) and the likely infrastructure works schemes which will benefit the rural population living within the Markaz area. The blueprints for works included: the cost-estimates; the likely benefits; and the number of beneficiaries. The Survey and the blueprints in a Markaz area became: (a) the basis of Works Programme on which Rs 3.2 million are to be spent from Year Two through Year Five of the Programme, or 47 per cent of the Markaz budget for five years, (b) the mechanism which focusses on the real clientele (the beneficiaries), and (c) the basic plan through which the various Markaz-posted Departmental functionaries design their respective departmental strategies. The survey and blueprints were prepared only in consultation with the people. The benefits of preparing surveys and blueprints for each Markaz are evident in that the rural development strategy for each Markaz area will be unique depending upon the local problems and priorities. Planning for such problems and priorities will not be possible without the area blueprints and surveys.

In this area the constraints included the development of a corps of rural engineers; misuse of funds and a reluctance towards evolving plans in consultation with the local population. To surmount these difficulties the methodology of having a pool of engineers at the district level for supervision of the work of sub-engineers at the Markaz level was evolved. In cases of corruption, instead of withdrawing powers and centralizing them, the remedy adopted was to bring to book the corrupt functionaries promptly; and to counter the tendency towards imposition of plans on the people, the monthly meeting of the core functionaries of the Markaz was initiated.

Works Programme

As noted earlier, works schemes are based on the surveys and blueprints prepared during Year One of a five-year programme. The major portion of a Markaz budget is expended on this activity resulting in direct visible benefits from land development projects and the building of physical infrastructure. It is important to note

that works schemes are not undertaken till blueprints have been prepared and village organizations formed. In fact, no works scheme could be implemented unless a resolution had been passed by a village organization and project committee nominated by the organization to undertake the scheme in consultation with the Project Engineer. This implies that only those works could be implemented which collectively benefit. The first priority in works schemes was given to projects directly leading to increased agricultural output or leading to income generation. The prevalent system of getting projects executed through contractors was substituted by getting it done through village organizations or their nominated project committee.

Unlike Daudzai, funds for works programme were not made available as stipulated under the plan and the Directorate at the Provincial level tended to centralize the project-sanctioning authority. A system of pre-audit was also imposed on the works programme funds, which caused delay in release of funds for individual projects resulting in consequent postponement of the execution of the project. An attempt was made by the Academy to resolve these issues through intervention of policy makers, planners and administrative heads.

Village Organizations

During Year One the local population in Markaz area gets exposed to Rural Development Staff (Markaz Core Staff) conducting survey and preparing blueprints. Year One is a period of rising expectations and development awareness. Despite the temptations of undertaking investment in works schemes no physical infrastructure gets built. In Year Two a two-pronged rural strategy begins. Pressures built earlier by rising expectations and development awareness are harnessed through the formation of organizations (cooperatives). In fact, village organizations become the pivot of the entire rural development programme. Cooperatives of village organizations as treated in the rural development strategy in NWFP are "Local Development Organizations" at the village level and do not have any similarity with the traditional cooperatives functioning in the sub-continent for the last 50 years or so. Creation of these organizations that take over the development role, the maintenance of works schemes and become the vehicle for departmental extension programmes is the base on which the

whole edifice of rural development is built up. Once the village cooperatives get formed and registered under the local law, these are then federated at the Markaz level. The Federation at the Markaz is at apex of the cooperatives and also functions as the central bank for cooperative capital.

The response of the rural population to this offer of partnership between the Government and their organizations was positive in all the Markaz areas. If there was any slackening of effort in this regard it was more often on part of the Government than the people. It also resulted in creation of a development oriented local leadership.

Credits and Loans Programme

It was earlier noted that the real clientele for an effective rural development is the majority of farmers who own small landholdings. The commercial/agricultural bank credits for agriculture development have, regardless of the intention, primarily concentrated on farmers with larger landholdings. The small farmer is seldom exposed to credit for agricultural inputs. Since the present programme focuses on small farmers who are less exposed to modern agricultural inputs, it is evident this service could only be provided through group action. Loans are, therefore, given to members of village cooperatives for seeds, fertilizers and pesticides. Collective loans are also given to cooperative for pesticides, spray-pumps, soil-testing kits, tube-wells, etc. An interest rate of 12 per cent per annum is realized. These interest rates make the small farmers realize that such credits are not charities. An amount of Rs 800,000 will be available to each Markaz during the five-year phasing period as capital for credit and loans or 11.7 per cent of the total Markaz budget for five-years. This amount will be repaid to government in eight instalments after the sixth year of a Markaz functioning. Therefore, the credit and loan amount for each Markaz is an interest free loan from the government to the Markaz. The equity capital and savings accumulated in the weekly village cooperatives meetings during the five years Markaz expansion programme is anticipated to make cooperatives and the Markaz Federation independent of government grants and loans.

Despite reluctance on part of the Provincial Cooperatives Department to register the Markaz Federation as a Central Bank and inadequate and irregular provision of funds the credits pro-

gramme in most of the Markaz areas made significant inroads and impact. The rate of repayment was highly satisfactory compared to that of the loans advanced by credit institutions.

Departmental/Extension Programme

The programme aims at providing services of nine nation-building departments at the Markaz level. The departmental functionaries physically posted at the Markaz complex include the following Departments: Revenue, Health, Education, Animal Husbandry, Forests, Agriculture, Cooperatives, Small Industries and Electricity. The primary objective is to train through Department functionaries, representatives of village cooperatives in their respective fields. In addition the functionaries carry out their respective departmental development programmes. This mechanism on the one hand benefits not individuals but groups, while on the other, puts least pressure on the available thin layer of government staff. The extension benefits are, therefore, maximized by least inputs. The strategy envisages a status quo regarding the development efforts of the various government departments. All nation-building departments continue to pursue their respective development plans in the rural areas. However through the Markaz their efforts will be more effectively tapped by a thrust in which rural population (through cooperative action) will take the initiative of "demanding" a project or service and the Departmental functionaries will be "supplying" the project or service. The Project Manager or his staff will be coordinator between the "supplier" and the "consumer." This will: (i) eliminate fears that the Markaz is a super department; (ii) keep the departmental functionaries' seniority and promotion intact with their respective departments; and (iii) eliminate inter-departmental jealousies so frequently cited as one of the causes of failure of the earlier programmes, such as, Village AID, ADC, SCARP, etc.

Despite every effort to allay apprehensions of the line departments it needed an Herculean effort to really convince them of the intentions of the programme. There was some change perceptible but the goal appeared still a long way away.

Issues and Prospects

Inevitably a programme of the type that innovates, deviates from standard development procedures and aims at a particular

group in the economic system will encounter opposition. It is a long-term effort. It aims at a fundamental behavioural change. Although results in economic terms can be shown in the short run, the ultimate test of success is whether the programme can change the way the village people think about themselves and their environment. Unlike a large engineering project where scientific principles are well established and international experience has accumulated, there is no such established body of knowledge for rural development and the programme based on Daudzai approach is in the time sense experimental. There would inevitably be unsuccessful experiments as well as successful. The process of experimentation needs time and cannot be hurried excessively. For this reason it must have support for a sufficiently long period to ensure a full opportunity to succeed. Political leadership cannot insist on definite performance in the very short run so that it will have an impact within a particular term of office or before a particular election.

CHAPTER SIX²⁶PAKISTAN ACADEMY FOR
RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Independence from colonial rule threw two major challenges to the people of Pakistan—one of self-government in a democratic institutional framework and the other of building up a viable economy in which distribution of rewards and enterprises reinforce each other. These were formidable challenges when it is remembered that for centuries the country had an established authoritarian political set-up, a feudal social organization and a peculiar geographical situation. On the other hand, it hardly had any innovative and entrepreneurial spirit or an infrastructure necessary for building up a modern economy and, above all, had suffered at its very birth a damaging social and economic disruption due to partition. It was obvious that these challenges could only be met by the government accepting responsibility, redefining national goals, devising mechanisms for planning and implementing them and developing new social, political and economic institutions in keeping with the hopes and aspirations of the people.

The Government of Pakistan hence decided to set up an organization which should serve as a link between the people and the administration—between the masses and the departments engaged in nation-building activities. Through this organization, it was hoped to achieve the expansion in all directions. Called the Village Agricultural Industrial Development (V-AID) Programme, the organization was started in early 1953. The central figure of this programme was the village worker, stationed in the village after a year's training at one of the Village AID Training Institutes, but no institution existed to train the staff which was to supervise the work of the village workers.

The anomaly of having an untrained supervisory staff train expert village workers was recognized in the First Five Year Plan which envisaged the establishment of two Village AID Academies for the purpose of giving pre-service training to the trainers and adminis-

trators for the new Village AID Work and carrying out research. Simultaneously, several other institutions emerged in the country for the training of administrators. The most important among them were the Administrative Staff College and the National Institutes of Public Administration. The scope and the role of the Academy was laid down and carefully planned training in the career of a public servant was agreed upon in addition to the prescribed probationary training, as follows: (a) training at the Village Development Academies before attaining a deputy commissioner's or equivalent rank; (b) training at the National Institute of Public Administration between the eighth and fourteenth year of service; (c) training at the Pakistan Administrative Staff College between the fourteenth and twentieth year of service; and (d) training abroad in specialized fields for selected officers.

Approach to Training

The Academy developed its approach to training along the following lines:

(1) for rural development, the villagers were to be made aware of their rights and responsibilities and be prepared to shoulder them;

(2) due to the large number of villagers, training through any one agency or institution was not possible and necessitated the use of persons who contacted them most frequently and influence them;

(3) these persons were Government functionaries of all categories playing the triple role of (a) administrators, (b) educators/trainers and (c) friends, philosophers and guides;

(4) the functionaries, by virtue of their status and position and whether consciously or unconsciously are educating the people. But faced with the challenge of developing the country, they will have to train the people, particularly rural people, more like professionals and will themselves have to learn the techniques of doing so;

(5) the functionaries have the authority and power to get things done, but the results were not permanent. Hence the effort had to be the people's own in order to create lasting impact.

(6) the functionaries had to be trained afresh and equipped for the present day needs and for the new role they were to play;

(7) re-training the functionaries, particularly those dealing with rural people was designed to: (a) focus attention on the use of social sciences as a means of supplementing and reinforcing their job skills and knowledge; (b) convince the functionaries of the growing importance of research and cultivating a scientific and objective outlook; (c) help these functionaries better equip themselves as educators in addition to their regular roles and thereby creating techniques of training adults in informal situations; and (d) collect and analyse such material, with the help of the functionaries who come to the Academy for training, as could be subsequently used for improving administration with special emphasis on rural administration.

(8) In re-training the functionaries care will be taken to ensure that the Academy training is in addition to, and not an alternative for, the developmental training, and

(9) since Government functionaries are to be trained in the Academy in the context of their utility it would be desirable if they were trained along with rural elders with whom they work.

Training Patterns

The assumption on which the Academy training is based is that rural development is really a problem of rural administration and the development process can be accelerated only if administrators are equipped with the necessary skills to be effective instruments of change. Parallel to this, the people have also to accept change and be involved in the development programmes. Within this framework, the Academy training is confined to: (1) Imparting in-service training to administrators in development, (2) (a) conducting research in rural development and its administration, for it to be realistic and meaningful, and (b) experimenting with new techniques of rural development and forwarding the results to the relevant Departments; (3) organizing conventions, seminars, conferences and off-campus courses as well as action research programmes.

In order that the training has a fuller and more effective impact, it has to be imparted in a way that brings out the best in the participants. It should be beyond the basic employment terms and conditions called for. In other words, the method to be adopted should be flexible enough to include and ensure: (a) the maximum involvement of the participants in the different phases of training;

(b) that the various disciplines represented at the Academy do not function only in their specialized subject, but are integrated with a view to giving the participants a better understanding of the problems they are expected to face.

Training Courses

The Academy regularly organizes miscellaneous courses besides holding seminars, conventions and workshops.

The courses are held for officers of the provincial governments. These are heterogeneous courses and in each, on an average, 12 provincial departments are represented. Courses are spread over six to eight weeks organized upon request.

For regular courses, the year has been divided into three training sessions of eight weeks each. Special courses, like decentralized training, are arranged in the interval between sessions or simultaneously with the regular courses.

Since 1959 the Academy has organized a total of 960 courses and has trained 25,802 persons.

Each course is tailored to the needs of the group and the participants are encouraged to analyse their problems with the help of social sciences and discuss the solutions themselves. The disciplines represented in the programme include: Public Administration; Social Psychology; Rural Sociology and Applied Anthropology; Development Economics; Agricultural Economics and Extension; Education and Communication; and Social Research.

Decentralized On-The-Job-Training

Another facet of the training programme has been its decentralized, on-the-job training. The number of officers to be trained is so large that it would take decades before they can all pass through the Academy. To accelerate the pace and to have the largest number possible benefit, the Academy has been conducting short off-campus decentralized training courses. The object is to give short exposure of the Academy training to officers who have as yet had no opportunity of coming to the Academy. Decentralized training thus helps train a large number of officers without removing them from their jobs and also prepares them for future regular courses.

Research and Experimentation

Although the main emphasis is on training, research and experimental projects in specific fields have also been undertaken. Around 1966, it was felt that the training approach in some cases was not proving so successful. Attempts were made to launch a few action research projects such as the Wara Lasoona or the Rural Youth Project, the Ulema Project, Mosque Feeder Schools Project, Adult Education Project, Farm Bureau Project, etc. Of these, the Wara Lasoona proved to be the most successful and after proper evaluation was offered to the different provincial governments and agencies as a replica, in keeping with the role of the Academy. To undertake a project and experiment with different ideas and theories with a view to producing a viable model, the project is continuously evaluated, independent of the agencies directly involved in its execution.

The Wara Lasoona programme initiated in ten primary schools in 1966, set out to inculcate in rural school children; the love of Islamic values, a liking for agriculture, habits of saving and thrift. Training was imparted in cooperation within school co-operative stores and in community development. The programme was extended to 92 rural schools and encompassed nearly 11,000 rural boys and girls. In terms of physical achievements, the children saved over Rs 72,000.00 and bought co-operative shares amounting to Rs 8,771.000 which earned them a profit of Rs 3,141.00.

Considerable work was done in community development such as repairing the school house, making a culvert, cleaning and paving village paths and mosques, etc. It was estimated that a substantial income accrued through agricultural plots and poultry farms. The programme was accepted by all the four provinces for adoption and specially by the Sind Government's Department of Education. Thus the Youth Programme has been adopted in a large number of schools in Sind, including 10 girl's primary schools of Karachi.

Another important project in the field of education was initiated by the Academy in 1968 aimed at turning village mosques into feeder schools. The potential of this project cannot be underestimated. In order to achieve universal primary education by 1979, the Government of NWFP should open at least 8,000 primary schools. There are now about 5,000. Each new school shall cost the Provincial Government, around Rs 20,500.00, in building costs alone even assuming that there shall be no increase in building material costs, labour expenses, etc. In addition, the Provincial Government

will have to allot Rs 2,000 against the recurring expenditure for a one-teacher school. The total for all this would come to a staggering figure which the Provincial Government would be in no position to provide. However, through this project the Academy has been experimenting with an idea whereby functional literacy would be made available to rural children at less than Rs 1,500 per annum per mosque. Construction expenses would be eliminated altogether and the recurring expenditure of running the school almost halved. The project has great potential in universal primary education and the Academy is continuously documenting and evaluating the results.

Despite these action research projects, the need for an all-embracing project was keenly felt. Government's Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) provided the necessary base for launching such a project. Of the nine project areas to be launched under IRDP by the Government of NWFP, one was given to the Academy for implementation. The Academy with the necessary expertise, selected an area where some of the action research projects had already been tried. The Provincial Government on its part agreed to help adapt to IRDP's mode of operation. They agreed that the selected project area should correspond to an already existing administrative unit so that some of the basic infra-structural facilities become available. This was a deviation from that had been laid down for the IRDP where a much smaller region was to form the project area. The Academy selected a bigger area for the simple reason that if the experiment was successful it would be possible to replicate it. The Daudzai Markaz, the project area, comprises eight (now defunct) union councils, 90 square miles and 89 villages with a population of about 96,000 (1972 census). The Markaz headquarters are located at Nahaqi where the police headquarters are also located.

Having established the Markaz (the hub of the project area), action was taken with regard to the creation of "base of operation" centres, where development could be extended. This is a platform where people come together and a viable unit of planning without which rural development rarely takes place.

The Daudzai Project has been accepted as the rural development model for the North West Frontier Province and a scheme approved by the Pakistan Government for its expansion and replication at an estimated cost of Rs 56 million with an annual recurring expen-

dition of Rs 25 million and an additional development grant to each project from the Provincial Annual Development Programme of rupees 1 million for the next ten years. Hence at the peak of its implementation there would be an allocation of over Rs 125 million annually for rural development in the Province.

Research and Publications

The academy carries out research in rural development and administration problems. All faculty members are involved both in training and research at a Research Section with a staff of eight senior workers. Research activities are organized around: (1) individual and joint research projects by faculty members; (2) collecting basic material for training and other purposes; (3) research projects in collaboration with other institutions; and (4) research by the participants.

There are several individual and joint research projects which have been completed and their reports published, while some are still in progress.

Collection of Basic Material

Under this head, the Research Section collects basic data about the country, districts, departments, etc. and passes it on to the Academy for teaching and reference purposes. Basic facts about various districts in the NWFP and the West Pakistan Police are typical results of such efforts.

Research Projects in Collaboration with other Institutions

The academy has carried out collaborative research with institutions like the Board of Economic Enquiry, Peshawar, National Reconstruction Bureau, Government of Pakistan, Public Administration Department, Punjab University, and the UNESCO Research Centre.

Research by Participants

The academy also encourages in-coming participants to undertake small research projects which helps them not only in clarifying their ideas but also learning techniques for designing questionnaires, data collection, tabulation and preparation of reports. Some of their researches have been published.

Academy Publications

During the past 15 years the academy has published about 115 research reports, training reports, monographs, seminar studies, etc. The Academy also publishes the "*Journal of Rural Development and Administration*" once every three months.

Evaluation

Evaluation at the Academy serves a dual purpose. On the one hand, it offers a chance to measure the programme effectiveness and to improve upon it and, on the other, it helps the participants to assess their own contributions.

The Academy evaluates all its training programmes by employing techniques such as: (a) teaching and other assignments; (b) field training reports; (c) class room participation; and (d) personal observations.

The assignments, questionnaires, field reports, etc., are graded by instructors, individually or jointly and consolidated, so as to show a participant's competence to understand rural development work and to help in enacting it when necessary. Certificates are awarded at the end of the courses.

Follow-Up

The most important and difficult problem is to devise a successful follow-up programme to gauge the training impact on the participants. The Academy has not made much headway in this direction. However, following are some of the mechanisms adopted during the last twelve years for the purpose:

- (1) Participants are encouraged to write on the problems they face in the field and how far they have been able to make use of the knowledge and insights gained in the Academy.
- (2) Instructors visit the participants during training breaks in their district headquarters to discuss the problems and evaluate the effectiveness of training.
- (3) The Academy issues questionnaires to ex-participants from time to time to elicit reactions of the trainees.
- (4) It holds annual conventions where selected participants from various regions and departments are to be invited to read out papers and voice their reactions to the training programme.

As besides internal evaluation of training and research and follow-up programmes, no evaluation of the Academy programme had been carried out by any outside agency the Academy constituted an Evaluation Committee for this purpose in 1968. The Evaluation Committee members were drawn from the Board of Governors of the Academy. It carried out a survey of the participants and interviewed a large number of ex-participants from the various departments of the four Provinces to find out the utility of the academy training to them and to the departments. The Committee also issued a questionnaire and conducted studies on the objectives of the Academy etc. After going through these interviews, questionnaires etc., the Committee was satisfied with the overall performance of the academy. Nevertheless the following recommendations were made by the Committee to further streamline the programme:

Objectives

(1) In the light of the past "ten years" experience and changing conditions the objectives of the academy should be restated as: (a) training in rural development administration; (b) generating consciousness about the utility of social research in public administration; (c) promoting development through interdepartmental approach and coordination of activities among rural development departments; and (d) closer links between administrators and the people to better achieve common goals.

(2) In order to achieve these goals, the Academy should continue to use social sciences and adopt an inter-disciplinary approach between the departments.

Course Contents and Research

(3) The course contents of training should be determined afresh, class room instruction should be related to field research and project work.

(4) Research should be given priority with reference to factors impeding or promoting rural area changes, including development administration problems.

(5) The Academy needs to operate its training and research activities within a project area serving as a laboratory in which the principles of co-operative development and coordinated efforts of the people and the government can be applied and tested.

Pilot Project

(6) In the absence of an experimental area, the Peshawar Pilot Project Area should be revived to acquire knowledge of field conditions. (Since then the Daudzai Markaz Integrated Rural Development Programme has been started.)

CHAPTER SEVEN

OBJECTIVE CONCEPTS AND OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES

Rural development has become a widespread objective of development shared by developing nations and aid donors alike. Programmes exist, or are being designed, in many countries and both domestic and foreign finance is available for them. This concern is an appropriate reaction to rural poverty and growing income disparities between rural and urban areas: Given this attention and concern it is remarkable how vague is the concept of rural development. There is no clear-out definition, there are no generally-accepted measures of performance and relatively little consistency between programmes that are called rural development in various locations. If this international concern with rural development is to be translated in rural change, more concreteness is urgently needed both to understand the complexities of the process of local level planning and also for development of training material. One contribution to such an effort could be the examination of rural development programmes that have clearly established objective concepts and operational principles.

The UNCRD's* applied research programme on planning methodologies, viz., MPCRD, encompassing a cross national empirical study on the methods of planning for basic needs of the people at micro-area level and a cross national comparative review on the experience of rural development in selected countries in Asia, is appropriate and pertinent in this context. The programme of Daudzai Markaz, which was developed on a clearly articulated set of ideas, offers an opportunity for such an analysis. There is no doubt that similar programmes in other parts of Asia and the Pacific would also lend themselves to examination and conceptualization within the MPCRD framework.

In establishing the concept and organizing principles of Daudzai

*United Nations Centre for Regional Development, Nagoya, Japan.

programme, it is readily acknowledged that there are no universally applicable models of rural development, but rather knowledge gathered from a particular situation can contribute to an evolving general body of knowledge and experience.

In the context of the tentative conceptual framework of Daudzai comparative review of experiences in Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka was undertaken by me as part of the MPCRD Research with a view to (i) identification of those factors which have been playing a crucial role in the development processes along with analyses of the functions those factors play and interrelations among those factors, and (ii) identification of key factors, through the analyses above, that have to do with augmenting implementability of development plans and programmes, i.e. distillation of those methodological ingredients which will contribute to the improvement of methods of planning for comprehensive development at micro-area level.

In attempting to establish the objective concepts and operational principles the following major issues* have been kept in view.

I. Principles of Administration and Organization for Rural Development

(a) Existing pattern of administration and search for a viable unit of development administration. What should be the largest area over which detailed contact, assistance, village level programming and investment can be exercised? The area-population relationship. Is area more important than population? Access by farmers/villagers to service centre and by government and service staff to villages. Should it be a *Thana* in Pakistan, Bangladesh etc. and a sub-district in Sri Lanka?

(b) Inadequacy of the existing departments and need for their expansion. Which departments should be most actively involved? What level of expertise this personnel should possess?

(c) Role of a coordinator at the development unit level. What powers he should exercise? Which department should he belong to? What authority, if any, he should have over other departmental functionaries? Should he be the host department? Providing office

*See Guy Hunter, "The Daudzai Project: Some Practical Implications for Agricultural Administration," *Agricultural Administration*, Vol. 3, No 1, January 1976, Applied Science Publishers, Barking, Essex, England.

and residential accommodation and in return ensuring conformity to the new role set out for the departmental functionaries.

(d) Role of the departmental functionaries. Should it be that of teachers and instructors to upgrade the human skills of villagers to help create rural cadres? How problems of training be tackled? And problem of coordination at field level and adequate senior technical supervision from specialized departments?

(e) How cadres for group organization and management be created with a view to people themselves slowly relieving the bureaucracy of multiple jobs?

(f) Is organizing people the key to rural development? To stimulate the organization of the majority of the rural population—mainly small farmers and labourers—in their villages, government help should be conditional in return for their active co-operation in this regard? Should village groups be built around the solution of specific problems to be agreed to by villagers or around a specific facility? What should be the size of groups in the initial stages? Should these be standard cooperatives? If not, what administrative innovation will be needed to define the corporate character of such groups and to settle the necessary rules for their action? The composition of these groups and the problem of keeping the “bigger man” out. The self-discipline to be imposed by the group-regular meetings, building up equity capital, subjection of group leaders to group’s constant scrutiny and willingness of the group to acquire skills through their own nominees, who in turn should be willing to get training from departmental experts.

II. Contents of Rural Development

(a) Investment in works programme and rural infrastructure. Often land development is a pre-requisite to production programmes. The need for rural works. The apathy of the established departments towards minor works and their inability to recognize need for such works. The benefit-cost ratio of such works. The employment generation aspects of the programme. Its claim as an important factor in forging common bonds between the rich and the poor of the village. The problems of execution and maintenance of works. Checking corruption. The hostility from the Public Works Department. Size of investment. (b) Agriculture extension. (c) Health programmes—village paramedics and rural health centres. (d) Village programmes: Womens; Youth; Cooperative organiza-

tion; MCH-Nutrition; Population Planning; and Sports etc. (e) Education-adult and non formal, primary and secondary.

III. Planning and Finance

(a) *Survey and Diagnosis*. Should no village programme be initiated before a preliminary survey and discussion with villagers, leading to diagnosis of priority action, has been carried out? The question of setting up a “development unit” of mixed skills, the depth of survey and time taken by it, the number of skilled personnel-needed for it and the extent to which each village may need separate attention—the micro variations from village to village.

(b) *The bogey of self-help*. Should governments be required to make big investments in rural projects at micro level before expecting any returns? Should there be equal emphasis on micro-projects as compared to big national and prestigious projects? Are local projects more productive?

(c) The relative importance to social welfare provision vis-a-vis productive projects.

(d) The case for a sizeable allocation of annual or plan development outlay for rural development *i.e.* upgrading of human skills, organizing and mobilizing rural populace, executing and maintaining local projects, availability of credit, etc. etc.

(e) Have commercial or special credit banks succeeded in reaching the poor? Or is it desirable to encourage growth of cooperative capital, as against state or private, through exploitation of indigenous and crude village-level credit institutions.

(f) Would it be better to encourage cooperative efforts for establishment of processing industries as against government intervention or private enterprise?

IV. Role of Local Councils

(a) Have local councils proved effective vehicles for economic development of a village? Do local councils tend to ignore the poor and are prone to elitist influences? Are local councils a must for rural development? Would it be desirable to have two parallel institutions in the rural areas—local councils and village groups. The former for political development and inter-village planning and taxation, the latter for economic development and cooperative activity in the private sector.

(b) Problem of integration of local councils with development

departments. Is the council chairman the most suitable coordinator?

V. Evaluation

(a) How to keep the programme on the right track and provide an in-built system for making corrections. The need for continuous monitoring and evaluation. The desirability of a commitment in favour of rigorous and continuous internal evaluation. The modus operandi for external evaluation.

(b) The absolute necessity for defining accurate indicators to measure progress.

Suggestions and Recommendations

The major issues raised in the preceding pages were indeed the problems faced in implementing the Daudzai programme. A review of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka situation further reinforced the dire need for tackling these issues effectively. When these issues are juxtaposed against conditions obtaining in the three countries we find that instead of being homogenous societies and cohesive villages, as is wrongly assumed many a time by planners and administrators, the rural people in case of Pakistan and Bangladesh are highly disorganized and in case of Sri Lanka lack concerted action because of a surfeit of village-level organizations. The government services on the other hand are either inadequate as in case of Pakistan and to some extent in Bangladesh or ineffective as in case of Sri Lanka. However in both the cases the inadequacy or ineffectiveness is made worse because of lack of organization in the rural poor. Without organization the rural poor lack the capability to make use or have access to the government services and as experience has shown most of these services are only utilized or are accessible to the better off and richer in the rural society. Organization is, therefore, the sine qua non to a successful development strategy for the rural poor. The village organizations initially need not be formal or embracing the whole village. These may be interest-groups in the beginning. Once they gain strength, they may acquire a formal status. In Daudzai village groups were registered as co-operatives fairly long after their coming into existence. In Bangladesh the organizations were mostly credit-based and required immediate registration. Bangladesh now is facing the second gene-

ration problem of these organizations being dominated by the well to do and the newly rich class created by the Comilla project approach. In Daudzai the bigger man was initially not attracted to the organization because it had little to offer him which gave enough time to the organization of the poor to gain strength and be in a position to safeguard its interests.

Organizing rural poor is not an end in itself, however, it is the surest and most effective means to establish a development partnership between the government and the people. Organization of the people has to be supplemented and supported with adequate government services which entails the establishment of a base of operations to meet the need of a "demand-oriented" strategy. Through organization, by getting it select leaders, the upgradation of human skills of the rural poor is undertaken by government experts. The local leaders so trained disseminate knowledge and skills to the members of the group and thus increase managerial and productive capacities of people at large. The role of teachers and instructors of the rural cadres has to be assumed by the representatives of the line departments. This would require not only a type of coordination mechanism different from an authority-based approach but would also channelize government services through forums in shape of village organizations and thus make departments more effective.

The stress of local level planning for works programme on productive projects only does not mean stoppage or exclusion of social and welfare provision from the ambit of rural development. It simply entails continuance of health and education programmes as nationally planned and conceived, by the departments concerned. The reasons being firstly these countries especially Bangladesh and Pakistan cannot afford to spend more than what has already been allocated to these sectors in the national plans and secondly as clearly borne out by the Sri Lanka situation that these programmes can be centrally conceived and implemented effectively. And as also apparent in Sri Lanka, social welfare programmes alone do not help in alleviating rural poverty. The thrust of local level planning should therefore be on income generation schemes. It has also been established by empirical evidence in Daudzai and in Comilla that payoff of small-scale village projects is much higher than big projects. However, the identification of such projects is only possible through active involvement of the rural people. The importance of

diagnostic survey supported with primary and secondary data was clearly brought out in case of Daudzai. Both Bangladesh and Sri Lanka lack this important component in their planning process for rural development. Dialogues with people not only result in identification of needs but also in coming up with solutions to these local problems. Since the micro variations of these needs are great these cannot be perceived by an outsider. Most of the local programmes for the rural people are however formulated on the assumption that elected leaders at the district or national level or the government servants know the needs of the people and these can therefore be met by solutions from above. Indeed this capacity is available in case of macro-projects to be located in villages or social and welfare programmes but local level projects which result in increasing incomes of the rural poor can only be identified by involving the rural poor themselves in the planning process. Even the local council proves incompetent in this regard. Experience has shown in all the three countries that local councils, elected at local level, were no substitutes for broad based village organizations especially of the rural poor. The councils, because of their elitist domination, were firstly not so much concerned with the problems of the poor and secondly they had no mechanism to undertake a diagnostic survey for evolving a local level plan based on productive schemes. The local council mostly confine themselves to building of schools, dispensaries or community buildings. They do however prove effective in identifying projects affecting more than one village such as communications problems. A works programme, wholly left to local councils, therefore fails to produce the desired results. It is therefore necessary that along with the local councils structure there should be a structure for economic development of the rural people. In Bangladesh experiments are being tried with primary cooperatives federated at Thana level into a federation under the IRDP approach. In Daudzai village level organizations federated into a Markaz federation undertook: extension education in collaboration with departmental representatives, credit provision by serving as the central bank to the village organizations and development of processing industries, marketing etc. Without this economic arm the political arm in shape of local councils, cannot achieve economic salvation of the rural masses.

Keeping the experience of the three countries in view the follow-

ing suggestions and recommendations* are made:

(1) Although the selection of the most appropriate level for local level planning would have to be determined by each country taking into consideration the particular conditions operating, some considerations that could objectively determine this process would include: (i) its coverage of an area viable enough to allow the provision of essential services and upgradation of managerial and productive skills of rural poor through group action to assist in the mobilization of resources for activating a locally inspired development programme; (ii) its feasibility to facilitate direct and indirect participation in the plan development process; (iii) its coincidence with the lowest level of the administrative hierarchy; and (iv) its link up with primary growth centres and markets.

(2) Similarly, local level planning, in practice, would imply the location of a development centre, including people's organizations and the developments, at that level to provide coordination, to mobilize and organize peoples' participation, to plan for infrastructure and economic development, to facilitate the undertaking of a diagnostic survey or village profile and to supply training inputs to village level cadres. The first step in the planning process would, therefore, be a *diagnostic survey* elaborating on primary and secondary data and supported by an extensive process of consultation with the villagers. Dialogues of this type are instrumental in providing perception of problems and requirements leading to provision of projects that are overlooked by more distant planning processes. It is, therefore, imperative that such planning capability, in the form of a development unit of mixed skills for both planning and implementation, should be located as close to the people as possible. The most appropriate location could be at the development centres. This also entails a low level of technical sophistication if services are to be provided on an extensive scale.

(3) The bringing in of the rural poor in an organized fold seems to be the key to ameliorating their economic and social condition because it is only as a group that the villages have the capacity to articulate problems and evolve solutions to their problems; only

*Suggestions 1-9 received the approval of the Expert Group Meeting held on 28 November to 4 December 1978, at the United Nations Centre for Regional Development, Nagoya, Japan, comprising experts from India, Bangladesh, Philippines, South Korea, Pakistan, Japan and the UK.

through organization and collective responsibility can credit be made available to the small farmer; as an organized group knowledge on agriculture can be obtained more quickly and in more relevant form and investment becomes possible only through individual savings in a cooperative society and the resulting capital accumulation. In this way funds are made available and controlled by the village organizations. To stimulate the organization of the majority of the rural population—mainly small farmers and labourers - in their villages, government help should be conditional in return for their active cooperation. Administrative innovations would be needed to define the corporate character of such groups and to settle the rules for their action.

(4) The emphasis of local level planning should be on projects to increase production and thereby raise incomes. Social welfare programmes should be deferred to later date or to concerned national government departments/ministries. There are general and specific reasons for this, namely, welfare services must be commensurate with incomes and what people can afford. Therefore they must follow rather than precede income levels. As additional patronage from large land owners or the government has traditionally been schools and dispensaries, which does not break the vicious circle of poverty.

(5) A steady guaranteed level of funding, at whatever level is possible, for implementing local level plans is of critical importance. Sudden reduction in funds have a disillusioning effect on the village groups and a devastating effect on staff and saps people's belief in official help.

(6) Creation of rural cadres for group organization and management has to be vigorously pursued with a view to people themselves slowly relieving the bureaucracy of multiple jobs. The development of village groups is by far the most direct, face to face expression of democracy and of the needs and demands of the people themselves on matters which are of most direct concern to their village with the federation of groups serving as a democratic organization on the economic and technical side to look after their interests, such as, credit needs, establishment of processing industries, marketing, etc.

(7) Given the local level plan formulation cannot be undertaken in a vacuum, it would appear that this process should integrate into it the means whereby adjustments and modifications can be

made to national, regional and sectoral planning guidelines while working within the framework of available resources. This would ultimately lead to a developmental scenario at the local level consistent with the specific needs of the people, growth potential of the area and budgetary allocations available.

(8) Training, research and evaluation are important. Given the varying environments obtaining in countries in the region, training programmes will have to be country-specific in nature. Similarly the first requirement is not research but records of data—a time series of acreages, yields, investment, etc. Without good records evaluation will be extremely difficult and benefit-cost of projects impossible to ascertain. Beyond this, research would be needed on the level and sources of farm incomes and off farm employment and incomes at village level. At a higher level, there will be a need in the initial years of the programme for more experienced economic, social and administrative research on the strategies and performance of the local development including administrative and management methods within the programme. The universities may be able to play a major role here provided that they are willing to tackle operational research designed to give answers to policy issues. The need for continuous monitoring and evaluation envisages the desirability of a commitment in favour of rigorous and continuous internal evaluation with a clear definition of accurate indicators to measure progress. Development of simplified systems of monitoring and evaluating rural projects with the participation of local functionaries and local people would be pertinent.

(9) National policies to decentralize the processes of rural development must be undertaken with political will otherwise the achievements of local level planning would be severely limited. Alongwith the political commitment there is ardent need to improve the planning capabilities of the government functionaries as much to assist in the overall process of national and regional development as to provide planning inputs in the local level planning exercises.

(10) Whereas the role of traditional local councils is acknowledged in the field of inter-village planning, raising of taxation and coordination with development departments, their effectiveness or competence to undertake economic development or infrastructure planning, implementation and maintenance of projects at village

level is questionable. Guy Hunter's Guidelines* come down quite firmly against entrusting the development process too much to these highly unequal democratic (= elected) bodies in the early stage. Indeed Daudzai experience shows that absence of local councils did not hamper the planning and implementation of the works programme. The formation of disciplined groups, in which the weaker sections are the majority, proved more viable for economic and agricultural development of each village. Along with the local councils structure, the formation of village groups, of the rural poor, is therefore of prime importance for ameliorating the condition of the rural masses.

**Agricultural Development and the Rural Poor*, Overseas Development Institute, London, 1978, p. 18.

APPENDIX ONE

THE MARCH PLAN

Transcript of a talk by Dr Akhter Hameed Khan
delivered on 10 March 1973

1. *An Evaluation*

We discussed in October certain principles on which programmes of development should be based. Now we have further experience of six months of field conditions. Let us make an evaluation of what we have learnt and determine the future direction. In the first place credit can be given to you for having established the Markaz. The Markaz is indeed well established, and that in itself is a great advance. Just imagine the possibility of development without any Markaz. The Markaz is a "base of operation" from where development can be extended. It is "a platform for the people" to come together, and it is a viable unit of planning without which rural development rarely takes place.

2. *Frustration*

You deserve praise for setting up the Markaz, but to be frank, it must be admitted that the project staff is feeling frustrated because they consider that there has been little actual development, specially economic development. While innumerable problems have been revealed, few have been solved. Of course, if the Markaz had not been there, these problems would have been ignored as they have been ignored for dozens of years.

3. *Two Great Weaknesses*(a) *Inadequacy of the Departments*

To simplify matters we can say that the Markaz has revealed two great weaknesses. One is the inadequacy of the departments; the other is anarchy among people. Now the word "inadequacy" should be understood in a special sense. We are not condemning the departments. We are not saying they are useless. We are just saying they do not seem to be adequate for solving problems of the

villagers. Take the Irrigation Department. If you run a great deal after them they might take up a scheme or two, but the Daudzai thana needs not one or two schemes but dozens of schemes and the Irrigation Department is not able to do that sort of work. Similarly the PWD might built one or two big roads, but they cannot construct the entire network necessary for Daudzai Thana. The Agriculture Department cannot rapidly improve the skill of small farmers or save their crops and orchards from insects and diseases. Its Beldars and its sprayers cannot go everywhere. They are too few. Nor can Animal Husbandry Department with its scanty staff look after all the cattle in the villages. We should not blame our army for not capturing Delhi. They are not designed for that purpose. Our departments have not been properly designed for rural work in the true sense. The Irrigation Department thinks rarely of small schemes. I doubt that it even knows about the sand dune that is blocking the channels we saw yesterday. The removal of the sand dune or the construction of a regular network of small channels is beyond their capacity. But you should not blame them. There should be no recriminations. Besides you should go slow on the desire to control which is based on the assumption that it is slack control which results in inefficiency. The assumption is not correct. You will find that even if operational control is given to the project, it will make but slight improvement. To ask the departments to solve those numberless problems which the project is revealing is giving them "Taklif-i-ma la Yutaq," i.e. asking them to do things beyond their capacity. Of course, I do not mean that nothing can be done or nothing should be done. On the contrary we should try first to understand and then to remove the inadequacy.

4. *Rural Anarchy*

The inadequacy of the departments is compounded by the anarchy which prevails in the villages. The departments would have been more effective if the villagers had been organized. The Irrigation Department could help them more if there were institutions which could carry out expert advice. At present, there is no responsible organization which can collaborate with the department. Similarly expert advice about agricultural practices, or pesticides or animal improvement cannot be conveyed to mass of villagers. What the inadequate staff can do is to go to a few per-

sons and persuade them to follow these methods. As salesmen know too well only a few become customers even when many are canvassed. The departments, so few salesman and too many customers, are never approached. The lack of organization in the village makes the department more inadequate. What could have been done, if the people had been organized, can not be done because they are unorganized. Development is not a one-sided affair. It is a partnership between the departments who possess expert knowledge and resources and local organizations. Where numbers are so large and holdings so small not an individual farmer but a group or the representative of a group must be approached.

5. *Next Move*

So our next move is to organize the people and make the departments more adequate. Let us begin by organizing the people. In some cases where we want to make rapid progress the first step is to set up an adequate organization for departmental advice and services. We have seen how water control (flood, drought, salinity, water-logging) is a pervasive problem. We have also seen how the department is not designed to solve this problem effectively within a short time. We must, therefore, set up a water control unit which starts planning for the control of water in Daudzai Thana. I have explained in great detail how this water unit could be organized and how it can work. I have done the same for roads. The PWD will not plan a network of small roads.

6. *Organize the Villagers*

We can say confidently that the anarchy prevailing in the villages is our main problem. Even the traditional bonds are disintegrating. Villagers are reaching a stage when no body would listen to anybody else. The Cooperative Department cannot organize the villages. This department was designed almost exclusively for audit and it remains like that. That function it can perform effectively. Perhaps, it can run an apex bank and some central banks. It can receive requests at a central place and give loans. It was not designed for setting up cooperatives in the villages and supervizing them, looking at their accounts, teaching them managerial ability. When you ask them to go beyond their audit functions you get what you are getting, i.e. abortive societies. The poor Cooperative Inspector goes to a village. He is in a great

hurry. He does what is called a "hard sell." He says, "you just form a society and you will get a lot of money. All that you have to do is to buy a 10 rupee share and you will get a loan of 100 rupees." Unfortunately, even that technique has been tried too often. Hence the people have grown rather sceptical. We should, therefore, organize a cooperative federation. I have already explained in detail how that can be done, its objectives and its methods of work.

7. *Cooperatives and Agriculture Extension*

Once you have organized village cooperatives and they have selected managers and best farmers, the departmental experts can prepare instruction sheets and start calling these managers and best farmers for training. Thus very soon agriculture extension gets going. It is only the local representative who lives in the village all the time who can make the agriculture of that area progressive, teaching not one or two persons but a whole group of members. However, we should remember that a whole village does not accept all at once even the best advice. The process of diffusion and acceptance of new ideas takes many years. Some persons respond quickly. They are generally a small minority. The majority watches them closely. Small farmers cannot readily take risks or accept innovations. The best farmer or the manager first convince the small minority of early adopters, then others follow them. Finally, we may have a number of laggards who may not adopt at all. It is only continuous demonstration by the early adopters and the late adopters that will change the village. With the formation of village cooperatives you get a local extension agent from among the farmers who can teach 50, 60 or 100 farmers. The village cooperative can also make a pool of implements, and effectively distribute pesticides and fertilizers. Where there are orchards, this is specially important. Thus we see how as we proceed with water control and roads and cooperative organization we are also taking care of agriculture extension. The village cooperatives can not only build and maintain water channels, but can also introduce new cultural practices, modern inputs, spraying, etc.

8. *Future Direction Planning*

After we have set up basic organizations we start planning.

Planning in our case has two aspects: (a) Physical planning and (b) organizational planning. In physical planning we should fix realistic targets. Now a great temptation of planning is to hope for too many things in too short a time. It is very tempting to make grand plans. But we should have only realistic physical plans and we should have only realistic, organizational plans. We have already discussed how to prepare a water control and management plan for the whole Daudzai Thana. This plan would consist of possibly 50 or 60 schemes. As realistic targets for planning, I should think that by the end of one year you should have a road plan, a water plan and a plan for the Cooperative Federation.

9. *Execution—Road and Water Schemes*

Now as regards execution, i.e. what we expect to do actually apart from planning, I would think a very realistic target of actual work in one year would be about four or five roads. The project will have only one engineer and his assistant and it is essential that in the first year there should be no wastage. Five or six water control schemes—five or six—no more. You may have a plan consisting of fifty or sixty schemes but in the first year you should attempt only five or six—one or two comparatively large, one or two medium, one or two small. If you can do that in one year, it would provide, in the first place, good training to the water unit and in the second place good training for the cooperatives. Most of all it would provide a demonstration and a model for other areas. In the next year you can execute not five or six but fifteen or sixteen schemes, because now you can use the experience that has been gained and you can use local managers. You will have models and training centres in the schemes completed before and you can multiply your work three times as fast, so that in the third year you can execute twenty or thirty schemes. Perhaps in the fifth year you can complete the whole plan. On the other hand, if you meet extraordinary difficulties in the first year it does not matter in the least if the number comes down to two or three schemes. You must learn your job. And the local people should learn their job properly.

10. *Targets for Organization*

A realistic target for organization would be the formation of twenty village cooperatives in the first year. That would be a great

accomplishment. The first village cooperatives would centre round the irrigation scheme. Roughly it appears that every medium scheme would involve five or six villages. So the number of cooperatives can be determined by the number of water scheme that you can take up. Now in these twenty or twenty-five villages, there will be not only water management but also intensified extension activity with the managers and model farmers, will attend training classes for agriculture, for animal husbandry, forestry, horticulture, water management, land levelling, etc. Then from these villages the work will spread to other villages. If you can establish a cluster of three or four cooperative villages whose managers and progressive farmers are upgrading their skills the other villages will begin to watch what is happening there. Intelligent farmers will come and visit them. The managers will go to other villages and talk to the people. It is better that you make twenty odd cooperatives work in the first year and let the other villages watch them. In the next year, I am sure, you will get fifty cooperative. Then perhaps will get the snow-balling effect. You may have one hundred cooperatives in five years covering the whole thana. In the meanwhile more irrigation schemes, more road schemes, further intensified agriculture activity will be taken up.

11. Target for Agricultural Extension

A realistic target of agriculture extension would be intensified work in those twenty or twenty five villages. In the meanwhile the ordinary departmental work like distribution of fertilizer or seeds can be done for all the villages. But as soon as the training classes for managers and best farmers are started you will see that the demand for departmental supplies will grow so fast in these 20 villages that it would be difficult to fulfil even one-tenth of their requirement. This would be your next problem. You can wait till you come to that bridge.

12. Target for Instruction Sheets

Another target should be the preparation of instruction sheets by the departmental experts. The project need good instruction sheets in all fields—water management, or animal husbandry, plant pests and diseases, cultivation of improved varieties of wheat etc. Here I think the Academy can help by contacting the departments at higher levels to cooperate in the preparation of such instruction

sheets. It is pathetic how little instructive literature is available for the farmers. The more we can produce the better.

13. Other Matters, Monthly Conference and Reports

After discussing the various aspects of planning and realistic goals, we come to smaller matters. First, I suggest that you should have a monthly conference and systematic reporting. That monthly conference can be held at the Academy. The Project staff should bring written reports, in English or in Urdu as convenient for them, detailing what they have been doing during the month and what problems they are facing, what they are hoping to do next month and so on. These reports should be read and discussed and the Academy's research staff should collect the reports and take notes of the discussions and should prepare a consolidated monthly report. This should be done not by the project but by the research staff of the Academy. These monthly reports will become the raw data of future evaluations. This is action research: recording carefully what is happening month by month. The research section should be very systematic in recording and filing of reports and conference proceedings.

14. Collaboration between the Academy and the Project

My second suggestion is that the Academy should nominate research investigators to work in collaboration with the water unit, the road unit and the cooperative federation. The investigators need not be there all the time. They can visit at intervals but the visit must not be a hurried visit. They must stay and work for the whole day with the project officers and write down notes so that when the monthly conference is taking place there could be intelligent discussions.

15. Conference of Village Leaders

Another very useful convention is to bring local leaders. I do not mean by leaders Khans. I mean the real workers. The water engineer, let us say, has four or five intelligent managers who are working in the villages. They should be brought together, to upgrade their skills. Periodical conferences should be held of all representatives, managers, model farmers. It could be a three-day affair. Every one should stay in the hostel and not wander round the city. An allowance should be paid. In the water management conference the

water engineer should stay with them. The conferences will also serve as orientation courses. Again the research staff should record views of the participants. Departmental experts can be invited. Such conference should be held at intervals of three or four months. In the conferences the local workers would exchange views and compare notes. This was the principle of the folk schools—to bring village leaders together for long discussions. Those who were advanced or progressive stimulated others who were backward and slow and the result was a general movement forward. Periodical conferences would be our adaptation of the Danish folk school. The periodical conferences of local leaders, managers, progressive farmers, water management managers, road contractors, and so on, will also provide raw data for research. It will be a real bench mark. You will be able to show what they were discussing a year ago and what they are discussing now and how they have arrived from that to this position.

16. Recapitulation

To sum up you should have by the end of one year, the physical plans of roads, water management and a cooperative organization in at least one-fifth of the Thana villages. Supposing there are 100 villages, 20 or 25 villages should join the Cooperative Federation. Obviously we are not trying to work on a grand scale. Our scale is small in the beginning. But we will go faster as we proceed. We will not sprint and exhaust ourselves. This is a long race, a very long race, and we will run slowly. At the end of the year you should have a number of trained local leaders working with increasing capacity—managers, progressive farmers, road contractors, water managers. They are the nuclei of development. Essentially development results from human skill. You must create skilled people in the villages. Skill again is of two kinds: there is technical skill and there is organizational skill. After one year, in the cooperative villages no body should say that Pathans are incapable of working together and instead of listening to each other, they shoot each other. It is wrong to say that the Pathans are non-cooperative. On the other hand, there is much cooperation in the broad sense among them. They are a cooperative people. But they require upgrading a managerial skill. Large number of people working together require managers and such managers are either not there or their methods are traditional. Traditional methods of management are as out

of date as traditional agriculture. Take one example: in traditional management money is collected. But the account is not kept as it is done in a cooperative or in a bank. There is no audit and there is on publication of audit report. Under modern conditions wherever money is collected its account should be audited and published. This modernization of management has great psychological effects. It creates a sense of participation and confidence. Without it the small men think that their money is stolen. Often they say that not because their money is actually stolen but because accounts are not circulated or published.

So you will have trained local leaders working with increasing capacity and higher and higher technical and managerial skill. Then you will have instruction sheets prepared by the departments. Finally you should have a set of monthly reports, reports of periodical conferences, and an annual report. Besides you might have small research monographs prepared by the investigators on special problems. A monograph, for instance, on the control of a sanddune. After the scheme is completed a monograph can be prepared, showing the problem, the blueprint of the scheme, the method of work, the cost of completion etc., with some photographs. This will be a good research report. Literature of this kind produced by the Academy will serve as training material for other projects. It would also be in wide demand by others. Let us hope that at the end of one year you will have the beginning of an effective development model—not something great, but just a beginning. It would show how the inadequacy of the departments is removed and how people are organized and how in about a year's time one-fifth of a Thana is developed.

Frankly, I feel tempted greatly by looking at this project to stay here. It appears to me like a little island of sincerity in the midst of a sea of hypocrisy. Please send me your monthly reports and I will send you my comments. God-willing after one year I may come back and work with you for longer periods. I thank you for your kindness to me.

FLOOD CONTROL AND IRRIGATION IN DAUDZAI THANA

(1) Several months' observation clearly shows that water control (flooding, irrigation, drought) is the foremost problem of Daudzai Thana. Some villages are ruined by flood, others by drought. Much

dry land lies barren. Kathas and Irabs are in poor shape. Economic development is improveable unless flood is reduced and irrigation increased. Quite obviously good water control can make many villages prosperous within a short time. Fortunately, Daudzai Thana has abundant surface and underground water which can be utilized if much work is done.

(2) Water control requires both physical engineering and institution building. In the first place blueprints must be made after skilful investigations. In the second place institutions must be organized to do the work and then maintain it.

(3) For physical engineering the project should establish a Water Control Unit consisting of an irrigation engineer, a surveyor and some assistants. This Unit, moving from one site to another, should prepare the schemes, as far as possible, on the spot, in consultation with knowledgeable villagers. The bigger schemes may be sent for scrutiny by the Irrigation Department. Possibly the whole Thana can be surveyed within one year, and a five-or ten-year plan can be consolidated. Each year some of the schemes can be completed. When the plan gives an estimate of the required funds, intelligent attempts can be made to obtain them.

Through the experience of surveying and local consultation, the project engineer will become qualified for supervizing the water control works, under the guidance, where necessary, of irrigation experts.

(4) For institution building the project should start the nucleus of a thana cooperative association consisting of an executive officer, a deputy and an accountant. In every site selected for water control a cooperative society should be organized and then trained to do the work and maintain it. If the cooperative can perform the difficult task of water management, it can readily introduce improved methods of agronomy, credit and marketing.

(5) In case the proposal for Water Control Unit and Cooperative Association is acceptable, the following steps are suggested: (a) Appointment of a project engineer and a cooperative executive officer, (b) A two-day orientation course for both of them along with the project manager. I can be one of the instructors, (c) Preparation of a scheme for the Water Control Unit and a scheme for the Cooperative Association jointly by the above team. The two schemes will define goals and methods and work out the details of staffing and budgeting (two days). I can be one of the advisers, (d) Recruit-

ment of essential staff for both schemes (seven days) and (e) Inauguration of field work of survey and cooperative organization.

(6) In case (a), (b), (c) and (d) are finalized quickly, I may be able to spend some time in the field with the survey and cooperation team. The problem is twofold: to prepare efficient engineering designs, and to develop effective instructions.

The Daudzai project should discover a twofold solution and present it as a model for other thanas with similar conditions.

AKHTER HAMEED KHAN
24th February 1973.

ROAD UNIT AT THE MARKAZ

(1) A water unit can prepare plans for flood control and irrigation in Daudzai Markaz. Similarly plans for a network of link roads can be prepared by a Road Unit. After the schemes are designed the units can supervise their execution and maintenance through cooperative societies.

(2) The Water Unit will collaborate with the Irrigation Department and the WAPDA. The Road Unit will collaborate with the PWD and the District Council.

(3) The preparation of plans for flood control, irrigation and roads and their execution and maintenance by local agencies will prove an instructive model for other Markaz of the province. The engineers of the two units will serve as instructors and trainers for other engineers. We should fully utilize the presently unemployed engineers of the province to build a sound infrastructure in every Markaz.

(4) The project can begin by appointing a road engineer, who will, like the Water Engineer, work out the details of staffing and budgeting of his unit.

AKHTER HAMEED KHAN
3rd March 1973.

ORIENTATION COURSE FOR MARKAZ COOPERATIVE
EXECUTIVE OFFICERS AND MARKAZ ENGINEERS
LESSON NO. I

Course Incharge:
Dr. Akhter Hameed Khan


The Government Departments in the Daudzai Markaz are already working for the development of rural uplift of Daudzai Markaz. But these departments will not do this task efficiently unless their working is supplemented by adding the following units as and when needed: (1) Local Governments, (2) Cooperatives, (3) Water-Control (4) Machines etc., (5) Marketing, and (6) Processing Industries.

Thus the above organizations have to be organized and added gradually to the Government Departments of the Markaz for the solution of the problems of Daudzai Thana.

As a foremost problem of Daudzai Thana is that of Flood Control and Irrigation so as to solve this problem a Cooperative Federation and Technical Unit should be organized which will start their work with the coordination of the Government Departments and the Markaz. Its function and structure are:

I. Daudzai Cooperative Federation

Structure of D.C. Federation. The overall organizational structure of the D.C. Federation is presented in the following chart.



Functions of Daudzai Cooperative Federation

These may be summarized as follows:

(1) *Auditing.* This will be carried out by the Markaz staff of Cooperative Department at the Markaz.

(2) *Banking.* As the existing set-up delays advancement of loans due to long procedure and the loans are not given to the farmers in time for which the Markaz Cooperative Inspector is responsible. To avoid such irregularities, the primary cooperative societies at village level should directly be concerned with the Central Bank at Thana-level which interests should be affiliated to an Apex bank at the Provincial level.

Appex Bank Provincial

Central Bank Thana Level

Primary Society Village Level

Banking includes: (i) Credit; (ii) Loan realization; and (iii) Shares and Deposits.

(i) *Credit.* The Federation will provide credit facilities for the society or members of the society from the Central Bank working at Thana. Loan ceiling for society and for individuals should be decided in a General Meeting. Each society as well as the Federation should have the following record of each members to show his loans and deposits: (a) Number of Members; (b) Land; (c) Deposits and Share; (d) Attendance in Meetings; (e) Improved Methods; (f) Loan Ceiling; (g) Repayment; and (h) Miscellaneous.

Loan ceiling for a society or for individuals, should be decided in the General Meetings in the light of the information obtained from the individuals, records, etc. Such meetings will be held weekly.

(ii) *Regular Realization of Loan.* This would be one of the most important functions of the Federation. For realization of loans a General meeting of all the members of the society must be arranged weekly. If a member is not in a position to pay his loan in lump sum he may be advised to pay it in several instalments. Further loans must not be given to him unless and until he pays the earlier one.

(iii) *Deposits and Shares.* Deposits are life-blood for growth and development of cooperative institutions both at the Markaz and lower level. Hence it should be regular and permanent. The Federation will arrange also for deposits and shares. The members

of each society should be convinced to deposit even the smallest amount in addition to their shares, so as to eliminate the danger of its collapse. Keeping the above in view the goal of cooperative is to increase equity capital. Equity capital consists of shares and deposits. With these shares and deposits the federation can pay for the defaulter to the apex bank. Deposits can be withdrawn any time while shares cannot be withdrawn soon.

(3) *Extension.* Credit and extension be combined. The Markaz functionaries will act as teachers/instructors. They will teach to the members of the societies in their respective fields. They would be required to prepare instruction sheets in their fields, which should be distributed among the members and other villagers. This practice will continue regularly.

Moreover, each society will select one to three best farmers. Such farmer must be trained and specialized like wheat grower, corn grower, etc., who will be the progressive farmers. For this purpose weekly or fortnightly classes should be arranged. The progressive farmers will act as a bridge between the Agricultural Assistants and the farmers of the society.

Water Control

As described on the first page, there are two aspects to solve this problem. (1) Technical Unit, and (2) Cooperative Unit.

(1) Role of Cooperative Federation in Water Control

This will be the duty of the Federation to organize the societies in the villages where irrigation works has to be done. The members of the society in each village will do work and will maintain it in their respective villages which will be free of wages.

Moreover, for working as the Head-point a Central Society should be organized which will comprise the member selected from the village societies of the whole Daudzai Thana. The members of the Central Society will elect their own manager also.

(2) Role of Technical Unit

The Technical Unit will survey the area, prepare a blueprint of the complete scheme and will explain to the members and train them accordingly, i.e. how to work and how to maintain it. The unit is advised to prepare the plan with the help of the experts.

LESSON NO. 2

Physical Infrastructure

Some of the problems of Daudzai Markaz need immediate attention and are to be treated on priority basis. These include communication, irrigation, drainage power, and electricity problems. These facilities are called physical infrastructure. For Daudzai Markaz, these may be grouped into: (1) Road; (2) Drainage; (3) Irrigation; and (4) Power and Electricity.

Provision of these facilities require proper planning of each aspect complete in all respect. There should be a road plan, a drainage plan, an irrigation plan and a power and electricity plan.

Road Plan. A complete network of roads should be prepared for the Markaz area. Roads may be classified into five types according to their length and importance. These are: (a) Main Roads—Big roads/highways; (b) Medium Roads which connect thanas/Markaz with district headquarters; (c) Roads which connect villages with mandi-towns and (a) and (b); (d) Small Roads which connect one village to another; and (e) Very small roads which are inside a village.

This classification is essential for the purpose of making separate agencies responsible for the planning, execution and maintenance of each type of roads. These three are the basic considerations for successful completion of development programme for physical infrastructure. The (a) and (b) types of roads are generally looked after by the PWD (B&R) and District Councils respectively but there is no such arrangements for the (c), (d) and (e) type of roads and that is why these are found in bad shape even after these are metalled. The (a) and (b) type roads should be metalled while (c), (d) and (e) roads require earth work in the first stage, filling in the second stage and metalling in the third stage. Again it is important that there should be an agency to plan, execute and maintain the (c), (d) and (e) types roads. The arrangements in this respect are as follows: (a) Main roads by PWD (B&R); (b) Medium road by District Council; (c) Village to village roads by Thana/Markaz Council; (d) Small roads; and (e) Roads inside the village both by Union Council.

The following measures are necessary for a Road Plan of the Markaz: (1) A unit of nucleus engineering staff at each Markaz consisting of an Engineer with his staff and an Accountant to help

in planning, execution and maintenance of road schemes. The engineering unit will survey the Markaz area, prepare a blueprint of all types of roads and help in their execution. (2) Meeting of local government units like Union Councils are held to prepare a plan having two parts (I) *c*-type roads for Markaz and (ii) *d* and *e* type roads for Union Council. The people discuss and arrive at an agreement. (3) *c* type roads planned, executed and maintained by Markaz. (4) *d* and *e* type roads planned by Union Council for a complete net-work of roads.

The Union Council prepares five or ten years plan in consultation with the Ward member into two parts: (1) *c* roads and (2) *d+e* roads. For *d+e* roads the people are trained to prepare the specifications and cost of estimated expenditure with the help of Engineering Unit and the Accountant, while *c* type roads are simply indicated. There is no way out of it. There will be terrific discussion for thousands of hours in numerous meetings of the council to arrive at a consensus. Many problems will arise from time to time like opening Pandora's box as people will save their land and recommend that of others. The Government officer cannot do it for fear of petitions against him. The politician (MNA, MPA, District Council Member) cannot afford it for fear of losing the next election. All disputed issues are thrashed through discussions and unresolved matters are left for presentation and public opinion is formed and built up till these are settled. Still some may remain unsolved for some time.

The Road Unit prepare schemes and estimates of culverts and bridges. The schemes are categorised into accepted/approved and disputed/unapproved. These are consolidated into a Markaz Consolidated Road Plan as done in Malaya for each district. It undertakes the preparation of the following maps:

Map I. Network of existing roads, i.e. bench-mark survey.

Map II. A complete net-work of roads required or desired. It will indicate roads to be built by PWD by District Council, Markaz and Union Councils.

Map III. Annual Plan, i.e. phasing the programme according to priority because of limited finances and other essentials. Who is to decide which road should be given priority and who should wait? The Government Servants and Politicians will not involve themselves for obvious reasons. Hence let the people decide their disputes through meetings, discussions, and presentation or till public

opinion is built up in such cases. There is no short cut to it and disputes are inevitable.

Map IV. Map I and III combined becomes Map IV.

Execution

The engineers have evolved very efficient system of inviting, tenders from contractors and giving it to the lowest bid or after the plan is ready. The technical expertise of the engineers is a must and must be accepted but not his pay masterships which is not his function. In fact the Chinese Commune model have proved quite efficient here. A Project Committee is formed to replace the contractor in each village. If a road passes through more than one village, then as many Project Committees, each covering geographical jurisdiction of the village. In order that the Project Committees are supervised and controlled for specifications, estimates and recruitment of labour so that the accounts could be audited, the elected member of each ward should be made the Chairman of the Project Committee. It should have a paid secretary besides 4/5 members. The committees were successful where the people had learnt the art of working together, while these failed at other places. It is advisable to concentrate on the Secretary who is to be trained in reading the blue-prints and maintenance of Muster-Roll-2 key things. If these are not properly done, then there will be no end to problems like corruption etc. Weekly checks by the Overseer are a must. The Muster-Roll must be signed by the Secretary and Chairman of the Project Committee.

The institutional framework at Markaz and lower levels is necessary for decentralization of work. Its elements are: (1) Agency for planning, (2) Agency for execution, (3) Agency for maintenance. It is because the *d* and *e* roads must be planned, executed and maintained by the people under the guidance, training and supervision of Engineering unit. The department do not undertake such small schemes. In fact it is not meant for these nor it has time, resources and finances for such small schemes. Hence these could be carried out through cooperatives at village level. Replacement of contractors by project committees will have to be worked out with the District Council. If it is agreed, then it may be decentralized. This will ensure active participation of the people, proper execution and permanent maintenance of the scheme.

II—Drainage Plan and III—Irrigation Plan

Planning should commence from ward level to Union Council and consolidated into Markaz Plan for drainage and irrigation problems. Drainage may be (a) Local or of one village, which is easy, (b) Inter village drainage, and (c) Bigger drainages.

In improving (b) and (c) type drainages disputes will definitely crop up as it exists in Daudzai Markaz. The lower and upper riparians problems can be solved through their joint meetings where they will discuss again and again their problems and for which they will find solutions eventually.

Technical investigation will have to be carried out for some of the big problems of the Markaz. Like the Road Plan, the Drainage Plan will also have Map I, II, and III giving existing situation, projecting desirable facilities and Annual Development Plan phasing the programme respectively. Likewise the planning, executing and maintenance agencies are assigned and vested with necessary functions.

Irrigation

It is the most difficult aspect of all and hence require top level competency. The irrigation works may also be categorized into (a) local or one village, (b) Inter village, and (c) Big project. It will have to be seen whether surface water through gravity flow or ground water through tube-wells will have to be tapped and explored. Mapping of tube-well irrigation water potential by a test-boring unit will have to be searched out to reduce cost, save time and energy.

Agency for Execution and Maintenance

Cooperative organisations will have to be constituted. It is not very difficult because there already exist a system of contribution and collective effort. It is simply to be made more methodical, systematic and better organised. In fact the cooperatives have proved much more effective on this front than on any one else. In addition, cooperatives can easily distribute fertilizer, seed and plant protection facilities among farmers for which managers of each society will have to be trained properly to hand the jobs efficiently. In order that the economics of scale are availed of, the village cooperative societies will form a cooperative Association at the Markaz. There should be one Accountant and one Inspector

each for a group of 4/5 cooperatives. Immense and intensive training programme for all particularly for the Accountant and Inspector as well as the Manager will have to be organized and conducted. The Markaz level departmental functionaries will act as teachers/instructors.

The Raiffeisen principle of social cohesion should be followed in organising Cooperatives to make them successful: (a) Weekly general meetings should be held regularly where the managing committee is made accountable rather than a governing body. The managing committee greatly limits effective participation otherwise. (b) Cooperative Societies should have small rather than big farmers. These have always failed due to class conflict because the big snatched them. (c) Cooperative Societies should be affiliated with the Central Cooperative Bank and Federation at the Markaz, which in turn should be affiliated with the Apex bank at the Provincial level. (d) The Central Cooperative Federation will be trainer and teacher.

LESSON NO. 3

WATER CONTROL UNIT AND COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION

We have the water and Flood Control Unit for preparation of an Irrigation Plan and the Cooperative Association for execution and maintenance of some of the irrigation works. Each unit will have the following: Part I—Objective and methods; and Part II—Staffing and Budgeting.

Part I—A. Objective

All problems of Daudzai Markaz area with regard to irrigation, flood, drainage, irabs and water-logging will fall in the purview of the Water Unit. It will: (i) Survey all problems; (ii) Prepare schemes; (iii) Train people of other Markaz; (iv) Organize local agents for execution; (v) Train local agents; (vi) Organize local people for maintenance; (vii) Supervise construction and maintenance works; and (viii) Prepare an instruction manual.

B. Methods. The following methods will be followed: (i) Survey—camping from site to site; (ii) Local consultation; (iii) Expert/departmental consultation where necessary; and (iv) Classification of schemes as: (a) One village scheme (by local people), (b) Inter-village scheme (Partly with local people), and (c) Departmental

schemes (with department of irrigation). (v) Preparation of blueprints and estimates for each scheme; (vi) Consolidation of Markaz Plan; (vii) Selection of schemes for annual plan; (viii) Execution and maintenance by local agencies; and (ix) Preparation of instruction manual.

Part II—Staffing and Budgeting

There should be a survey team to survey the area and prepare a complete plan and blueprints, to supervise execution and maintenance of executed schemes.

(i) Survey Team should comprise (a) One Engineer, (b) One Surveyer, (c) One Draftsman, (d) Two Chairmen.

(ii) *Equipment.* The survey team should have the necessary equipment which will be worked out by the team.

(iii) *Contingencies.* It is a must, and adequate provision must be made for it in the budget.

Execution and Supervision Unit. It should consist of (a) Overseer—1; (b) Accountant—2; and (c) Assistants—2.

This unit will be work charge and financed from the budget allocated for each scheme. Therefore, provision for such costs must be kept in the estimates of the scheme. It will perform the following functions: (1) Executive works; (2) Supervise execution; and (3) Training work.

Maintenance. The schemes are of three kinds. Separate agency should be made responsible for each kind of schemes as given below for purposes of maintenance: (a) Big schemes to WAPDA and Corporations, etc. (b) Medium schemes carried by departments, and (c) Small schemes to village cooperative societies.

Finances. Funds will be required for supervision of work and maintenance. Supervision charges for maintenance of schemes improved for cooperative should be made from the beneficiaries of the scheme. They should be persuaded to keep a part time person to look after the work. In underdeveloped countries funds are required for infrastructure which does not exist. People can not pay because they are already destitute. But they should contribute towards maintenance expenditures either through taxes, contributions or subscriptions.

(B) *Cooperative Association.* The Water Control and Irrigation unit is to be coordinated with the cooperation unit. The cooperative unit is a must for execution and maintenance of some of the

schemes and works. Its objectives and methods are given below:

Objectives. (a) Auditing, (b) Banking: (i) Credit, (ii) Loan realization, (iii) Shares and deposits, (c) Extension.

Methods. (a) Weekly meetings, (b) Weekly deposits, (c) Develop equity capital, (d) Training of Manager, Accountant and Inspector, and (e) Banking—Loans and deposits.

The programme of the cooperative unit will be as follows:

Ist six months. The unit will accompany the Engineering team to survey the area. It will also start educating the people that only first investment will be made on behalf of the Government. The schemes will be executed, supervised and maintained by the people. Funds for these will be raised from the beneficiaries. The staff will educate and train the people and teach them the principles.

After six months. The unit should have a nucleus staff of the following: (1) Executive Officers, (2) Accountant—with B. Com qualification. The team is educator and promotor.

Organization of Primary Cooperative Units. The team will organize people at village level into primary cooperative society. Each unit will have:

One Manager. He will be a local person and employee of the primary cooperative society. He will not write accounts

One Accountant. He will be an employee of the central cooperative association. There will be one Accountant for every four or five cooperatives. Initially he will be trained by the accountant at the Markaz. He will not handle cash but will maintain proper accounts.

One Inspector. A poor and little educated local person who will be responsible for four or five cooperative societies. The executive officer and accountant will train him from time to time.

Budget. Budget will be prepared for the following:

- | | |
|--|----------------------|
| (1) Permanent staff at the Markaz headquarters | } Pay |
| (2) Inspectors and Accountants | |
| (3) Managers of Primary Societies | } Training allowance |
| (4) Model/Best farmers etc. | |

Hence the budget will provide for permanent staff, village level and training allowances.

Sources of Funds. The following can be the sources of finance:

- (a) Project Grant for organization, education and training by the government as these are its functions; (b) Business earnings; and (c) Contribution/subscription from beneficiaries.

Credit. The team will try to understand the credit requirements during the six months survey period and teach the people that credit is impossible without increasing equity capital. Cooperatives cannot run without growing deposits and increasing credits. The people must save and deposit their saving for investment because without it there can be no fruitful economic development. Credit may be advanced for small schemes which the cooperatives may repay within one year.

APPENDIX TWO

THE INITIAL RESPONSE

A.O. Staff Town,
Karachi University,
Karachi-32.
Dated: 15.11.1972

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

This is to thank you for a delightful and instructive week at the Academy and your gracious hospitality.

Did you meet Ali Asghar and did he do anything to get my No Objection Certificate from Establishment Division. I have waited for a fortnight but have heard nothing from Vaqar Ahmad. Can you exercise some influence through the Amir Yusuf?

How is your artist wife. I have read all her stories and desire to discuss my impressions next time I come to Peshawar (if ever).

Yours sincerely,
Akhter Hameed Khan

Dated: 18.11.1972.

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

Thanks for your letter and thanks for your "TADBIR" for my exit permit. At last I have got it.

I sent you two copies of my pamphlets on rural works. I sent the same to Ziauddin Khan and asked him if he wanted any further report from me. He has kept quiet, so I presume that I need not write any more reports. My views are clearly stated here.

On my return from Peshawar I was engaged in arranging the marriage of my second daughter. She has now left with her husband for the United States. I must now devote all my attention to completing the course work with the students before I leave myself. I am sorry that (much as I would like to come to Peshawar), I cannot leave Karachi just now. With best wishes for you and your family.

Yours sincerely,
Akhter Hameed Khan

Dated: 15th December, 1972

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

You are very kind and your kindness makes me feel ashamed for not coming at once to Peshawar to work with you. But I shall try to pay you at least one visit before I leave for Michigan. I hope to arrange this when I come to Rawalpindi to read a paper in the Economic Conference next month. Just now I am busy writing that paper. This paper and my class work make it impossible for me to take up any other writing assignment as proposed in your second letter.

I shall inform you about my arrival in Peshawar as soon as I know definitely about the Conference dates.

Thanks for the air ticket. Love to your family.

Yours sincerely,
Akhter Hameed Khan

Dated: January 4, 1973

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

I have corrected the script of the talk and shall soon send it back to you after it has been copied in a day or two. I have also received Yell's letter and shall write a story for him entitled "How I tried to be a Spiritual Leader." I shall write this story after completing my essay for the Economic Conference (it may take 10 days).

As regards my visit to Peshawar, it would help me greatly if you can persuade the Chief Secretary to write to the Vice-Chancellor for lending my services to the Daudzai Project for six weeks. I hope to come after getting this invitation early in February and stay till the middle of March and leave a comprehensive report before my departure.

Yours sincerely,
Akhter Hameed Khan

Dated: January 30, 1973

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

I have completed the arrangements to come to Peshawar, but the date is as yet a little uncertain. Either I would come to Peshawar on the 15th February and then go with you to Islamabad to attend the Economic Conference on 18th February. Or come to Peshawar after attending the Conference. In any case I will inform

you definitely after another week.

Once I am in Peshawar I shall very gladly talk to any class of your trainees on any day convenient for them. I just need one day's notice for preparation. I have completed my Conference paper "A History of the Food Problem" and will bring a copy. Maybe you can use it in the Journal. It is written in a popular, non-academic style.

Thanks for getting the letter from the Chief Secretary.

Looking forward to seeing you.

Yours sincerely,
Akhter Hameed Khan

Dated: 6th February, 1973

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

I have booked a seat on P.I.A. flights 304/636 which leave Karachi on 16th Feb. at 1445 hours and arrive at Peshawar about 1830 hours.

The Economic Conference begins at Islamabad on 18th and I hope we will both go together either on 17th evening or 18th morning.

More when we meet.

Yours sincerely,
Akhter Hameed Khan

Dated: March 19, 1973

Dear Shoaib,

My stay at Peshawar was delightful for me, physically and intellectually, except that sometimes I feel that your hospitality to me was excessive. I have told my friends here how you picked me up from the dust-bin and used me. I shall remain deeply interested in the Daudzai Project.

I have also told my friends how your wife has made me a member of the Trinity, Buddha, Tariq Sidjiqui, Akhter Hameed Khan. In Lahore I met Tariq and for the first time (literally the first time) heard the voice of confidence in Pakistan. The son (i.e. Tariq) is making an island in the great sea of turbulence.

My love to the family.

Yours sincerely,
Akhter Hameed Khan

LETTERS FROM APRIL TO APRIL

Michigan State University, East Lansing—Michigan 48823

11th April 1973

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

I had to stop in Beirut for 12 days because my daughter Aisha contracted measles. Finally on the 8th of April I arrived at East Lansing and am now well settled. My address will be as follows:

202, International Programs Building
M.S.U. East Lansing,
Mich. 48823, U.S.A.

I am sure your seminar must have gone very well. You certainly succeeded in getting good participants. Please keep me informed about the Academy, the Project and yourself. How is your wife. Please give her my Salaam.

And how are things shaping in Pakistan. There has been no news in the Beirut paper except about the arrest of 80 or more officers—Civil and Military. God will save Pakistan.

Yours sincerely,
Akhter Hameed Khan

Michigan State University, East Lansing—Michigan 48823

202, International Programs
Building

2nd May, 1973

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

I am delighted to receive your letter and its enclosures. That Seminar must indeed have been impressive. The list of delegates is terrific as is the range of the papers and then the Chief Guests. I am surprised that you could attract so many V.I.P.s to listen to the problems of rural development.

The monthly reports were instructive. But I am not impressed by the trainees' evaluation of the Daudzai project. They only tell us their pet ideas. I would suggest that we should now go slow on the trainees' visits and evaluations and let the project officers continue their work in peace. Let their be documentation only for a few months. The time for evaluation will come later.

I would also like to suggest that Ghulam Habib and Motaher

Shah should write a daily diary, briefly noting each days' work and conversations. They can write in whatever language is convenient to them—English or Urdu. At the end of each month the two diaries may be bound in files. If they could be sent to me I would return them with my comments. The real problem now is to get ahead with even two or three projects. Their execution will teach us to do better planning.

Frank Miller of the Ford Foundation wanted my advice about a consultant for the Academy. My reply to him is enclosed. Please forward it to him after you have read it, with your comments.

Thanks for your interest in the Diary. Greetings to your wife and children.

Yours sincerely,
Akhter Hameed Khan

Encl: Original (not copy)
letter to Frank Miller.

Michigan State University, East Lansing

3rd June 1973

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

I have read the project reports with pleasure and satisfaction. These are definitely good reports. I think we have got going. Let me, however, make one or two comments. (1) We need more details about the persons in each place, viz those who have expressed interest in organising the project. The Cooperative Officers, Ghulam Habib and Motaher Shah should carefully study such persons. The success or failure of the projects will ultimately depend on local leaders. (2) It must always be kept in view that organisation is supremely important—more important actually than the completion of the project. The local people must do the work. Engineers should be left with estimates, blueprints etc., but keep the contractors out. Supervision, and the work must be under the control of project committees. If the contractors have to be entrusted with the work, even then the tenders must be called by the local committee. The Engineer should be only an adviser. You will see the wisdom of this procedure later. Just now resist the temptation of paternalism. (3) And also please resist all temptation for using power or force to solve a dispute. That would be fatal. A dispute should be settled amicably. If not just wait. Have more

discussions. More talks. No streamrollers. No dictatorships. Beware of the military mentality. We have plenty of time. We can wait for the democratic process to work slowly. (4) And, as you have said, complete as many projects as can be taken up immediately. One or two projects completed promptly will change the climate of opinion in Daudzai. (5) Let the Engineers concentrate on roads, drainage and flood control. Avoid entanglements with Schools and dispensaries. Those are simple enough for contractors.

I shall now wait for Ghulam Habib's and Motaher Shah's diaries—tell me about persons by name—their age background, interest etc. When I think of Daudzai I want to return to Peshawar and work with the Project Officers. And I think I will do that, if you are still there in April 1974. I have agreed to accept appointment as Prof. Emeritus in Baluchistan University. When I settle down in Quetta, will you invite me to spend half my time in Peshawar. You need not pay me exorbitantly as you did last time.

Yours sincerely,
Akhter Hameed Khan

Michigan State University, East Lansing

27th June, 1973

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

Your letter and reports reached here yesterday. More progress, obviously and you are now running into your first difficulties. Here are my comments:

Organization

I must emphasize again the need for local leaders. The time has come to appoint and train them. The cooperative officers or the Engineers will not be able to look after the many projects in the many villages they have already got. They must work through local agents. I suggest that a good and energetic local worker be now appointed as an Inspector for three or more adjoining village projects. He should be trained by going around with the Ex Off. and the Engineers and then continue to visit the village projects and report weekly to the E. Os & Eng. Give the Inspectors salaries and encourage them to work whole time. Organising and reporting in *writing*. Inspectors again must work through the village managers. Start holding weekly meetings of all the managers and the

Inspectors, to discuss the progress individually and in detail. That is how they will learn. That is how cadres are trained. Place a proper budget with E.O. for this purpose. Inspector's Managers T.A's etc. It would be a good investment. It will create local skill and it will make the E.O. and Eng. effective. Train the Managers for keeping muster rolls and measuring the work and keeping the accounts.

Publicity

Be careful of the Pakistani type publicity. It is worse than useless. It is harmful. You have three audiences. (1) The villagers themselves, (2) the policy makers and officers, (3) the reading public. For the (1) best course is to prepare slides of actual work and tape recording of interviews of those who have done work. Begin with slides of road and irrigation or flood control projects. You are about to do and record the views of those who are doing them. Display these in other villages and in the training class of managers and inspectors. Also let the actual good workers speak themselves when the slides are shown. Thus you mobilize the reluctant or ignorant villagers. For (2) depend on well documented reports and monograph produced by the Academy's researchers. Circulate them discreetly. For (3) *Wait* till some more work has been done and at *long* intervals invite the gentlemen of the press to see and examine. Let them talk with the village workers not the Academy staff. Let them hear from the horse's mouth, not our mouth.

Progress

Don't try to go too fast. It is no use. Just the important thing is to complete a few projects and effectively organise the villagers *through* Inspectors and Managers. E.O's and Eng's will themselves learn much from these early projects. They have to learn. They must learn carefully. Don't bother about targets. The real target is success not failure, not bogus statistics. And *document every* thing. Keep records and photographs. Above all get the local leaders. Each successful project should mean the emergence of a local organiser. Cherish them like gold and diamonds. Train them constantly, listen to them. Establish weekly meetings. Don't expect the Ex. Off or Eng. to be present every where in every village.

Survey

For the time being, I am sorry to insist the E.Os and Eng. must live the life of gypsies. Let them stay in the villages. Later they should be able to find accommodation in villages close to Nahaqi. Why should you make mud houses at Nahaqi. I found your mud houses horrible. Why not rent houses in the villages. Encourage the private investor. But if you *have* to make houses, make them habitable. No hovels please and sanitary latrines and pucca floors.

This should be enough for this month. I will write to you again and not so dogmatically.

Yours sincerely,
Akhter Hameed Khan

Michigan State University East Lansing, Michigan 48823

JULY 31st, 1973

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

Your letter with enclosures reached me yesterday. Before these I had received the diaries for May. I am returning all the four diaries so that you may keep them in the research section. These are valuable documents for present and future reference, and should be preserved in well bound files. Ghulam Habib and Motaher Shah should read them at intervals to refresh their memory. They would also become aware, like me, of the progress they are making. They have really started to learn their job. As I read these diaries I feel sorry about my decision to leave Pakistan for a year. I should have stayed on in Peshawar. The fact which persuaded me to leave was my uncertainty of *your* not staying as Director for very long. This still bothers me. One day you may suddenly leave and the project may hang in the air. Do you realize what great response you are getting even before you have accomplished anything for the people. Imagine what would happen when some roads have been built and some flood control and irrigation measures have been completed.

I am pleased with the slow and steady approach of the E.Os and the Engineers. I am glad they are not rushing headlong and are not steam rolling opposition. It is good to leave disputed territory. In course of time the people who are fighting and doubting now will have second thoughts when they see the progress in other places.

Yes the important thing is to secure progress somewhere. And I am glad that Motaher and Habib have decided to be wary of the Khans and to avoid forming "one man's cooperatives." The project will succeed if it retains its bias for and its identity with the small farmers. The Khans will also come along later. It is good not to let them capture the organisation at the very beginning. The attitude towards them should not be one of *hostilitd*. We do not want to destroy them. We only want to *restrain* them and that would be possible only if the cooperative is organised and controlled primarily by the small farmers. I am sure they are ready—as ready as the labourers are for trade unions. In my opinion small farmers cooperatives should be their trade unions. Big farmers and Khans will not be excluded but will be controlled, as the employers are controlled by labourers unions.

Now a few important suggestions:

Accounts

In a movement involving large numbers of very distrustful persons (cheated so many times) a very strict system of accounting is essential, if you want to prevent an early collapse. I would therefore request you to take the following steps:

(1) A whole time trained accountant (preferably a young B. Com) should be appointed at once as the next member of the Cooperative—Engineers—Road—Drainage team.

(2) He should be trained to supervise two systems of accounts—*(i)* for the cooperatives *(ii)* for the Road—Drainage—Irrigation works project.

(3) The Cooperative System should follow the departmental pattern (Cooperative Department) in its cash book, ledgers, pass book etc. The works account should be based on the previous system followed in the works programs—abstract—estimates—muster rolls—voucher books, ledgers. The accountant should have enough sets of these to be supplied to each Society and Project Committee.

(4) The Cooperatives and the Works Accounts should be kept entirely separate. The Works accounts (muster roll etc.) should be secured by the Project accountant after the completion of the works and kept in a safe for future audit. The Cooperative accounts should remain with the Society.

(5) A whole-time Secretary-accountant should be appointed for

each project for its duration (1 month, 2 month or more as the case may be). He should be local man and should get as much salary as a teacher. All such secretaries should be trained by the Project Accountant and the Engineer and called for inspection of accounts fortnightly to the Centre. Advance for the next fortnights work may also be made at the same time jointly to the Secretary and two other members of the Project Committee. All expenditure during the fortnight must be properly accounted for.

(6) For the Cooperatives a separate accountant must be appointed—1 for 3 or 4 cooperatives. He must be a local resident able to visit each society once every week and write up the registers and pass books. All such accountants should come for a fortnightly training and inspection session with the Project Accountant and bring the Society books with them.

(7) You should soon register a central cooperative association and receive all deposits made in the societies for safe-keeping (in their own names) with a bank at the Centre.

All this is important—crucial for future success or failure. That is why I feel so strongly that I should have been personally present to outline it for the officers.

Training

Our training, as pointed out in the reports, cannot be conducted by the old Cooperative Officers. This training is something quite different. Its contents are as follows:

(1) To bring together the selected local workers (managers, presidents, accountants, secretaries) together frequently to *meet each other* and to *meet the officers*. The technique is to let them learn by mutual discussion. The good workers, as they proceed, teach the less good workers. That is the first aim.

(2) To impart to the local workers a higher standard of skill in their jobs: accounts for the accountants, accounts and management for the managers—measurement etc., for managers and secretaries of works project. Each group may need a different skill. Now accounts should be taught by the Accountant, measurement by the Engineers, Cooperative organisation by Motaher and Habib. The team which is working in the field and is familiar with the conditions and the workers is the best team of trainers.

(3) Therefore I suggest a fortnightly training program, in the middle and beginning of each month. On those two days (and it

should be just one day) the Engineers the Executive Officers (Motaher and Habib), the Project Accountant, should devote themselves exclusively to the training and discussion sessions: scheduling it like a school routine—hour by hour. Do not make it weekly at present. Let it be fortnightly. Notes should be taken of the discussion and instruction material should be prepared. Chalk and black-board must be used frequently. Good work during the fortnight should be specially highlighted and the good workers encouraged to be the real teachers.

(4) The old Cooperative Officers function will be mainly to audit the accounts. If he can be persuaded to do concurrent audit each month, it would be very helpful for the village accountants. It would train them excellently. But this audit should be done at the Centre, the village accountant fetching all the books. In Comilla the Cooperative directorate had given us special auditors who used to complete the audit each month one officer was in-charge of 15 Societies. You might ask the Registrar for one auditor to assist the Daudzai Cooperative Officer. The two should be able to manage for the time being.

Do not give the rest of the training job to the auditors. Let them stick to accounts and audit.

Documentation

Now that some projects have been started I would urge that audio visual documentation should be organised. The best method would be for the Engineer and Executive Officer to outline the documentation: e.g.

- “photography of work site”
- “photo depicting problem”
- “discussion and planning meeting—manager & secretaries”
- “recruitment of labour”
- “shots depicting work”
- “shots of payment”
- “purchase of material—issue of stocks”
- “keeping of accounts”
- “completed work”
- “Benefits of the project”
- “finally tape recordings—relation by manager—president—secretary—some of the labourers—interviews—all in Pushto.”

When the outline is completed the team should requisition the Academy's photographers and tape recorders from time to time. I would allow only one photograph of the team itself at the end—just one and no more. And no photograph of Shoaib Sultan Khan C.S.P—None. Each project would thus be documented by slides and tapes. These are both cheaper and more effective than movies. In a few months you would have quite a refertory.

Finally one warning. The Academy's research officers should be careful about *advising*. For the time being let them just record—observe and record. Go slow on too rapid an evaluation and go *very very* slow on advising. Leave the field officers alone. They are learning their job in the right way i.e. from the people and from experience.

Next time in your monthly meeting let the Executive Officers attempt to compile an annotated list of good local workers who are emerging. Send me this list. Best wishes and don't go away from the Academy. We will soon have the best project in Pakistan.

Yours sincerely,
A.H. Khan

Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, 48823

AUGUST 24, 1973

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

Thanks for the reports and the diaries. Here are my comments:

(1) *Consolidation*: I think we have reached a point where for the time being, consolidation is more important than expansion. So I suggest a slight pause in organising new societies and starting new projects. A slight pause—let us say of about two months or better 3 months. During these months the visits to the established societies and projects should be more frequent. The purpose of the pause is to study the growing process more closely and solve the problems while they are still few in order to solve them when they are many. The special aspects of consolidation are as follows:

(2) Meetings of the societies and thrift deposits. Regularity of both must be thoroughly established. Of course there would be a few failures, but that need not worry us as long as the percentage of failure remains small. I would say, at this stage, that if one out of five societies fizzles out, it would be tolerable. Even two though dangerously near the margin. But 3 out of 5 would be tragic. Now

thrifths and meetings would depend very much on the *managers* and the inspectors. They must really be convinced themselves and should then convince the members of the danger of indifference—of the utter necessity of attendance and deposits. If any-one absents he should send his deposit and explain his absence. To convince the managers is the function of the Cooperative Officers.

(3) *Training*: Make it fortnightly but make it thorough. And there must be a constant repetition of the basic themes: organise, unite, meet regularly, discuss, control, assume responsibility, give time and money, learn new techniques. There must be lot of discussions—questions and answers—discourses by good workers—review of bad work. That is how the cadre of managers will emerge. I warn again that the managers must be small farmers themselves—not big. Literacy is not as important as we think. Very soon the accounts will be kept by a separate accountant. What is important is that the manager must feel responsible to his group—be ready to be their servant not their master. Persuade the illiterate ones to become literate. Run a special course for them. I can safely predict that where the society disintegrates it will be due to a bad manager. In that case the Cooperative Officer should call all the members and urge them to select a better manager. Such changes will go on for quite a time. Possibly one in 5 of the early managers will drop out.

(4) *Accounts*: I cannot overemphasize the importance of punctual and honest account keeping. Please get the Project accountant and the village accountants (1 for 3 or 4 cooperatives) quickly in place. Get the proformas of the account books, vouchers, muster rolls etc—printed and train the village accountants or the project secretaries thoroughly. Arrange regular checking of the accounts. Moreover at every village meetings the account must be read out and explained to the members and their objections answered. Any neglect here will soon bring disaster. Impress on the managers the need for open and honest accounting of the funds to the members.

(5) Arrangements have now to be made that the share and deposit money does not remain in the hand of the manager. It must be deposited regularly in a bank account of the society operated jointly by the manager and the chairman. Inspectors and Cooperative Officers must check this pass-book at the fortnightly training conference and explain its importance to the members when they visit the village. Each member must have his own in-

dividual pass book and its entries must be updated regularly by the village accountant from the rough cash book of the manager.

(6) But please don't call any big wigs to over-whelm the poor workers. Next time perhaps when they have learnt how not to be over whelmed. I would very much like to read the report of such a conference with annotated biographies of the participants and their present work.

(7) I notice that the two eternal problems which we faced in Comilla are appearing in your program. One was the conflict between the Academy Staff and the Project Staff. The other was the attempt of pretentious leaders to by pass the village organization and secure the direct support of the Project. We solved the first by confining the Academy's role more and more to observation and restraining the natural impulse to advise and criticize. We solved the second only by resolutely working only through the village organization and its accredited representatives. If anyone wanted to be a local leader he was advised to seek local support. We were neutral in the fight for local leadership. There is no need for rudeness; but there is great need for firmness. Let us avoid such entanglement. For us whoever is recognized by the group is the real representative. We do not represent anybody nor do we nominate anyone as a representative.

(8) Now the proposal that there would soon be 30 IRDP's does not make me happy. We have not yet set up one Markaz properly *تہ کار زمین را نکوساختی کہ با آسمان نیز برداختی* Let us concentrate on Daudzai. On its Road and Drainage, on its first cooperatives, on accounts, on training, on project execution, maintenance. Let us document all this properly. May be we will be able to tell the other Markazes something next year.

(9) The talk of starting a Mandi at Nahaqi Markaz is premature. You really don't have any cooperative substructure, as yet. Not yet. As yet you are only tempting the groups to come together by giving them lots of money to build roads and drains, let us wait till the real cooperative emerge. You don't have even a cooperative association and you don't have a credit programme. When we have expanded our credit programme we will think of combining it with marketing—not yet. Let us walk patiently. We have a long way to go.

AKHTER HAMEED KHAN

Michigan State University, East Lansing

5th September 1973

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

This is my third letter of the month and it is to inform you that I am going on 10th October for a fortnight visit to Addis Ababa. I will return on the 25th October. So I hope there won't be any delay in sending my comments on the next report.

'Recently I happened to read my "Tour of Twenty Thanas" written in February 1971. Here I found a thorough discussion of the concept of IRDP and its problems. If you have a copy in your library you should duplicate for your officers and trainees. You can also publish the Introductory Chapters in your Journal. This Chapter summarises and pin points the main issues.

If your library does not have a copy please inform me and I will arrange to send one.

Ted Owens of AID is coming from Washington to attend Col. Sadeq's grand show. Can you make sure (through Wheeler etc.) that Ted visits Daudzai before his return to U.S.A. Keep him for a whole day. He is a thinker and writer and is becoming very influential in policy making. Please don't tell about my instigation. This is secret. Bring the other Experts too but not as a big herd. Be selective. And surely bring Ted separately.

Yours sincerely,
A.H. Khan.

Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan-48824
Office of the Dean of International Students and Programs
202 Center for International Programs—September 28, '73

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

The jibe is on me. I now realize that I was the culprit behind the P.C. Form. The fact is that sometimes the dreamer in me goes far ahead of the organizer. Please give me a week to ponder over the plan and I will let you know my opinion.

The comments on the Daudzai project are enclosed under various heads. I am becoming repetitive partly because repetition cannot be avoided and partly because I am a kind of absentee land lord. Over and above the comments I want to make two general observations. The first one is about the attitude which you should

promote among the villagers. The great temptation is to pose as God or Emperor. That is what the villagers want—a benign providence who yields to entreaty and prayer. But it is a fatal pose because the Markaz cannot perform these roles. It should present itself as a partner, as an organizer. The people should be repeatedly told that this much can be done for them *if* (IF) they would do that much themselves i.e. organise, unite, assume responsibility and control, give time and money, learn new techniques, manage, select leaders etc. And it must be made clear that the powers of the Markaz are very limited. Every thing cannot be provided and somethings cannot be provided quickly. The people themselves will have to work hard and become disciplined. It must be made clear that individual service will not be given. This service is much demanded especially by the privileged. To this end special personal relationships, visits to officers home etc., should be discouraged. They soon and inevitably lead to favouritism, corruption, rumours, and factions, Official and collective relationship is safest under our conditions. I was struck by Mr Bhatti's suggestion that the Markaz should be open 24 hours a day. That is a wrong estimation of our capacity. That may be necessary for a hospital or a police station.

The Markaz should work like a normal office, open and close at proper times and the people must learn to observe the timing. In our attempt to emulate God (who never sleeps or doses) or a King (who pretends to be like God) we may overstrain ourselves and will soon lose our credibility. Let the officers do an honest days work and then relax. Work will begin again next day. I noticed that Capt. Israruddin inspite of his sandow physique looked tense and his eyes had red streaks. Let him relax and let others do so. They can organize and co-ordinate and provide some services but they cannot move mountains by force. They will become more effective only when the people are more organized and more disciplined.

My second observation is about writing a little pamphlet to explain the functions of the Markaz, the Cooperative Unit and Water and Road Units—their functions and their modus operandi. This pamphlet (about 10-15 pages) would be written for the villagers (master version in Urdu-translation in Pushto). It should be written by a team (Pr. Mang, Cooperative Officer (Mother & Habid and the Engineers) and edited by perhaps Mr Alvi. (Send me a

copy.) The pamphlet should emphasise the partnership, the limitation the importance of popular organization and discipline. It should then describe the approach. How the problems are investigated by the Water & Road Engineers, how they survey and make blue-prints. Then why village organization is essential, how it is introduced. Then how the work is done, what is the source of funds (emphasise the limitation). Then how it will be maintained. Then how the society will function, Emphasise thrift, weekly meetings, joint action. Describe how manager will perform his duties, how accounts will be kept. Then describe how improved methods will be adopted through training of model farmers etc. Finally mention, (just mention) the possibility of loans if (IF-IF) equity capitals, deposits and shares are raised and IF loans are repaid punctually. I am sure that a very good pamphlet can be written by the team on the basis of their experience. Another little pamphlet about 4 pages or so may describe the work done in the best village (I suppose Garhi Karimdad). We would pour forth a stream of such pamphlets, gradually improving the contents and style and there would be a great demand for them from other areas. The field work is training our officers and Engineers and they will train others.

Accounts

Proper organisation of accounts is now extremely urgent. The system will be as follows:

(a) *Project Account*: He will be the teacher and trainer of P.A. (b) village accountants. Will keep proformas of all registers, (cash book, ledgers) vouchers, receipt books etc. For the convenience of the village societies copies of these should be stocked for sale. The societies should not have to go anywhere else for these papers. PA should keep in touch with their department. The Rural Business Management Instructor of the Academy should help in this respect and himself specialize in their accounts.

The village accountant must be recruited locally like the inspectors. (I prefer Inspector to Supervisor.) They must be residents of their area. Education upto class VIII should be enough. Each will keep the accounts of 3 or 4 societies.

It must be realized that the manager and the accountant must always be two separate persons. The manager should not write the account books and the accountant should never handle cash.

This is a fundamental principle. Its neglect always leads to trouble.

The village accountants should be given intensive (2 weeks training) at the Academy (preferably residential). After that they should bring the account books fortnightly to a training class at the Centre for checking by the Auditors (The old Cooperative officers). The Coop; auditors service should be fully utilized for streamlining the accounting system.

Village accountants will be wholtime employees of the Markaz federation (Not the societies) and should be paid regular salaries. This would prove a good investment. Their scale may be fixed according to qualifications and local grades. Two scales may be started to begin with (a) for matriculates (b) for non matrics. It must be made clear to the candidates that this is not a part time job, and that discipline will be quite strict. Six monthly exams should be arranged to upgrade their skill. The cadre of village accountants will be only a little less important than the cadre of managers.

It may be considered to ask for the deputation of a departmental auditor as an accountant for the Project if you are having difficulty in recruiting a B.Com. In any case the Coop: auditor must be fully associated with accounting although we have not used him for organisation.

The above paragraphs refer to Cooperative accounts. For works accounts the system is different. They should not be fixed. As I have explained before the each works (Roads and Drains) account should be closed with the completion of the single project and the papers deposited for future audit by the R.G.'s representative. The two Engineers should familiarize themselves with the accounting system for works as should the Academy P.I. Instructor.

Each project committee must engage a separate accountant (Secretary) for the duration of the work. The manager should not keep the accounts. There is no conflict here. We are not dismissing the manager. He does the work—he buys material. He even keeps a rough cash book. But we must have a separate account writer. This man disappears after the work is completed while the manager continues. There should be no difficulty about paying both the manager and the temporary accountant for the duration of the work. That is a necessary investment.

The payment of managers and accountants is important. Ini-

tially the societies cannot do it. Later we will get the funds from the societies where the volume of business (especially credit) has grown. For the time being the Markaz should be given a budget for paying managers and accountants. In the case of Road and Drainage work the payment can come out of the works fund. But the Cooperative accounts like the Cooperative inspectors must get a regular salary. For the managers a system of commission would provide better incentive. In Comilla the federation paid them as follows:

- (1) $\frac{1}{2}$ rupee per month for each active member.
- (2) 1% on collection for loans.
- (3) 15 rupees per month during the irrigation season (when a pump or tube well was in operation).
- (4) 5 rupees a day when a tractor was hired.
- (5) 1 rupee per maund on procurement of potatoes for cold storage.
- (6) $\frac{1}{2}$ rupee per maund for rice.

They also get a commission from the societies for joint purchase of fertilizer, seed etc., and they received travelling expenses. As you can see the manager of a thriving society was very well remunerated. If you want good cadre this has to be endured. You can expect hard work and honest service from a manager but not financial sacrifice. That is impractical in the long run.

The Federation

The federation now needs a budget. You have to scrape a grant from somewhere for the following purposes:

I. Federation Staff :

1. Coop. Officers.
2. Accountant
3. Village accountants

II. Training of village cadres:

1. Payment of managers
2. T.A. of managers, model farmers
3. T.A. of other Coop. members for training conferences.

The By-Laws: I feel sorry that I am not there to help directly in framing the by-laws as well as designing the accounts and training. I could have trained the officers in this process. Instructions from

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nine thousand miles away are a poor substitute especially as I feel uninformed about certain important issues. Any way here are a few points:

Functions:

(1) The federation will function as a Control Bank for the Primary Village societies. It will be affiliated directly to the Apex Coop Bank (provincial) (This is important).

(2) It will organise credit as well as raise shares and deposits. Its aim will be to collect within the next five years at least a 30 per cent collateral or equity capital in relation to its loan capital.

(3) It will supervise the credit through inspectors.

(4) It will arrange proper accounting through a cadre of village accounts.

(5) It will train a cadre of managers.

(6) It will arrange extension training for its members with the help of departmental experts, through managers and model farmers.

(7) It will gradually combine credit with marketing and processing.

Management

(1) For the first three years the Project Manager of Nahaqi Markaz will be nominated as Chairman of the Federation in order to ensure (a) proper coordination, (b) strict control and supervision of grant and loan funds.

(2) The first managing committee will be nominated by the R.C.S. for a period of one year on the recommendation of the Project Manager.

(3) After the completion of one year the managing committee will be elected each year by delegates from the primary societies.

(4) After the completion of 3 years the by-laws in respect of the Chairman may be revised if the federation's performances in respect of payment of loan and the collection of equity capital is satisfactory.

(5) The federation will have full time staff under the Chairman: (1) Senior Deputy Director organization; (2) Deputy Director accounts; (3) Deputy Director training; (4) Deputy Director Loans; (5) V. Inspector; and (6) V. Accountant.

Audit

The Registrar will be requested to depute special audit officers to audit currently the accounts of the federation as well as the accounts of the primary societies. The annual audit report will be published and circulated to all member societies not more than 3 months after the end of the financial year.

Meetings

(1) All member societies will pledge to hold a weekly general meeting whose proceedings will be properly kept. A register of attendance will be maintained at these weekly meetings.

(2) The managers will be required to attend weekly or fortnightly conferences at the federations headquarters.

(3) The federation will hold monthly meetings of its managing committee and six monthly general meetings of the delegates from each society.

Thrift and equity Capitals, Funds

The federation will promote thrift by taking a pledge from every member that he will make a deposit at the weekly meetings. The members will also be persuaded to buy shares at harvest times so that the federation may have a large equity capital.

The federation will receive grants and borrow loans. The federation will keep its fund with a Commercial Scheduled bank. It will not keep cash in its possession.

These are some important points. One of the instructors must become a specialist in this. A good deal of consultation with the Registrar would be necessary.

Training

The time is now ripe for compiling really useful extension training material. I suggest that Dr Shareef should take charge of this (if he is willing). He should collect all the published material put out by the dept. of agriculture, horticulture, forestry, animal husbandry etc. This should be sorted for what is relevant for Daudzai and then edited to fit into a Calendar of training. For instance wheat—a full course extending over several weeks beginning with seed selection and containing instructions on preparation of land, sowing, fertilization, weeding, irrigation, pest control, harvesting etc. Thus there may be 10 or 15 lessons arranged

according to season. Similarly for fruit trees, or cattle epidemics etc., may be the departments have already produced good instructional material. So much the better. If the Academy does it efficiently in Daudzai and the departmental officers get this properly arranged material across to the Coop: farmers, a pioneering work would have been accomplished. To call the farmers is easy but to teach them properly is difficult. Even more difficult is to make expert instructions really useful for the small farmer. Let us attempt it.

Much of this material should be published in the shape of profusely illustrated pamphlets (line drawings only with a price). And it should always be sold, never given free.

Close collaboration with department will be essential. This is not an attempt by passing or parallel action. This is an attempt to adapt the experts teaching to field conditions: editing and arranging not inventing.

Road and Drainage Units

I am glad at the progress they have made. To consolidate what has been learnt, I am making one or two suggestions:

(1) We are getting ready for a plan. Let us therefore make a series of maps—Map I: shows the actual condition at the start i.e. April 1973. It shows the existing work. Map II shows the improvements demanded by the villagers as surveyed by the Engineer. Map III shows the work undertaken since April 1973 to end in April or June 1974. Map IV will show the work in 1974-75 and so on. Map II will be revised each year as Map II 1973 and Map II 1974.

(2) There would be two separate plan books, one for roads and the other for Drainage and Irrigation with separate maps. Make the Plan book fairly large with hard covers (30" × 30").

(3) It would be convenient to have subsidiary union maps too (thus map I union I, map I union 2 etc.).

You may think that I am asking for a lot of paper work. Yes. But it will serve several purposes. (a) It will make the work methodical. (b) It will provide ready training material when you start training the Engineers for other areas. (Inshallah.)

As soon as I return we will write our first annual report on the Daudzai Road and Drainage works to show how a Peoples Works Programme can be organised.

Tube-well

To install a tube well looks easy. But please wait. We must first set up a tube well unit so that the tube wells are not only sunk cheaply but are maintained properly. This is an elaborate affair and you may as well wait till I come back. If you sink one tube well, remember you will be flooded with a hundred requests and you have neither the funds nor the organisation for sinking even 25 tube-wells. Beware of contractors. We will organise our Lift Pump and Tube Well Unit which will bring down the costs and ensure proper servicing. Besides, the realization of recurring expenditure for pumps or wells is also a complicated matter and you may need my experience for that. Just now, concentrate on surface water—flood control, drainage, Irabs, Kathas etc. There is more than enough there.

Grouping

I notice that in some cases the group do not want to combine into one cooperative. From what I read I rather agree with them. There is no merit in a big group if it is not homogenous. Homogeneity and identity of interest is the real criterion not size. So do not insist on togetherness unnecessarily. Insist on identity of interest. Of course if there is a fundamental faction and the group cannot really come together even for a common purpose there could be no point in forming splinter groups. Just leave them alone till they see with their own eyes what united groups are doing.

Contractors

You have made my heart glad by keeping the contractors out. They have offered 15,000 rupees. They may even offer 1,50,000 rupees. And they will organise slandering campaigns. But as long as the vast majority of the people are appreciative of the work, the campaigns will fail. Remember to put the notice boards on the sites of completed projects to ensure wide publicity. Let there be much local publicity in other ways also. Go in first with your campaign before the contractors start theirs.

Finally, greetings and congratulations to CAPTIN ISRAR! the COOPERATIVE OFFICERS! the ENGINEERS! the RESEARCH OFFICERS! to MINH AJUDDIN and most of all to the Peach of a DIRECTOR SBOAIB SULTAN KHAN.

Yours sincerely,
AKHTER HAMEED KHAN

Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan-48824

1st October, 1973

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

I have read carefully the P.C. form. Whoever has written has done a good job. A good job to get started with. It is great that the Peshawar bosses have accepted the Thana concept. Its full benefits will put the frontier province ahead of the Punjab in ten years. My remarks are as follows:

(1) We have as yet only partially developed the Daudzai model. It is incomplete because: (a) there is no local Govt. (b) there is no Cooperative Federation with its separate budget and staff, (that is necessary because Coops. are private sector institutions not public or Govt.), (c) and because the Thana Centre buildings (including residential quarters) are still of a temporary nature. When I come back I hope to do further investigation and write a proposal for completing the mode. In the meanwhile we are proceeding with some fundamental work: (i) Coordination of deptt. activities, (ii) preparation of road and drainage plans and, (iii) exploration of organisational prototypes. I am not sure whether the same can be done in other thanas as they do not have the incomparable resources of the Academy. Nevertheless let us proceed.

(2) I should insist on at least 4 months training for each of the officers who will start a new project area. The team will be (1) Project Manager, (2) Coop. Officer Water—(3) Coop. Officer Roads. (4) Engineer Water (5) Engineer Roads, (6) Project Accountant.

These six persons must be trained thoroughly before being sent to their area and their practical training will consist of working in the Daudzai Project with their counterparts. Obviously you cannot train more than 2 teams at a time which cuts down the total to six teams a year.

(3) I think we are being unrealistic in thinking that in every thana an old discarded building will be readily available as it was fortunately in Nahaqi. It would be better to start with a suitable building as did in East Bengal. There are other points. But I don't want to put too many hurdles.

In October a Mr. John S. Rouse will contact you from Lahore. He is a Ph.D. student who has married a Lahore girl and is com-

ing to Pakistan for a years research. He would like to spend some-time at the Academy.

Yours sincerely,
AKHTER HAMEED

M.S U. East Lansing.

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

Here are comments on the papers relating to last month.

1. *Follow up:* A good deal remains to be done in respect of accounts and training. I hope that during November much progress would be made in both respect. I find no mention of the appointment of village accountants. Now that the Project accountant is in position the village accountants should also be recruited and trained. For the time being one accountant may write the accounts of five or six societies. Later as their work increases the number may have to be reduced to 3 or 4. Thus not one accountant may be attached to each supervisor forming a two men's team for a unit of 6 societies. The accountant should be a local resident and his training should be arranged at the Academy.

The first manual of cooperative societies accounts should have preformas of all registers, ledgers, vouchers, receipts, pass books, loan applicable forms, sureties etc., along with simple instructions.

The fortnightly training of the supervisors, accountants and managers should be held together.

The training calendar for agriculture should be prepared as early as possible by the A.E. instructor after collecting all published material from the departments.

For this purpose a one or two days conference of the projects technical staff should be held at the Academy. Proceedings should be recorded.


II. *Consolidation:* Having completed six months of experimental organization the Cooperative Officers are now ready for consolidating what they have learnt. The main thing is to understand that their effectiveness depends on training the following cadres:

- (1) Supervisors (or Inspectors) of six societies.
- (2) Accountants of six societies each.
- (3) Managers of each Society.

If the Cooperative Officers can train these cadres and guide their work the societies will be firmly established and it would become easier to enrol more societies.

If the cadres are not trained the Cooperative Officers will be bogged down and there would be no quick progress.

Let us look at this unit of organization:




Ghulam Habib has mentioned in his diary that he has recruited 2 (two) Supervisors and distributed the Societies among them. I hope Motaher will also do the same. Let the accountants be also recruited so that the team is completed.

This is consolidation. The Supervisors should be asked to keep diaries and the Cooperative Officers should read these diaries carefully and discuss all the problems as well as the progress in the training fortnightly conferences. The Cooperative Officers should alternatively accompany the Supervisors. The more intimately they come to know each other and the managers the easier it would be to guide the societies.

It must be clearly understood that the Cooperative Officer himself cannot do every thing. He cannot attend every meeting and give personal directions to every where. But he can do it through his trained cadres.

III. *Expansion:* Having established the pattern of the unit of organization further expansion can be under taken. I think each of the Cooperative Officers can have four units under him. The diagram will be as follows by the end of first year—



Of course the exact number does not matter. A unit may have six or seven or five Societies depending on the distances etc. But care must be taken that the inspector and accountant are not stretched too thinly. They must be able to visit each of their

societies at least once every week.

IV. *The Budget for Works:* I can see that you are running short of funds. There is so much work that has not been done for decades. But you must find more funds to maintain the momentum of the works. In the first year we must be able somehow to serve at least fifty societies. In the second year we should be able to solve the problems of another fifty. In the third year every village must be covered.

V. *The Unit of Cooperation Organization* is also the unit of water and road organization. Therefore the Supervisor, the accountant and the manager should be continuously trained by the Engineers too. The Supervisors, accountants and managers are cadres for social as well as physical engineering. Not only the execution but the future maintenance of works will depend on their skill.

VI. I notice that the cooperative groups are being used for agricultural extension. That is excellent. Let us enunciate one principle clearly. Increased production by small farmers required two conditions (1) learning of new skills and (2) a great deal of joint management (water distribution, fertilizer, seed procurement etc.). We should train the model farmers exclusively as an agricultural expert and train the managers for collective management. We should be careful not to give the best farmer any managerial duties or any discretionary powers in respect of recommending loans etc. That would mean the end of group solidarity.

VII. The manager and the group should be encouraged to undertake more responsibility for joint management. For instance pest control. In the case of the "Pyrilla," attack I would follow the procedure outline below: (1) The agricultural officer obtains the best expert instruction on its control. (2) He writes a little illustrated leaflet. (3) He calls the model farmers and managers and teaches them the methods and sells them the leaflet. (4) He secures the necessary pesticides and sprayers and demonstrates their use. (5) Then he lends the sprayers etc. (6) The manager and model farmers teach the members of their societies. (7) The members then do the work. (8) The society buys a sprayer and keeps it for future use.

Dependence on muqaddams, agriculture departments, labourers etc., should be entirely abolished.

The same procedure will apply for all common problems.

For instance, cattle epidemics: (1) Veterinary Officer writes a

pamphlet. (2) Manager and model farmers are trained. (3) Veterinary Officer fixes one day for each society for a vaccination visit. (4) Manager and model farmer keep all the cattle ready. (5) Veterinary Officer vaccinates all the cattle etc. (6) One member is selected for training as vaccinator.

VIII. We are fast approaching the problem of credit. But I leave it for future discussion.

I would like to have a description of one of the fortnightly training session. Let Ghulam Habib do it for me. (1) The attendance (who came) (2) The routine (what was taught or discussed) (3) The literature used (4) Any question asked (5) Any problems (6) What instructions for the next fortnight.

Finally I want to express my sympathy for Motaher Shah because he did not get any ghee at all. I am sure he need plenty of ghee to maintain his energy for the hard work he is doing. I strongly recommend that next time he should get a double quota.

AKHTER HAMEED KHAN

Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan

8th Jan. 1974

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

Here are my comments on the November reports and diaries.

How did the famous, the magnificent, international seminar on IRDP go in Lahore? Did it make sense. Were the world expert able to teach Col. Sadiq any thing? Does he want to learn a thing or does any one else. Did you go there? Tell me.

I find that you are having a lot of important visitors—Jamil Nishtar in Nov. and the Los Angeles Time Reporter. Are they impressed? Especially Jamil Nishtar?

How is the Govt. reacting to your project? The Govt. of NWFP Interest? Sympathy? The Govt. of Pakistan. Any interest hostile or favourable.

How are they getting on elsewhere? Col. Sadiq's IRDP and Latif Mirza's P.W.P.?

And finally tell me do you still want me to come to Peshawar? Honestly do you? Of course I am not changing my mind. It seems you did not go to London? I got a strange letter from your wife. Some body has persuaded her that he has got a real casket of real

Buddha bones. Great find. That should fetch him what a billion dollars? In his sleep.

Yours sincerely,
AKHTER HAMEED KHAN

Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan-48824

24th Jan. 1974

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

Today I have received two copies of my diary. I am very pleased with the get up. Thank you very much.

As soon as I arrive in Peshawar I will pay for 150 copies as I had promised. I hope that our friend YL will not suffer finally financial loss. That will make me most unhappy, but I will be ready to bear the loss myself. I also want to make sure that the Academy is not involved financially in this in any way.

I have sent you acopy of my tour of twenty thanas. That, if you like it, can reasonably be published by the Academy as it may prove a useful document to circulate.

About 25 packages of books and papers are being despatched by sea book post to me at the Academy's address. Please have them stored at the library if they arrive before me.

I am starting for Indonesia on 1st Feb. according to schedule.

Thanks again for the diary. I wonder if any one would be interested in my babbling. However--let us see.

Yours sincerely,
Akhter Hameed Khan

Michigan State University, East Lansing

2nd February, 1974

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

I received your packet just as I was leaving yesterday. As the next few days are going to be rather hectic, please excuse me for not commenting in detail. My stay in Indonesia may be shortened and probably I might be able to come to Peshawar in the last week of March. I will send you my Indonesia address when I reach Jokarta (10th Feb.). Tentatively a letter may reach

me C/O Mr. David Jordon—Representative World Bank (IBRD)
Jokarta-Indonesia.

Best wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Akhter Hameed Khan

THE PERSONAL LETTERS

Private

Michigan State University
East Lansing, Michigan-48823.
Office of the Dean of International
Students and Programs-202 Center
for International Programs.

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

This letter is not unlike the enclosed one for circulation. This is between you and me. You know the more I hear from the Daudzai Project the more I am tempted to settle in Peshawar and see this thing through. In my leisure hours at M.S.U. I have pondered over this question—should I become a recluse or should I use my hard earned experience for the well being of my poor countrymen. And though seclusion seems so pleasant, my conscience urges me not to choose it. Now perhaps you can help me to a decision. I feel that you have started something at the Academy which can provide me an opportunity to make a useful contribution to the development of rural areas. Recently I have received an offer of appointment as Professor Emeritus in the Economics Department of Baluchistan University. I would get a free house and fifteen hundred rupees per month. I consider this a very good offer and I have accepted it. But what is happening in Peshawar is so exciting for me that I am willing to change my decision. Now you give me your sincere advise. Should I decide to come to Peshawar or should I not. Would you as my well wisher recommend that I agree to serve as an Advisor with the Peshawar Academy? You know that I only seek an opportunity of working quietly with the village people and teaching others what I have learnt, I have few ambitions and I dont want prestige or status. I would be willing for the sake of doing rural work to accept terms which are not so good as that I am getting in Baluchistan. Would I be allowed to work. Would I

be welcome. Would you really want me to put my head in this noose.

Write me a letter so that I may decide my future course of action. All I want is a house to live, and some money to feed myself and an opportunity to do work which I like.

Enclosed is a paper I have written for a conferenc in Addis Ababa to be held in October. This paper is not for publication till the Conference is over.

Yours sincerely,
Akhter Hameed Khan

P.S. I read your letter again. Isn't it curious that in answer to your invitation to come for a week or ten days. I am offering to come and stay permanently. How do you like that. To come to Pakistan for ten days and then return to M.S.U. seems to me absurd. It is an extravagance which I cannot accept. I have informed Mrs. Inayatullah accordingly.

Private

Michigan State University
East Lansing, Michigan-48823.
Office of the Dean of International
Students and Programms—202 Center
for International Programms.
11th Sept. 1973.

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

I did not expect such prompt action. You are a peach. Dont worry about a making we unhappy (in the future). I cannot be made unhappy. All my affairs are thoroughly well-settled. Two of my daughters are married. The third will soon be a doctor. The boy is in college. I have put endowments aside for their education and for my wife and baby daughter. Thus I have met my liabilities. Inspite of the loss of some of my savings I have enough to sustain me and my family even if I do not earn anything else. So I am secure and thank God I am free from the disease of greed which gets very aggravated in old age. To my surprise I find that my services are in demand in many places. I have many offers even here in the U.S., from the World Bank, Agriculture Council, M.S.U., etc. There was an interesting proposal from Douglas

Ensinger that I should agree to become a R.D. Advisor to President Nyerere of Tanzania. So you see how can an old man like me be afraid. I did not demand any security, guarantee of tenure for me. What I wanted to make sure was that (1) you really want me to come, and (2) you are interested enough in the dev. job to desire to stay on. Of course I know that in Govt. service one can never be sure. But you are senior enough and the Academy's Directorship is obscure enough to allow you to be left there till the models are clearly established. You have satisfied me in every way. I shall now await your instructions. Spiritually I have already committed myself to Peshawar and the Academy. Thanks.

We will have a great time creating something bigger than Comilla.

Yours sincerely,
Akhter Hameed Khan

Personal:

28th October, 1973

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

Thanks for two letters. I am writing to the Chief Secretary indicating my acceptance of the Board's offer. I hope to join within a few days of my return (1st week of April 1974).

For the last part of October, I was absent from East Lansing as I had gone to a workshop in Addis Ababa. I returned two days ago. So there may have been some delay in replying to your letters.

(By the way, please ask your despatcher to wrap the papers more securely as at least there packages have arrived in tatters.)

I am sorry to hear that your wife is under treatment in London. Especially, as I have come to think poorly about doctors as physicians. They are good surgeons and very poor physicians. Let us hope that the change of scene will do her good. She worries too much about Pakistan.

I am also sorry that you would be absent for several weeks at this formative stage of the project. Your leadership has seemed essential for its progress. However let us hope that your deputy will continue to provide the same support. As you must have realized it is quite a jugglers job to keep the Academy and the Project pulling together in the same direction.

The delegation to Somalia etc., is a mere waste of time. I refused

outright when I was asked. I said I would rather go and work in Peshawar.

The Daudzai Project is approaching a critical phase. You have aroused the peoples expectations. You have also shown how a lot of work can be done effectively. Now a great deal of consolidation is needed—clearly defining the unit of organisation and establishing conventions of organisational work. At the same time further funds have to be obtained to ensure that more projects are completed. And we have to start thinking of creating a good system of credit and deposits for our members. The best of your ability is needed for the next two or 3 years.

With highest regards,

Yours sincerely,
Akhter Hameed Khan

MICHIGAN REVISITED

Michigan State University,
Department of Agricultural Economics,
216-Agricultural Hall,
East Lansing, Michigan-48824
Dated: 22nd Jan-1975

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

I joined here on the 1st of January. On 12th I went to Hawaii. The paper I read there is being sent to you under separate cover. Now I am engaged in teaching a course on rural development to a graduate class of about 20 students.

I did not receive copies of the 1st and 2nd reports in Karachi upto 28th December when I left. Can you send two or 3 copies each of the report plus 3 copies of the Daudzai review. There is much interest in Daudzai here.

I am sure everything is going on smoothly at the Academy and in the Projects. How was the first monthly conference of Project Managers. What is the position about the German proposal. I hope the Government is not again changing policies and personnel.

I shall welcome a letter from you although I know fully that as long as you are there, things will soon be alright, even if they are not alright now greetings to colleagues.

Yours sincerely,
Akhter Hameed Khan

Michigan State University
 Department of Agricultural Economics,
 216-Agricultural Hall,
 East Lansing, Michigan-48824.
 Dated: 3rd February, 1975.

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

Your letter and enclosures of 15th January reached me today. Perhaps the delay was due to their being registered. (Kindly note my room No. 216-Agri. Hall—that will expedite delivery.) I am very pleased with the news of German Aid being at last finalised. Who convinced the Ag-minister and how. Is the Daudzai approach really the same as cooperative farming. Of course it is, what else could it be. I am also happy to see the conference proceedings. At last the Project begins to move—thanks to you. You have to keep it up for at least two years. Then you will see real results, even the bosses of Islamabad will see—even the great colonel. I hope the December report was compiled in time, and I hope you got the budget transferred. I very much wanted to rearrange the statement of accounts after getting the grant. How it was to be done was explained to Tariq.

Now about the consultants. I am afraid that we are not likely to get any good consultant. McBride or Stevens are not available. I talked with them. Tomorrow I am meeting the Dean of Ag-engineering. He wants to send a Ph.D. candidate but that would be more useful to him than to us. And about accounts and cooperative management, I am afraid, we will have to work at it ourselves, when I come back you should pay me 5% more salary and I will teach accounts and business management to all concerned. (Deduct my 5% from their salaries.) Seriously this seems to be the only way—this plus engaging trained Pakistani like Tariq, and engaging Chartered Accountants etc. I am confident that within 3 months of my return we will take care of the accounts and the cooperatives. In Comilla also I was the best expert on these (Down with modesty). I suggest that you keep a fairly large amount in the Ford Aid for engaging Pakistani experts. And please don't be in a hurry to spend the Ford money except on things and persons really useful to us. Our position is strengthened by not wasting or spending uselessly. Best wishes—and greetings to everybody.

Yours sincerely,
 Akhter Hameed Khan,

P.S. Please charge my wife for using the Academy vehicles or long distance calls. She has some wrong ideas in this respect. I must pay all the bills as soon as I come back.

Dated: 20th Feb. 1975

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

The enclosed letter to Dr Wood is sent to you. If you approve of the invitation to Achi Ishaq then make a formal request to Dr Wood. I think Dr Ishaq's training and experience would be extremely useful for us. I have met him several times and have been quite impressed. He is young and energetic and quite willing to spend a lot of time walking with the Engineer in the villages.

I hope everything is going on smoothly at the Academy and in the project in spite of the turmoil in the province about which I have read in the papers. I have not received the project report for December or January.

Best wishes,

Yours sincerely,
 Akhter Hameed Khan

Dated: 3rd March, 1975

Dear Shoaib,

This is in reply to your letter of Feb. 18th—the letter which speaks about our friend the late Sherpao. You have indeed suffered a great loss; but let us hope that the support to our programme will continue and let us hope and pray that we will not suffer the fate of Bangladesh.

I am very pleased with the reports for December and your case study of Daudzai. It seems that even in December the project did not get its full budget. However, was it alright in January. I feel a great urge to return as soon as possible to be with you in the time of troubles. My course ends on 31st March, but unfortunately I have to stay on for a rural development seminar which does not end till the middle of April. So now my arrival in Peshawar will be early in May. This I suppose will not inconvenience you. I have already informed my wife. (Thanks for taking good care of my family, but please don't let them use the Academy vehicles and telephone without full payment and don't give them anything extra.)

I wrote to you about Achi Ishaq's appointment as a consultant for irrigation on 20th Feb. You must have finalised it by now. Please cable result to me and to Achi Ishaq.

As regards John Thomas. It is an excellent arrangement. So make it as soon as you can.

The P.C. form looks very good. When will it be approved.

I hope you are keeping Tariq Durrani with you. Dont let him go till I come back. Even after that we will try to keep him. If necessary we can use the Ford grant to finance his stay.

With best wishes and hopes.

Yours sincerely,
Akhter Hameed Khan.

Dated: 27th March, 1975.

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

I have finished teaching my course, but have been detained for a seminar. However I hope to join the Academy in the first week of May. This is final and there wont be any more delay. I will let you know of the time of the flight after my arrival in Karachi. I am sorry for missing one month at this time. The visitors (Vernon Ruttan of ADC being the most recent) give me very encouraging reports.

I am looking forward to my return.

Yours sincerely,
Akhter Hameed Khan.

28th March, 1975.

Dear Shoaib Sultan,

I got the reports and your letter just as I was leaving for New York. I see that you are carrying the IRDP forward very vigorously. Javed Musharraf will indeed prove a great leader. The annex to the P.C. reads well and is extremely convincing. Get enough copies of it to the World Bank and the AID. I notice that as usual the World Bank is about to be a disruptive factor in the Frontier P too. Dont let them. Please keep Tariq Durrani firmly in Peshawar.

As regards Achi Ishaq, the F.F. should not ask me to negotiate the terms. I dont know these as well as the F.F. Let them make

the same offer to Dr. Ishaq as they generally make to a consultant of his qualifications (and these are very high) and do it fast. I am not to be involved any further. Thanks for looking after my family.

I will soon be back.

Yours sincerely,
Akhter Hameed Khan.

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- ²⁰The material in this chapter had previously appeared in the RCD Magazine Vol. 3 No. 1 1976 published from Tehran. The author would like to acknowledge the assistance received from Mr S. M. Z. Rizi, Deputy Director PARD, in writing of this article.

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